The Summit in Beijing, August–December 1975

117. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Habib), the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Gleysteen), the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lord), and Richard H. Solomon of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger[1]

Washington, August 4, 1975.

Partial Steps Toward Normalization of U.S./PRC Relations in Conjunction with the President's Trip to Peking

1. As you asked in our meeting of July 7,[2] we have examined whether there are further steps short of full normalization which we might take in conjunction with the President's trip this fall to sustain the momentum in U.S./PRC relations. Bearing in mind the need not to stir up excessively those who are opposed to a changeover in relations, we have looked at moves which would:

—indicate to people in the United States, PRC, and elsewhere that we are continuing to move toward full normalization of relations.
—signal the Soviets that our relationship with the PRC remains sound.
—ease doubts among PRC elements who may question wisdom of Peking's acquiescing in normalization delays.
—discourage Taiwan from assuming there had been a setback or that it could exploit the lack of dramatic movement in our relations with Peking.

2. We find that the concept of an interim step has some merit as an alternative for reaching full normalization this year (or as a fallback in the event such an attempt were authorized and proved unsuccessful). There is, we think, some possibility of devising adequately balanced U.S. and PRC measures which would not involve major concessions on our part or invite serious domestic criticism. Even though the Chinese might be hard to budge, they might see the advantage of small, matched concessions to provide an aura of success at the summit.

---

[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, Box 5, China, unnumbered items (17), 8/4/75–8/31/75. Secret; Nodis.

[2] The meeting was on July 6; see Document 113.

3. Nevertheless, the boundaries for an interim step are quite narrow. Peking continues to set three political preconditions to full normalization: breaking diplomatic relations with Taipei and recognition of Peking "as the sole legal government of China;" full withdrawal of the American military presence from Taiwan and abrogation of our defense treaty with the ROC; and U.S. recognition of Taiwan as part of China.

4. For the purpose of this paper, we assume that domestic and international constraints will prevent us from fully and explicitly accepting any of these conditions at this time. However, we could touch on these various conditions by unilateral statements going beyond those we made in the Shanghai Communiqué. We would not, of course, wish to go so far as to make a major unilateral concession in the absence of agreement on other elements of a final normalization package. Without the elements of reassurance that would hopefully be included in full normalization arrangements, we would also have to be especially careful not to panic Taiwan and its supporters in this country.

5. A second category of steps—which hopefully might be combined with any political statements—would involve agreement with the Chinese on practical issues such as claims, exchanges, trade, or governmental relations (branch liaison offices, etc.). Agreement along these lines, which would require some shift in PRC positions, would convey a sense of strengthened ties and continuing momentum toward normalization.

Political Half Steps

6. *One China Formulations.* As a sign of political movement we could make a unilateral statement in the communiqué taking us beyond our Shanghai Communiqué position of not challenging the view that "all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China." Short of a direct affirmation, which would seem premature in this context, the most far-reaching formulation would be a fairly clear though indirect acknowledgment that "Taiwan is part of China." (See Tab 1).[3] Such an important concession on our part, even if accompanied by progress on practical issues, would entail rather serious risks. In the absence of some offsetting statement about our concern for Taiwan's security, it would intensify anxieties on Taiwan, possibly to the danger point, and it would almost surely come under attack in this country from both self-determinationists and more conservative supporters of the ROC. We

[3] Tab 1, attached but not printed, contains draft language for "formulation indirectly acknowledging Taiwan as part of China."

would face political criticism, and conceivably legal problems, from the contradiction of continued diplomatic recognition of the ROC, while having acknowledged in an official communiqué with the PRC that Taiwan was part of China.

7. A considerably more attractive possibility would play on the PRC's November 1973 Communiqué statement that "the normalization of relations between China and the United States can be realized only on the basis of confirming the principle of one China."[4] Given Chou's initiative on this point, it should have some appeal for Peking. This variant could, moreover, be phrased to maintain linkage to the "peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves." (See Tab 2).[5] The impact on Taiwan should be constructive because the formulation would constitute a useful conditioning step toward the future without setting up shock waves. Proponents of normalization might criticize it as a rather empty, teasing step, but such complaints could be countered by coupling it with some other measures of a practical nature in a package suggesting distinct, if not dramatic, progress.

8. *Full Normalization.* In the summit communiqué, we could either unilaterally or jointly speak in terms of further progress toward *full* normalization of relations, a phrase which we have not so far used in formal declarations. The nuance would raise the communiqué's temperature several degrees, especially if coupled with the "one China" formulation discussed above. It would not be welcome in Taiwan but would hardly come as a great surprise. In this country it might stimulate unhelpful counter moves trying to box us in regarding the unstated but inevitable corollary prospect of a break in U.S./ROC diplomatic relations. However, we believe these risks are manageable.

9. *Military Withdrawals.* An interim step could also include further unilateral reference to U.S. military withdrawals from Taiwan. There is a range of statements we could make short of announcing a complete withdrawal. The most extreme would be a statement that, assuming continued reductions in tensions in the area, we intended substantially to complete withdrawals of our military forces from Taiwan by some specific date. This would attenuate the basic linkage in the Shanghai Communiqué between complete withdrawals and the prospect of a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan problem. A more immediate disadvantage would be great anxiety in Taiwan and unhelpful questioning here. If the reaction in Taiwan appeared to threaten the

---

[4] See footnote 7, Document 60.

[5] Tab 2, attached but not printed, contains an "alternative formulation regarding the 'principle of one China.'"

island's "stable" adjustment to our evolving relations with Peking, the statement might even misfire with the PRC which, in any event, does not seem to doubt our good faith on troop withdrawals. Thus we question whether this card should be played without some compensating PRC movement on the issue of peaceful settlement.

10. Most of the difficulties—and, to be sure, some of the drama—would be eliminated if the communiqué merely referred approvingly to the substantial withdrawals that have taken place on Taiwan and noted the prospect for additional cuts if tensions continued to ease.

11. Given our present schedule we should be in position by November/December to justify an additional withdrawal statement which would of course be unilateral, even though you might wish to inform the Chinese at the time of your trip of our contemplated drawdowns. (Last November you told Teng Hsiao-ping that we would reduce our forces in Taiwan even in the absence of a normalization agreement, and when we informed the PRC early this year of certain reductions in Taiwan you indicated there would be further drawdowns this year and that we would keep Peking informed.[6] The benefit of these moves vis-à-vis Peking might be increased if we also told the Chinese privately before the summit that we intended to consolidate the Taiwan Defense Command and MAAG and/or to reduce the rank of the commanding officers. However, we have not yet decided on this step which would be quite unsettling in Taiwan.)

12. *Diplomatic Representation.* The only diplomatic measure we could adopt short of a break in U.S./ROC relations would be lowering the level of our representation from an ambassador to chargé, or reducing the size of the embassy. (You told the Chinese in November 1974 that we would reduce the seniority of our diplomatic representation before 1976 even in the absence of full normalization.[7] However, replacement of Unger with a junior ambassador might be counterproductive in view of the fuss Peking made over our replacement of McConaughy.) Either of these steps, especially, if announced in a communiqué, would be welcomed by Peking but we think they would be ill-advised. More than any of the other measures discussed above, they would be seen on Taiwan as impending notice of radical change. Some of the same destabilizing tendencies which would come into play with a full break in U.S./ROC relations would be stimulated with plenty of time to cause us serious trouble and without our being in position to make the kind of reassuring gestures that might be possible in the context of full normalization.

---

[6] See Documents 94, 98, and Document 109.

[7] See Document 98.

13. In sum, after considering the balance of advantage and disadvantage, the political measures which seem promising would be the play on Chou En-lai's November 1973 statement on "confirming the unity of China" (para 7 above), a reference to "full normalization" (para 8), and possibly a rounded reference to continuing progress in the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Taiwan (para 10). Even without some matching advance from the Chinese side, we might find one or possibly more of these initiatives in our interest as a means of getting the right message to various audiences, not simply the PRC. Obviously it would be far better if our statements were part of a carefully balanced package, including some bilateral agreements with the PRC. Such a package might consist, for example, of one or more U.S. political statements, a claims agreement, exchange of defense liaison officers or a hot line, and some qualitative improvement in the exchange program. (Even if not in a publicly useable form it would be helpful if you were able to obtain PRC agreement to adopt a less antagonistic tone toward us on international issues.) The Chinese might resist such an extensive "interim step," but we should have enough choice to ensure that the measures were adequately balanced in terms of US interests.

Bilateral Issues Where Progress Might Be Made

14. Irrespective of any progress in resolving the political issues which remain between us and Peking in conjunction with the President's trip, you should seek agreement on a number of outstanding bilateral issues in the areas of claims, exchanges, trade, and governmental relations. Agreements of this kind would strengthen our ties with the PRC, sustain abroad a sense of continuing momentum in our relationship, and help justify to domestic audiences a second Presidential trip to Peking. The alternative to such agreements is conclusion of a modest set of understandings in already-familiar exchange areas which would do little more than indicate to the world that U.S./PRC relations were coasting at their present level.

15. Following are a number of possible areas for agreement which would strengthen our bilateral relationship with the PRC. Some would constitute a step forward in ongoing matters; others would break new ground. We must emphasize that to date the Chinese have indicated an unwillingness, for example, to solve the claims/assets problem before our relationship is fully normalized. They may not shift their position, either because doing so would limit their future leverage on the outstanding normalization issues, and/or because there probably exist domestic PRC political constraints on concessions in these areas in the absence of progress toward full normalization. Nevertheless, if the Chinese share our desire to demonstrate continuing momentum in our relationship, they may be more receptive to one or more of these steps than they have been in the past.

16. *Claims Settlement.* A settlement, despite the existing agreement in principle in March 1973,[8] would have a sizable symbolic value: the issue has received considerable public attention, and it would be the first formal U.S./PRC intergovernmental agreement. More concretely, a settlement would remove a major impediment to further progress in economic/commercial relations, such as banking, trade exhibits and air and sea links.

17. Settlement has been prevented by the Chinese unwillingness to compromise on several issues. However, in the counterpart talks during your November 1974 visit, it became clear that the Chinese did not want a settlement then and were using the few remaining problems as a pretext for stalling.[9] We believe that whenever the Chinese decide that a settlement is desirable, those problems can be resolved relatively easily. If they are receptive, an agreement could be signed during the Presidential trip.

18. *Branch Liaison Offices.* An agreement to establish branch liaison offices, e.g., in San Francisco and Canton, would have considerable symbolic value. However, the Chinese would derive far more benefit; they could take full advantage of our open society, while our branch would be of limited value to us. This situation might change if our branch were involved in implementing an agreement on the reuniting of families (see separate item).

19. *Defense Liaison Officers.* We could suggest an exchange of "defense liaison officers." In addition to publicly expanding the scope of our two Liaison Offices, the move might be welcomed by the Chinese because of its impact on the Soviets. We would need to carefully consider such an exchange in terms of our relations with Moscow, and Taipei would be displeased. In a more practical vein, foreign military attachés in Peking have minimal contact with the Chinese military, and our Liaison Office is so crowded that Chinese cooperation in providing more office space would probably be necessary.

20. *Hot Line.* We could propose that a "hot line" be established between Washington and Peking and that an announcement be included in the communiqué. You have tentatively floated this idea before with the PRC without any interest on their part. But it remains the only feasible step in the arms control area.

---

[8] In a memorandum to Kissinger, March 9, 1973, Theodore Eliot reported that the PRC "has agreed to settle U.S. private claims through an assignment of blocked Chinese assets to the U.S. Government for use in compensating American claimants." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 527, Country Files, Far East, People's Republic of China, Vol. 7, May, 1973–Jul 9, 1973)

[9] See footnote 4, Document 98.

21. *Exchanges.* We have already been requested by the two committees involved in our exchange program to support their efforts to improve the quality of the exchanges and to achieve a better balance between the benefits to the PRC and the interests of American participants. In addition to seeking this general improvement, we could again propose several specific steps which would visibly demonstrate forward movement. The possibilities include:

—Exchange of students for language study.
—Longer term joint research efforts, preferably intergovernmental, in such fields as agriculture or environment.
—Permanent press representation in Peking and Washington.

22. *Reuniting Families.* The Canadians have an agreement with the PRC designed to make it easier for Chinese in the PRC to join their close relatives in Canada. In this country there are probably thousands of Chinese-Americans who want to bring their close relatives in China to the United States, and many members of Congress receive requests for assistance. Moreover, the 1974 Trade Act makes the extension of MFN partially contingent on the other country's willingness to permit the reuniting of families. We seriously doubt that the PRC, in the absence of full diplomatic relations, would be prepared to negotiate an agreement, and they will not want to appear to be yielding to the Trade Act provisions on emigration policies. Nevertheless, since an intergovernmental agreement on this subject would have a substantial positive impact in this country, we could make a low-key effort to determine the PRC attitude.

23. *Trade Agreement and MFN.* We have indicated to the PRC that once the claims issue is settled, we would be prepared to discuss extension of the Most Favored Nation treatment to PRC exports to the United States. However, the 1975 Trade Act provides that MFN can be extended only through a bilateral trade agreement under which we would receive some comparable benefits. Moreover, the "emigration" provisions of the Act (the Jackson–Vanik amendment and an article about reuniting families) will be unacceptable to the PRC. Proposing preliminary discussions of a trade agreement, including MFN, therefore seems pointless. However, we could suggest a more limited agreement, e.g., on trade exhibits, trademarks, and arbitration of business disputes.

24. *Embassy Sites.* Our Liaison Office in Peking is now so crowded that little expansion of staff is possible. The PRC Liaison Office here has plenty of room, and we do not know if they would move when embassies are established. In any event, we could tell the Chinese that in anticipation of the time when our two Liaison Offices are changed to embassies, we would like to start discussions on permanent sites for our respective missions. A statement to this effect could be included in a communiqué, along the following lines: "The two sides, looking for-

ward to the further normalization of relations, have agreed to initiate discussions regarding more permanent facilities for their respective missions in each other's capital." Such a statement would obviously have significant symbolic impact.

25. *Jamming of VOA.* The Chinese continue to jam the Chinese-language broadcasts of VOA. As far as we know, these are the only foreign broadcasts which are jammed (even those from the Soviet Union are not jammed). We could express our puzzlement and our hope that the jamming could be ended. If they agreed, we would not press for any mention of jamming in the communiqué, but we could make the change public by other means.

26. We will continue to work on formulas and other ideas but wanted you to have our thoughts so far.

---

118. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, August 12, 1975, 3:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

1) President Ford's Trip to Europe and the Miki Visit to Washington
2) The President's and the Secretary's Trips to China

PARTICIPANTS

U.S. Side:
The Secretary
Assistant Secretary Philip C. Habib
Director Winston Lord
Deputy Assistant Secretary William Gleysteen

PRC Side:
Ambassador Huang Chen
Chien Ta-yung
Shen Jo-yun
Yang Hsu-ching

Ambassador Huang: You must be very busy Mr. Secretary.

Secretary: Yes. I wanted to have dinner with you tonight at Marquis Childs' but unfortunately I have to work on a speech instead,

---

[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Convenience Files, 1969–1977, Box 39, Richard Solomon Subject Files, 1974–76. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Gleysteen.

my speech in Birmingham.[2] Perhaps it could be arranged on another occasion. We could have dinner at the house of another mutual friend.

Ambassador: Good. Let's do that.

Secretary: It's been too long since we last saw each other. I thought we should have a brief review of events. We have, as you know, just come back from the Helsinki meetings and Eastern Europe.

Ambassador: Are you going away soon on another round of shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East?

Secretary: It's not settled yet, but chances are now better than 50–50. The chances are that I will go the middle of next week.

Let me say a few things about our recent trip. The President's trip was obviously not designed to strengthen Soviet control over Eastern Europe. We deliberately visited those countries in Eastern Europe that have shown the most independence. In Romania we found deep concern and hostility toward the Soviets. I am sure you are familiar with the situation in Yugoslavia. As we announced during our trip, we will start selling some military equipment to Yugoslavia.

Ambassador: Is it decided already?

Secretary: Yes. It has been decided.

Let me first say something about the formal conference at Helsinki. I think it is a great mistake to overstate the significance of the conference. We do not see it as having ratified any frontiers. No new legal status was accorded to frontiers beyond the status they had from previous agreements. The Declaration dealt only with the methods of change, not the sanctity of borders.

In the bilateral meetings with Soviet leaders, Brezhnev seemed to us to have been in better health in other places we have met him than he was in Helsinki. He seemed to have a little trouble concentrating. We talked primarily about the problems of strategic arms limitation, but we haven't come to any final conclusions; we are not even sure they are possible.

On other issues, I made clear that we would not participate in the Soviet scheme for an Asian collective security system. (The Secretary turned to Lord and asked if he had sent to the Chinese his Helsinki press statement which ruled out U.S. participation in such an exercise. Lord replied that he had.) Of course, if China should favor our participation, we might reconsider our position.

---

[2] Marquis Childs was a prominent journalist. On August 14, Kissinger spoke before the Southern Commodity Producers Conference at Birmingham, Alabama. Kissinger's address is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, September 15, 1975, pp. 389–396.

Ambassador: I received a copy of your statement. We think that the Soviets will have a very hard time peddling their collective security system.

Secretary: I agree. We will oppose it. We also told Brezhnev privately about our position. Those were the only significant issues in our bilateral discussions with the Soviet leaders. The President also had an extremely good meeting with the British Prime Minister, the President of France, and the German Chancellor concerning ways of strengthening cooperation. The meeting was extremely constructive and may be followed by another one in the fall dealing with the economic situation.

Ambassador: I understand from the press that less than a week after the Helsinki conference, the Soviets violated Norwegian airspace. This would seem to confirm our view that the conference represents no change in basic Soviet strategy. They will continue to feint toward the East and move toward the West.

Secretary: Maybe they will feint toward the West and move toward the East, but for us the problem is the same. Although I am not aware of the Norwegian overflight, I won't contest that it actually occurred. I agree there has not been any fundamental change in Soviet policy.

Ambassador: We do not think that the CSCE will change things, especially the Soviet strategy of feinting to the East but moving to the West.

Secretary: It won't change our determination to prevent an attack in either direction.

I would also like to tell you about our meetings with Prime Minister Miki of Japan. We told the Japanese we supported their attempt to improve relations with you. Miki asked me privately about the anti-hegemony clause in the treaty negotiations. I told him we couldn't object to what we put in our own communiqué with you.

The Japanese expressed great concern over the Korean situation. We agreed with them on the extreme importance of maintaining peace in the Korean peninsula. We also told the Japanese that we were opposed to the Soviets' Asian collective security scheme or any other moves which seemed directed at the People's Republic of China.

At some point, not necessarily now, we would be interested in your Government's assessment of the Indochina situation, especially the relations of Cambodia and Viet-Nam.[3] We would like your real assessment.

Ambassador: I think our leaders have already discussed this with some of your recent visitors.

---

[3] There had been reports of fighting between Vietnam and Cambodia. ("Vietnamese Forces Reported in Clash With Cambodians," *The New York Times,* June 14, 1975, p. 1)

Secretary: I haven't seen any such reports. You must get your reports faster than we do.

Ambassador: The situation in Cambodia is good.

Secretary: Except for all the people who had to leave Phnom Penh.[4] Seriously, although I would not have recommended or endorsed the measures adopted by the Government in Phnom Penh, we are genuinely interested in Cambodian independence.

Ambassador: Cambodian conditions are really very good.

Chien: We don't discuss such relationships or even make suggestions.

Ambassador: We are opposed to expansionism in Southeast Asia.

Secretary: Expansionism? I agree.

Do you have any views or comments on my review?

Ambassador: Nothing in particular.

Secretary: I also wish to discuss the possibility of the President's visit to China. We are thinking of the beginning of December, give or take a day or so. Specifically, the President might arrive on November 29th or 30th. For my trip, I would plan to go to China five or six weeks earlier than the President, around the 16th of October or so. And if these plans are convenient, we could first announce my visit, perhaps in mid-September, and then when I leave China we could announce the President's trip.

Ambassador: We will report.

Secretary: Please confirm to my colleagues or me, if this is convenient.

Ambassador: We will report and tell your colleagues. Did you say your own trip would be around the 16th?

Secretary: Yes, the 15th or 16th.

Ambassador: For how long?

Secretary: Maybe three or four days. I think we should agree on the communiqué while I am there. It would be too precarious to leave it until the President's trip. The President is also thinking of a stay of about four days. Of course, we are open to suggestions.

Ambassador: We would follow the old practice of making a joint announcement of the President's trip at the end of your trip. Is that correct?

Secretary: Exactly.

---

[4] Reports had reached the United States about the forced evacuation of Phnom Penh, slave labor, and mass starvation. ("Fleeing Cambodians Tell of Khmer Rouge Killings," *The Washington Post*, July 21, 1975, p. A1)

I should tell you that the President is also thinking of visiting a few other countries, not on the way to Peking but on the way home. He certainly would not visit India because of the situation there, but he probably will go to the Philippines, Australia, and possibly Indonesia.

Ambassador: Will he go to Singapore? I saw something in the press about his visiting Singapore.

Secretary: Certainly not. We cannot go to Singapore without going to Malaysia. We have no scheme to visit Singapore or Malaysia.

Ambassador: How definite is Indonesia?

Secretary: There is a good chance of stopping in Indonesia. We haven't discussed these plans with any of the countries involved. In my own case, I have to get to a NATO meeting by the 11th of December. I know you wouldn't want me to miss it.

Ambassador: Yes. You should help strengthen NATO. How about the situation in Turkey and Greece? What is happening on the southern flank of NATO?

Secretary: I have told many friends that China would be watching the southern flank even though it was far away, because I remember my conversation with Chairman Mao. What is happening is a total stupidity. I think we can get it reversed by mid-September when Congress returns.

Ambassador: Good.

Secretary: By then, there is also hope for an interim agreement in the Middle East.

Ambassador: Will you spend about ten days in the Middle East?

Secretary: A week to ten days.

Ambassador: I see that there are two Israeli delegations here.

Secretary: Yes. They are here right now to help us draft.

Ambassador: I understand one delegation is here about aid.

Secretary: Yes. We have held up aid matters. However, it has also been understood that we would give aid after the agreement was reached. The technical studies just happen to coincide with the arrival of the aid delegation.

Who is going to head your delegation to the UN General Assembly?

Ambassador: Even I do not yet know.

119. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

New York City, September 28, 1975, 8:10–11:55 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China
Huang Hua, PRC Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Chang Han-chih, Deputy Director, Asian Affairs Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Lo Hsu, Deputy Director, African Affairs Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Shih Yen-hua, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Interpreter [Notetaker]
Kuo Chia-ting, Second Secretary, PRC United Nations Mission, Notetaker [Interpreter]

Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Patrick Moynihan, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations
Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
William H. Gleysteen, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Richard H. Solomon, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council

SUBJECT

The Soviet Union; CSCE; Europe; Japan; Angola; Indochina; the President's China Trip; the Global Strategic Situation; Korea

[Foreign Minister Ch'iao and his party were escorted into the Secretary's suite. After initial greetings, representatives of the press were brought in for a few minutes to photograph the Secretary and Foreign Minister.]

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: It has been almost ten months since we last met.

Secretary Kissinger: Your Ambassador [Huang Hua] has since learned the he has less of an [English] accent than I do.

You have met all of my friends here. Ambassador Moynihan—he is extremely competent. The other day the Albanian Ambassador attacked the U.S. Moynihan responded by attacking the Soviet Union. Malik did not know what hit him.

Ambassador Moynihan: What I said was that the Albanian Ambassador had missed an opportunity to attack that superpower which styles itself as Socialist.

---

[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, Box 2, China Memcons and Reports, September 28, 1975, Kissinger's Meeting with PRC Officials. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The dinner meeting took place in the Secretary of State's suite on the 35th floor of the Waldorf Towers. All brackets are in the original.

Secretary Kissinger: I have read the Foreign Minister's speech.[2] This time you fired some real cannons.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Half real; half empty.

Secretary Kissinger: The empty ones were fired at the British.

I told the Soviet Ambassador that we are gaining on them. Of course, he was so wounded by what you said [about the Soviet Union] that he didn't notice [Ch'iao's attacks on the U.S.]. But I told him that in every category we are gaining on him.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: So much about my speech. I would like to listen to your views, as I have not seen you in a while. I would like to listen to your views on the international situation as a whole.

Secretary Kissinger: We have kept you informed through Ambassador Huang Chen.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: We appreciate that. Every time there has been some development you have informed us. But what is your view of the international situation as a whole?

Secretary Kissinger: The basic situation—with respect to the Soviet Union—let me begin there. The basic tendencies which we have commented on before are continuing, or somewhat increasing. We believe they are divided evenly between East and West.

According to our perception, the [Soviets'] physical strength and the capabilities for pressure are the same in either direction. The danger is about even.

Our assessment is that they [the Soviets] are probably in a period of transition from one leadership to another.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: But what is the tendency?

Secretary Kissinger: Well—[pause] I think the tendency—

[Mrs. Kissinger enters the room and is introduced to the Foreign Minister and the other Chinese guests. She departs after a few words with the Secretary on her plans for the evening.]

Secretary Kissinger (continuing): What is the tendency of their policy? It is very hard to tell in a succession situation, as those with the highest inclination to grasp power have the highest motivation to mask their intentions. Assuming that Kirilenko[3]—[the Chinese discuss among themselves to clarify the Soviet leader mentioned by the Secretary].

---

[2] Qiao delivered a speech on September 26 to the UN General Assembly. President Ford received and initialed a copy of it while at Camp David. (White House telegram 51893 to the President at Camp David, September 28; ibid., Presidential Country Files for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 1974–1977, Box 13, People's Republic of China)

[3] Andrei P. Kirilenko was a member of the Politburo and the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee.

We would expect them to continue on their present course, but with some less flexibility. But since he [Kirilenko] is likely to be even more dependent on vested bureaucratic interests than Brezhnev, the military element is likely to have a relatively larger influence. This [first] successor group is likely to be succeeded in three or four years by a younger group which will almost certainly try to establish the supremacy of the Party.

This is our assessment. I do not know whether it agrees with yours?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Well, on some points we do not share your views. We differ in that a change in the leadership in the Soviet Union—if a new leadership comes which is not the same as the old one, we are sure that its tendency will not change. As for the flexibility of that leadership, I have no information to indicate that Kirilenko will be less flexible than Brezhnev. We know him well, and have no such impression.

Secretary Kissinger: Will he be more flexible?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Such is the case with the Soviet Union that when a man is in power he sings a different tune when he is in power than a man who is not in power. So we do not think that the new man will be much different.

In 1964 when Khrushchev fell from power we knew this man Brezhnev well. When he took office we thought some change in their policy might be possible, as we had had previous contact with Brezhnev. But Brezhnev continued his expansionist policy even more viciously and actively.

Secretary Kissinger: So you think they will continue [on their present course]?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Basically. There is a false impression held by some of our Western friends because Brezhnev talks peace and coexistence. But their military talks strength. These are two tendencies in one situation.

Secretary Kissinger: Are we one of those friends?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao (with a somewhat surprised look on his face): At least I think this idea is widespread in Europe.

Last year I met Chancellor Schmidt [and raised this topic with him]. He thought that Brezhnev was more flexible, and if it was a question of others coming to power it was better to keep Brezhnev.

Secretary Kissinger: You will see Schmidt in November?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Late October.

Secretary Kissinger: My view of the basic tendency of Soviet policy is that there is no basic disagreement within their leadership. But as in this country [the U.S.], ambitious people will express different attitudes. But this is not a reflection of basic differences in philosophy.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Of course you have made a very detailed study of this. Since there are [now] economic difficulties in the world, all the Soviet leaders have made the same assessment of the West. They do not speak out [directly], but their scholars have. These scholars expressed differences in tactics, although their major assessments [of the situation in the West] are the same.

This is one subject. We can leave it aside and continue our studies [of Soviet intentions].

Secretary Kissinger: Let me say one thing. Our assessment of Soviet tendencies does not differ from yours, but our strategic problem is different than yours.

Your strategic problem is to call the attention to the dangers of this tendency. Our strategic problem is to be in a position to resist these tendencies when they occur. To do this we have to demonstrate for our domestic situation that no other alternative is available.

Therefore we must use language [descriptive] of our relations [with the USSR] which you do not like. But this is the only way for the United States to pursue a really strong policy. If you observe our actual policies in the Middle East, Portugal, Angola, or other areas, when the Soviet Union tries to expand we resist—even in the face of domestic or foreign criticism.

There is a prize fight on television every Tuesday night. You cannot stand flat-footed in the middle of the ring waiting for people to hit you. But not everyone who moves is running away.

Shall we have dinner?

[The party moved from the sitting room and seated themselves at the dining table.]

Secretary Kissinger: This is a brief visit for you, Mr. Foreign Minister. Are you going back [to China] next week?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: How is the Prime Minister's health?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: He is still in the hospital, but he is better now.

Secretary Kissinger: I still think of him with respect and affection.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Thank you.

Well, you said just now that in my speech to the UN General Assembly I fired some real cannons. I feel that after a period of time you will come to understand [my reasons for firing these cannons].

One other point on which I do not agree with you: the Soviet Union, geographically speaking, is in the middle. But proceeding from the realities of the situation, as I have often told you on many occasions, the focal point of the Soviet Union is in the West, not the East.

Secretary Kissinger: Frankly, I can develop an equally plausible interpretation for either course. I am not saying the focal point *is* in the East. I am saying that I do not know. But whether the focal point is in the West or the East, if they attack one, then the other will be the next victim. So it does not matter.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Well, this is a point of major importance, which affects how you look at the present situation and events of the future.

Secretary Kissinger: If the focal point is in the West, what should we be doing differently? How should we act [if the Soviets are primarily focusing on the West] as opposed to their focusing on the East? I am openminded—

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Quite differently. Well, let me give you an historical analogy on this. If in 1938 the Western politicians had had a clear idea that the focal point of Germany was in Europe, things might have turned out quite differently.

Secretary Kissinger: But if in 1939 the Soviet Union had understood whether the focal point was in the East or the West, the situation would also have been quite different. But I am openminded.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: To return to philosophy, you are a Kantian agnostic.

Secretary Kissinger: You have this basic advantage over me. You progressed to Hegel.

The Soviet Union believes that they can undermine the will to resist of the West politically—

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Of course they wish to achieve this.

Secretary Kissinger: —but in the East, they must undermine it militarily. That is my view, but it is based on agnosticism.

Our policy is based on the proposition that a strategic gain on either [the U.S. or China] is a disaster for the other. Therefore we seek to prevent either.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: You are right on this point. But you must have a very clear judgment about what is the focal point, as this has a bearing on many policies.

Secretary Kissinger: But if it is in the West, what should we be doing differently?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao (pauses in reflection): Your—

Secretary Kissinger (Ambassador Huang Hua): You are my advisor this evening!

Chang Han-chih (whispers in Chinese to Ch'iao): Helsinki.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Of course, your moves have both internal and external considerations. We have our differences. We notice

your moves in the West and Eastern worlds. But some of your moves are not necessary.

Secretary Kissinger: But we are speaking now as friends. I know you want to strengthen Western Europe. We want to also. I would not consider this criticism.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I would not like to mention highly controversial points, even among ourselves. But I should mention the Helsinki Conference. We do not see why it was necessary for you to take such a step. Why didn't you delay? I do not know why you permit them to take such a form which is of need to the Soviet Union.

We do not exactly know your idea. Perhaps it was that Brezhnev is relatively good among the Soviet leaders and you thought you wanted to stabilize his position among these leaders. This is my own idea [of what the Secretary had in mind].

I will be very candid. There is a contradiction [in your position]: On the one hand you said that the Helsinki agreement has no binding force. On the other hand, [your agreement with the Soviets] took the form of a conference. This is contradictory.

Secretary Kissinger: Our motives had nothing to do with Brezhnev personally.

I once had the intention of writing a book on Bismarck. I find him more interesting than Metternich, with whom I am usually identified. Bismark was more modern. He once wrote that a sentimental policy knows no reciprocity.

The European Security Conference cannot be analyzed in the context of just this year. You have to understand it in terms of its history. It was around for more than ten years as an idea. We negotiated on it for three years. We used it as a safety valve these past three years for other problems.

My instructions to our delegation were that they should remain one step behind the other European governments. We did not take the lead—although we did not block the conference either.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: This is what you told me last year. But at that time you had not decided whether to convene it as a summit meeting or a conference of foreign ministers.

Secretary Kissinger: That is correct. The foreign ministers' meeting was preempted as a result of Giscard's meeting with Schmidt in December [during which they agreed to hold the Conference at the summit level].

But I submit that you overestimate the European Security Conference.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: No. That is not the case.

Secretary Kissinger: What is its significance?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: The American press has almost compared the European Security Conference to another Munich.

Secretary Kissinger: The American press is in a mood of nihilism, complete unreality.

Mr. Foreign Minister, the same people who called the European Security Conference another Munich would organize a real Munich at the first crisis. The most destructive thing we can do is to pay attention to our press in its presently destructive mood.

There is one certain prediction: The only way to pursue a strong foreign policy is to do as we are now doing with the Soviet Union. If we are only rhetorically strong, the *Washington Post* and *New York Times* would be saying that we missed an opportunity for progress. Any third secretary in the Soviet Embassy could dangle hints of progress before the press, and we would be spending all of our time explaining why we are unresponsive. Just read our press of the 1960s! I would much rather have the *New York Times* to my right than on my left.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: About our assessment of the Helsinki conference, there is one point I would like to clarify: We do not attach much importance to that conference. There has not been even one editorial in our papers, only some commentaries.

Secretary Kissinger: I do not know if I like that. Indifference is a worse punishment than criticism.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: In our recent speeches we made criticism of the Helsinki conference. The Soviet Union has lauded it to the skies. But in terms of the international situation, this will all soon evaporate.

Secretary Kissinger: I agree. It [the conference] had to be brought to a conclusion, as its continuation gave it a greater significance than it deserved. It was not worth a battle over the question of [whether to hold] a summit. If the Soviet Union gained [from the conference], it was internally not internationally.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Whether this conference was convened or not, how long it was held, or the form it took—a summit meeting or foreign ministers' conference—these things cannot affect the international situation.

Secretary Kissinger: I do not think the results of the conference affected either. Borders—there are no unrecognized borders in Europe. They were all recognized before the conference.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: But there are some difficulties in it. Politically, they [the Soviets] can make some propaganda—not legally—that the borders are now more settled.

Secretary Kissinger: But the borders of the Balkans were fixed in 1946; the borders between Poland and the Federal Republic were es-

tablished at Yalta. There are no unrecognized frontiers. What fixes the borders now is the presence of 25,000 Soviet tanks between the Oder and the Elbe. Until that situation changes there will be no [political] changes.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: But at least this conference gives people the idea that the Soviets can station troops in Europe.

Secretary Kissinger: I doubt that we gave the Soviets anything in this agreement. We are trying to weaken Soviet influence [in central Europe] by [Presidential] visits and by our developing military relations with the Yugoslavs. But change requires a political process in Europe.

At the conference, the attitudes of Yugoslavia and Romania, and less so Poland, were most interesting.

At any rate, I do not exclude the possibility that we make mistakes—although I seldom will admit it. But our strategy is to weaken the Soviet Union.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I know you have taken some steps toward the Soviet Union—tactical measures.

Secretary Kissinger: At present no other strategy is possible—unless you have some other idea?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao (after a pause): Your former Secretary of State Stimson had a policy of "non-recognition."

Secretary Kissinger: We tried that with you for twenty years. It was not one of our most successful policies. (Laughter)

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: But in the end you gained the initiative. You did not recognize the Japanese occupation of northeast China as legal. In this you gained the initiative, so at the end of World War II as you did not recognize the Japanese occupation, the initiative was in American hands.

Secretary Kissinger: But the Soviets haven't—

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Hasn't the United States accorded more or less recognition to what the Soviets are doing in Eastern Europe?

Secretary Kissinger: This is a different situation from northeast China, as technically there are independent governments there [in Eastern Europe]. But our strategy is to weaken the Soviet presence in Eastern Europe; to make it more costly for them to hold on.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: But that is only one example. I agree that it is not an exact analogy.

Secretary Kissinger: We do not believe that the European Security Conference changed that situation in favor of the Soviet Union.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Perhaps this is the case with you, but quite many other countries think that the problems in Europe have been settled.

Secretary Kissinger: Which [countries]?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Just read their General Assembly speeches! You will see their groundless optimism, their great expectations about détente.

Secretary Kissinger: My impression—we have taken your advice about strengthening our relations with Europe. My meetings with my colleagues from Britain, Germany, and France, and others, indicate that they have no illusions.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: You are right. Our European friends also told us the same thing. Our friends in Britain, Germany, France, and Italy said that they would first of all strive for détente, and secondly heighten their vigilance. Some of our friends told us that they would seek to strengthen their defenses.

Secretary Kissinger: I would not necessarily rely on the Italians. The others, more so.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Theoretically speaking, this is a two-sided policy. In actuality, what do they stress? Do they strive for détente, or to prepare for war?

Secretary Kissinger: The basic problem in every European country is the complexity of their domestic situations. Strong Communist Parties directed by the Soviet Union seek to use their influence to pressure the Socialists—except in Germany.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Therefore, the illusion of détente can only help the revisionist parties gain in influence.

Secretary Kissinger: Unless a series of crises create a situation where what you call the revisionist parties can claim that only they can create peace.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: But now there is such a tendency.

Secretary Kissinger: It existed all the time.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: But the atmosphere of détente has helped them.

Secretary Kissinger: That is a matter of judgment. I believe the previous atmosphere was of more help of them [than the present one]. But I understand the argument [you are making]. I do not believe it is a trivial one.

You remember that I suggested that you invite Senator Jackson to China as he represents a tendency which, if strengthened, would make a really strong policy impossible.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I understand that.

Secretary Kissinger: I agree with your concern about Europe. The European political structure was so affected by two wars that their leadership has lost confidence.

Take the Italian situation. This has nothing to do with détente. There is a complete collapse of will on the part of the leadership of the Christian Democrats and a misperception on the part of the Church of the real danger. Italy does not have a foreign policy.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: How do you look at Portugal?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to be scolded by the Chinese representative at the United Nations again, so I will be careful. (Laughter)

One superpower has been active, so we are not far behind. Basically we thought that this was an internal Portuguese situation. And because of our internal situation we did very little.

We are now working with our European friends to keep groups supported by Moscow from gaining the upper hand. These has been a tactical improvement—a great tactical improvement—in the situation. The problem now is whether our European friends will celebrate a victory or realize that these Moscow-supported groups have to be systematically reduced in influence.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: This struggle will be a long-term one. No matter what you tell your European friends, we tell our European friends not to overestimate the strength of the Communist Parties. We think we know them better than you do. We once told Western European friends to give a free hand to the so-called Communist Parties. Let them take power and expose themselves in power. They said that they couldn't think of such a thing.

Secretary Kissinger: I do not think you really do either. Do you mean [let them take power] in Portugal, or elsewhere?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Portugal. In that case, the Communist Party of Portugal cannot control the Portuguese army.

Secretary Kissinger: We do not overestimate the strength of the Communist Party of Portugal. We have to let things mature to a certain point. First, we did not have the domestic capability; and secondly we had to bring Western Europe to understand what the situation was. Thirdly, we had to make certain that Soares was not Kerenski.[4]

Anyway, the situation in Portugal is at an early stage and can go in either direction.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Well, I think that if our European friends, backed by our American friends, take tactful action, the Soviets cannot gain the upper hand.

---

[4] Aleksandr F. Kerensky became the leader of Russia following the revolution that overthrew the Czarist government in 1917. He was himself overthrown in the Bolshevik revolution later that year. Mario Soares, as the leader of the Portuguese Socialist Party, became prominent following a violent change of government in 1974.

I do not know if you remember, but you told me that ultimately the Soviet Union will have to use its army to gain influence.

Secretary Kissinger: What I said was that the Soviets cannot expand [their influence] without using military power to make their point. They have not won a political victory yet.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: There is a good example to illustrate your point. If it were not necessary for the Soviets to rely on military force then it would not be necessary for them to put so many troops in Central Europe.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, it is striking that thirty years after they put in troops [in the various Central European countries], the governments have no legitimacy. They have to govern with traditional nationalism.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: In our view, if the Soviet Union takes adventuristic action it will lose Eastern Europe.

Secretary Kissinger: I agree, where do you think they will take action? Western Europe? This is why I have my doubts about their real focal point being Western Europe.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao (after a short pause): Well, the situation is very difficult. There are contradictions in everything.

We have stated our views to you on many occasions. Western Europe is the focal point—Chairman Mao told you—if the Soviet Union cannot gain hegemony over Western Europe, it cannot control the world. In our view, and your view, Eastern Europe is a liability of the Soviet Union, but they see it as an asset.

Secretary Kissinger: I agree that the Soviet Union's long-range objective is to turn Western Europe into a kind of Finland. The question is how it will really do that. I am speaking now as a professor, not as Secretary of State. Either they can do it by a direct move against Europe, or they can do it by moves which will demonstrate to Western Europe that they are [an] irresistible [force].

The question is whether they might make some move in the Middle East, or in the Far East [to demonstrate their power to Western Europe]. But I am speaking now as a professor; I am not making any predictions. From where I sit, as Secretary of State, we have to be prepared for any possibility.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Yes, you are right, but you have to have priorities on the basis of the urgency of the problem. I agree that the best way the Soviet Union can do this is to defeat Western European countries one by one, and turn the area into a Finland.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, that is their strategy.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: That is the first part of their strategy, because the Soviets realize that unless they do this they cannot realize the rest of their objectives.

There is an old Chinese expression said more than 2,000 years ago by a military strategist named Sun Tzu—Mr. Solomon will know this—that the best way to bring your opponents to their knees is not to use soldiers [but a political stratagem]. The Soviets want to do this, but in our opinion it is difficult to do.

Now the Soviet Union is waiting for an opportune time. Eventually it will see that its strategy will not work, and then it will have to use military means. Of course, now conditions are not right [for a resort to military force].

When I talked about the European Security Conference, I did not mean that it was important. I just meant that some words spoken in some quarters were not beneficial to Europe or to the U.S. This has caused some confusion in Europe.

Secretary Kissinger: Any confusion in Europe is not a result of the European Security Conference; it is a result of the domestic situation, particularly in Italy, and to some extent in Great Britain. It has to be dealt with at that level.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Let me add one point. After the European Security Conference, due to exaggerated and groundless propaganda, this has heightened the tendency of certain European friends to be negative [passive], especially these Christian Democratic parties.

Secretary Kissinger: The European Social Democrats are vulnerable to the Communist Parties. In Italy especially; not in Germany.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Not long ago I talked with Strauss. He said to me—this is no secret—the Soviet Union intends to bring up Willy Brandt again.

Secretary Kissinger: Perhaps that is correct.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: As he told me, they had grounds to expect this. I don't know, as I don't know Schmidt very well.

Secretary Kissinger: Brandt wants to bring up Brandt again!

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Schmidt is not in good health.

Secretary Kissinger: Schmidt is a good man, although he is not in good health. He has a thyroid condition, and some other [physical] problems, but he is very strong [as a leader]. Schmidt made a great mistake—we are old friends; we were introduced in 1955 as we were both considered promising young men—when I was made Secretary of State he was made Finance Minister. I thought I had finally gotten ahead of him. He now has retaliated and I can never outmatch him because of our Constitution [which prevents a foreign born citizen from being President]. So now I am a revolutionary. (Laughter)

He made a basic mistake. When he was made Chancellor, he did not also have himself made head of his party.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: The Soviet strategy is to foster the Christian Democrats in Western Europe and then to encourage the Communist Parties to merge with them.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. This is why the Italian Christian Democrats are no barrier [to the expansion of Soviet influence] as they cooperate with the Communist Party. But as long as Schmidt is Chancellor in the Federal Republic, this cannot happen [in Germany].

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Let me tell you a joke I read recently. The German Christian Democratic leader Kohl visited Moscow at the same time that Strauss was visiting Peking to attend the West German [industrial] exhibition. Our press issued an announcement about Strauss' visit to China, and so the Soviet Union refused to receive Kohl for three days.

Secretary Kissinger: The Soviet Union is very stupid. They should know that it is Strauss' nature to visit all sorts of industrial exhibitions.

When I visited the Soviet Union last year, when I was in the Crimea, Brezhnev complained bitterly about Schmidt and Genscher. I said, "Of course you didn't have to send two spies." They replied, "First, East Germany sent the spies; and secondly, we did not order Brandt to hire them."

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I heard that later Brezhnev apologized to Brandt. I do not know if this is true or not.

Secretary Kissinger: But Brandt did it to himself.

Anything we can do to strengthen Schmidt will be helpful. He is coming to Washington soon.

You mentioned earlier the Soviet speculation about the economic situation in the West. You might like to know that we are planning a meeting soon between the President, Giscard, Schmidt, and the Japanese to coordinate economic policy and deal with this situation.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: May I ask a question? How do you evaluate the Miki government? Because last year in Soochow we [Ch'iao and the Secretary] talked about the situation in Japan. We had not thought such changes [as have occurred since] were possible. We said we would keep you informed. I can tell you that before Miki took power we thought he was a friend of China.

Secretary Kissinger: I know he is a friend of China. He is a thoughtful man, but he heads a weak government. He does not have very great confidence. They are very timid. We do not think [the Miki government] will last more than two years. But I agree that his policy towards China is one of friendliness.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Not completely so.

Secretary Kissinger: Because of the hegemony clause?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Exactly! Do you agree?

Secretary Kissinger: I told their Foreign Minister that you [Ch'iao] were right when you said I had something to do with drafting this [clause in the Shanghai Communiqué dealing with hegemony].

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I told them to criticize either me or you.

Secretary Kissinger: They fear that you will apply the hegemony clause to us.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Yesterday I talked with the Japanese Foreign Minister about this situation and made an explanation. I told them on this point that, first, it was discussed and agreed upon by the U.S. and China; secondly, I indicated that the anti-hegemony clause is not aimed at undermining relations between Japan and the United States. He understands this. The main trouble is pressure on them by the Soviet Union.

Secretary Kissinger: You must know that we told him [Miyazawa] that we cannot oppose something that we ourselves signed.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Yes. I also told the Japanese Foreign Minister that China and the United States had reached agreement on this clause, and that also we had reached agreement with some small Southeast Asian countries—Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaysia. The Soviet Union did not protest then, only in the case of Japan.

Secretary Kissinger: Do you think they will sign [a peace and friendship treaty with the anti-hegemony clause]?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I don't know. I do not understand their internal problems.

Secretary Kissinger (rising with his glass): Mr. Foreign Minister, friends, it is a pleasure to welcome you to the United States. If I am not mistaken, this is your seventh visit to the U.S. It proves that you cannot let me be ahead in anything, even in the number of visits. (Laughter)

We have noted in general that you have this tendency not to let us get ahead of you. Next year we will be having our 200th anniversary. You sent us your archaeological exhibition to show us that 200 years is but a brief period in Chinese history.

Mr. Foreign Minister, your country and ours have a rather strange relationship. Many things we don't agree upon. Occasionally we make that public. And yet, we talk more frankly to each other, and in more depth, than with almost any other nation. This is because of certain objective factors, and certain necessities which have brought us together and which we assess in the same way. Among these [areas of agreement] I must include the phrases in the Shanghai Communiqué concerning hegemony, which we just discussed.

As I said in my speech to the UN General Assembly, we attach great importance to our relations with the People's Republic of China. We are prepared to cooperate in those basic perceptions we share.

We value these visits and our conversations; therefore, we welcome you.

So now let me propose a toast: to the health and long life of Chairman Mao and Premier Chou En-lai; to the health of Mr. Foreign Minister, and friends, to the friendship of the Chinese and American peoples. Kan-pei. (All rise and toast.)

(There was some discussion back and forth between the Chinese and American sides to clarify exactly how many times Foreign Minister Ch'iao had been to the United States. It was finally agreed that the number was seven, including two visits he had made to the U.S. in 1950.)

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I would also like to say a few words.

Respected Mr. Secretary—or rather, respected Dr. Kissinger. We once reached an agreement that I would call you Mister Doctor, and that you would call me Mr. X. Today you have already breached our agreement. But this is not important, this is just a superficial phenomenon.

What is important is that each time we meet we discuss important questions. We are quite candid. Sometimes we have heated discussions, but this is not important. If we talked only superficially, that would be senseless.

As for relations between our two countries, they are stated clearly in the Shanghai Communiqué. I believe that our two countries, China and the United States, have a determination to continue on the path charted by the Shanghai Communiqué.

When I was young, I read a sentence—I do not know where, perhaps it was by a Marxist—"The situation is stronger than man. A man may think this way or that way, but the situation is stronger than man."

I believe that in the present changing world, we have many common grounds—although you belong to the Kantian school, and I belong to the Hegelian school. They lived at the same time, under similar circumstances.

Now I would like to propose a toast: To Mr. President Ford; to our friend Mr. Secretary of State; to our new friend Mr. Moynihan; and to our old friends, Mr. Habib, Mr. Gleysteen, Mr. Solomon, and to Mr. Lord—who is half Chinese, because he has a Chinese wife. (All rise and toast.)

Secretary Kissinger: May I raise a few relatively brief problems here. Then we can talk about the President's visit, and my visit.

First, Angola, I want to discuss this with you. First, what is the problem of Angola? Geographically the railways connecting Zaire and Zambia with the sea go through Angola. Therefore the future of Angola has considerable impact on countries beyond Angola.

The United States has been next to nothing in Angola for many years. Starting in the early part of this year, the Soviet Union greatly

increased its arms deliveries in Angola, indirectly via the Congo Brazzaville and directly or through its friends in Portugal. Its sympathizers in the Portuguese army allowed soldiers to retire from the army and join the military in Neto. So the Neto forces, which were the weakest several months ago, now are the strongest—not by revolutionary activity, but by outside influence.

We agree with your view [expressed] in the General Assembly that the three revolutionary movements should combine. But if things are left as they are, Neto will defeat the others and there will be nothing left to combine. If nothing is done, Zaire and Zambia will learn that forces supported by the Soviet Union can prevail, and therefore they will shift toward the Soviet Union. So we are trying—so starting in August, not before, we began to try to establish a balance between the forces of Roberto, Savimbi, and Neto; to establish a balance, together with Kaunda and Mobutu.

I am surprised that China has said it would do nothing. As long as the Soviet Union is active in Africa, this is important to China. If we are concerned with hegemony, why let the Soviet Union stretch its hands into an area as far as this from the Soviet Union? We do not want anything for ourselves.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Our viewpoint perhaps is not alike.

We believe that by doing so, the Soviet Union will eventually fail even though it may gain some military advantages for a time.

Of course, what I said to the General Assembly is the policy of the Chinese Government. This policy is principled, and also may have some effect on our African friends.

I have discussed this question with some of our European friends. I told them that China will not object to their adopting measures to prevent the Soviet Union from taking advantage of Neto. It is clear now that the civil war in Angola was provoked by the Soviet Union. As they provoked it, they cannot prevent others from taking actions. Since the Soviet Union provoked the war, it has no moral justification for preventing others from taking action against its actions.

If you have made a detailed study of our speech, you will see we know where the blame lies.

Secretary Kissinger: But forget about the speech. What do we do now?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Some of our friends want to enlist the help of South Africa. This is short-sighted.

Secretary Kissinger: We have received the same proposal. We also refused. We worked with Tanzania and Zambia. This has to be done by the blacks there.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I suggest we give this further study.

Secretary Kissinger: We *have* studied the situation. Do you want to exchange ideas on it?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: We have a rather strict position on national liberation movements. Chairman Mao, you remember, told you that regarding the Middle East it was necessary to use dual tactics, to use both hands.

Secretary Kissinger: That is just what we are trying to do.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: But the case of Angola is different. So far we haven't given up hope that this problem can be solved between the African countries and the three liberation movements. Do you believe this cannot work?

Secretary Kissinger: No, I believe—I will be precise. Roberto and Savimbi have to be stronger. I get daily reports of Soviet military shipments to Luanda. It is mathematically certain that Neto will prevail unless Roberto and Savimbi are strengthened—or else when the Portuguese leave, Neto will take over. So unless Roberto and Savimbi are strengthened, then there can be no agreement between the three liberation movements and the African governments.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Can you do any work with the Portuguese government?

Secretary Kissinger: We are, but it does not help with the arms that the Soviets have already put in.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: How large are the Soviet deliveries?

Secretary Kissinger: Armored cars, they have about 30. That is a lot for Africa. 122 millimeter artillery. In Coxito they used the 122 millimeter artillery to great effect. The troops which had been trained on the Chinese model ran away. They need heavier weapons and training. Particularly Savimbi.

I understand that Chinese arms are held up somewhere. It is important that Roberto and Savimbi control the large part of Angola before independence. Otherwise Neto will declare independence and go to the UN.

Our people think this is a soluble problem it we act quickly. I repeat, we favor an outcome negotiated between the three liberation movements. But in a few weeks the outcome will be decided.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Good. I have taken note of your views.

Secretary Kissinger: If you want to be more specific, have your Ambassador in Washington get in touch with us. We can give you more precise assessments of the weapons they have and the weapons they need.

This is a clear situation of interference from abroad. We are prepared to help Roberto and Savimbi with weapons. Indeed, we are helping already to some extent.

Now Habib will have another heart attack. This is against all the principles of his bureau.

Mr. Habib: We are just peace-loving.

(The party rises from the dinner table and returns to the Secretary's sitting room.)

Secretary Kissinger: I will arrive in China on the 19th. I will stay a day in Japan [before coming to China].

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Will you bring your wife?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. I also was thinking of bringing Mr. Lynn, the head of our Office of Management and Budget. I thought it would be useful for him to know something about China.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Well, we will consider this.

So you will arrive on the 19th. In the morning or in the afternoon?

Secretary Kissinger: About 3:00 p.m. in the afternoon.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: How many days will you stay?

Secretary Kissinger: Maybe until the 23rd.

Before I get to this, let me briefly discuss Southeast Asia.

We, of course, no longer have a principal interest in Southeast Asia. In so far as we have, it is in preventing the hegemonial aspirations of others. In time we will have no reason not to establish relations with Vietnam.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Of course, regarding this question we know your domestic situation. We believe that the U.S. should not mind what happened in the past.

Secretary Kissinger: We don't. The question is that your friends in Vietnam do not have an excessively low opinion of themselves. Therefore, we want to let reality begin to sink in for a while. Then we can establish relations which will more accurately reflect the real world. This has nothing to do with the past.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Well perhaps. One thing that we told you is that you are too emotional in your actions.

Secretary Kissinger: We are trying to be practical.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Of course, it would not have been necessary for me to discuss this, but the *Mayaguez* was totally unnecessary.[5] But this is not important.

Secretary Kissinger: This gets me to the real point I wanted to discuss.

---

[5] See Document 110.

We see no reason not to begin discussions with Cambodia. If Prince Sihanouk or other members of the Cambodian delegation want to begin discussions, we are prepared.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I will be very honest with you. Prince Sihanouk and other members of the delegation feel that the U.S. harmed them so much that it is not easy for them to take the initiative.

In the interest of the overall situation, we hope you will have proper relations with Cambodia. Take the initiative with the Cambodians. I give you this advice as a friend and not on behalf of Prince Sihanouk, or the other Cambodian officials. Of course, I cannot reply on their behalf. But it is my estimate that they will give you proper courtesy.

Please go on with Southeast Asia.

Secretary Kissinger: Our only interest is in the independence of the various countries [in the region].

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: This is the same with us.

Secretary Kissinger: That is why we thought that the improvement of your relations with Thailand was a positive thing. We spoke in this sense to the Thai Foreign Minister last spring.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Chatchai. He has gone home already.

Secretary Kissinger: But he will come back.

So our policy is to support countries [in Southeast Asia] against foreign aggression.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Of course, bygones are bygones. But we hope you will learn lessons from the past and support the independence of these countries. This will make some real friends for the United States.

(The Foreign Minister rose and indicated he wished to take a break. The Secretary escorted him towards the washroom. After a few minutes the Foreign Minister returned and the conversation resumed.)

Secretary Kissinger: A great deal depends on Cambodia—on the exuberance of their language in the General Assembly—whether we can make any overtures to them this session.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Since they have come [to New York], and as the U.S. is a major power in the world, they should be received with a proper reception.

Secretary Kissinger: There are two questions here. First, they will receive a proper reception. But on the [second] issue of initiating discussions, it will be necessary for them to moderate their language.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: This is their affair. The Cambodians—I think their language is strong, although their actual language is another thing.

Secretary Kissinger: I think there is a relationship between language and reality.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: As I told you just now, I don't want to provoke a dispute—as there doesn't exist such a thing in our relationship—but the *Mayaguez* incident hurt their feelings. It will take them some time to forget.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, it is up to them. They can't do much for us. Hostile speeches won't be printed on the front page of the *New York Times.* As far as we are concerned, our only interest is in the independence of the countries of Southeast Asia. I wanted you to know this.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I'll very sincerely—I very sincerely hope you have learned your lessons from Indochina. It is up to you if you have learned your lessons. It is your affair whether you want to consider this [meeting with the Cambodians] or not.

In our view, the general situation in Southeast Asia is good. I don't know how you view the situation?

Secretary Kissinger: I think we are seeing the beginning of a process of evolution. As far as the United States is concerned, we have good relations with all of the countries [of the region] except for Indochina. I would not preclude the possibility of Vietnam having certain hegemonial aspirations with regard to Laos and Cambodia.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: It is possible, as a result of the influence of outside forces. But we doubt that it can succeed.

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to Laos, it is easier to succeed than with Cambodia.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: If such is the case, there has only been a short period of time.

Secretary Kissinger: Our estimate is that there are now 2,000 Soviet technicians in Laos.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: What is the significance of 2,000 even 3,000 Soviet technicians? The main question is if they can achieve popularity there.

Secretary Kissinger: I think the main question is influence from Hanoi.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Perhaps. Anyway, the history of the 30 years after the war in Asia is that an outside country cannot dominate any country for long. The Soviet Union for ten years wanted to dominate China. They sent a large number of experts to us to try to dominate us.

Secretary Kissinger: The question is whether China is stronger than Laos. (Laughter)

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: This is only a matter of degree, not kind.

Secretary Kissinger: This is not our primary problem. I just wanted you to know our attitude.

Shall we talk abut the President's visit for a few minutes? We don't need to discuss practical problems. I can do this when I come to Peking next month. The issue is what we are trying to achieve. What in your mind is the purpose of the visit [of the President]?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: We, when you were in China last time, when U.S. Senators or Congressmen visited China, we also discussed that it would be useful to exchange visits, to keep in contact. The visit of your President is a major event. In general we hope there will be some step forward on the basis of the Shanghai Communiqué.

Secretary Kissinger: It seems to me, as you said in your toast, the Shanghai Communiqué serves as a useful basis of our relationship, and we remain committed to it. We will carry out its provisions in all aspects.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: That is good.

Secretary Kissinger: That is our policy.

Strategically, in light of our discussions, we [the U.S. and China] have pursued somewhat parallel policies despite profound ideological differences as we have common concerns.

Therefore, what we should look for—to us politically, domestically, this is not now a major event, but from a foreign policy point of view there should be some symbolic advance. This should not be a visit of two enemies who are using each other, but rather of two countries who are cooperating on certain questions.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: There is no question about it. We have our common ground, as is stated in the Shanghai Communiqué.

Secretary Kissinger: But when you said we should have some advance [in our relationship], what did you have in mind?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao (laughs nervously): I was just speaking abstractly. As Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing told many U.S. friends, it is useful for the two sides to have discussions. We can see if there is a step forward on the basis of the Shanghai Communiqué. But it doesn't matter if there is none.

Secretary Kissinger: Do you have any idea about what kind of document might be published as a result of the President's trip?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: On this question my mind is a blank.

Secretary Kissinger: Anyway, we will change it [the document] on the last night. You know, I cannot remember anything of the last night of our discussions [during President Nixon's visit to China], of any of the issues discussed.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I admire you. Immediately after our talks you held a press conference, and did so at great ease.

Secretary Kissinger: I remembered the document in great detail—every version we had drafted.

Let me speak of advances, on the problem of Taiwan, and then other problems.

On Taiwan: We cannot complete the process on this visit. It is domestically impossible on this visit, and I have told you this. But perhaps we can think of some formula that can take us short of [completion of] the process.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: That depends on you. I can do nothing. The famous version of the Shanghai Communiqué was proposed by you.

Secretary Kissinger: Except for the two sections [where the U.S. and Chinese sides expressed their differing points of view]. That was proposed by you.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: This is not a departure from diplomacy. This is a reflection of realities. The world is such that we have contradictions between us, but we also have common ground. So the Shanghai Communiqué is a new creation, a reflection of realities.

Secretary Kissinger: But should we have a communiqué, or just an announcement about the President's visit?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I cannot tell you at this moment. As I told you, my mind is a blank.

Secretary Kissinger: That in itself is an historic event.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: We can discuss many problems in Peking.

Secretary Kissinger: My idea is not to take too many chances during the visit of the President. We should work out the outlines of a communiqué.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I agree.

Secretary Kissinger: Our idea is that in all categories of the Shanghai Communiqué on which we can come to some agreement, we be prepared to show some progress.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: It would be good if we can achieve that. We understand that you have problems. We have no problems.

Secretary Kissinger: But you understand that we cannot complete the process regarding Taiwan, but we can have some progress [in other areas]?!

Foreign Minister Ch'iao (obviously seeking to reorient the discussion): As friends, as this is not the first time that we have met, how do you view the world situation? Can we have peaceful coexistence; or will war break out?

Secretary Kissinger: As a friend?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I am not the Foreign Minister, and you are not the Secretary of State!

Secretary Kissinger: It is possible for war to break out. As an historian it [the prospects for war] is more likely than not. As Secretary of State, I have to act as if war will not break out, or do my best to prevent it.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I do not think we disagree on this point. In your speech—in my speech to the General Assembly, my purpose was to raise the problem of the danger of war. Yours was to speak about the materialization of détente. But to speak of the materialization of détente, it may backfire.

Secretary Kissinger: But as a friend, when you speak of the focal point [of Soviet pressure being] in the West, this is part analysis and part tactics.

You are afraid—no, you are concerned that we will use détente to push the Soviet Union toward the East.

My view—that—maybe you are right. If the Soviet Union attacks in the West, we have no psychological problems, and of course we will resist. If the Soviet Union attacks in the East, the same psychological preconditions do not yet exist. And yet—if we are reasonable, the same strategic necessity exists [for U.S. resistance to a Soviet attack in either the East or the West].

Therefore, for us—a problem for us is to create enough of a relationship to China to make this [attempt to resist Soviet pressures] psychologically meaningful. This [discussion] is so you understand my thinking. From our point of view this is one purpose of the President's visit.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I do not agree with you on the point that our analysis of the focal point of the Soviet Union in the West is a tactic.

Secretary Kissinger: Partly, partly—

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: —and that China fears the West will use détente to push the Soviets to the East.

Secretary Kissinger: That does not matter. We have to be prepared in the West [for either eventuality].

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I would like to remind you what Prime Minister Chou En-lai told you—

Secretary Kissinger: No, your position has been consistent.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Of course, when we talk you have your subjective views, and you have thought these out of our subjective views.

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, I do not exclude the fact that you may be right. We have to act as if you are right.

Shall we spend five minutes on Korea?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Okay—such a wide range [of topics]!

Secretary Kissinger: I think we have publicly stated our positions [on Korea]. They do not seem to be easily reconciled. But we are prepared to improve our relations with North Korea, but not if the price is isolating South Korea. I hope a way can be found during the UN debate not to drive this contradiction to its ultimate limit. Your Ambassador is a procedural genius. (Laughter)

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: This is not a big problem.

I think that after the events in Indochina, you exaggerated the situation in Korea. This problem is a very small one.

Our position is that your troops should withdraw at an early date. But you say this will not do. The overall situation of the world hinges on the situation in Korea?

Secretary Kissinger: You won't agree with me, but I do not think it is in your interests to see another precipitate withdrawal of American power. This would have a significant influence on Japan.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Things are quite complicated there, but this question has to be settled. I would advise you to have direct talks with the Korean side. But you have problems.

Secretary Kissinger: No, at the right time we are prepared to talk with sides that we have not talked to before. (Laughter)

One problem is that if the UN Command is abolished, we have to find some way to sustain the Armistice arrangement. Secondly, if we talk to North Korea at some point, it must include South Korea at some point.

Incidentally, your ally [North Korea] did not appreciate my proposal of holding talks with you. So they complained and rejected our proposal.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Never mind. Things in the world are so complicated. But some day there will be a solution.

Secretary Kissinger (with emphasis): But not in an American election year. It will not come in the fourth year!

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Everyone will be pleased if this question can be resolved this year. But it will not be terrible if it is not settled this year.

Secretary Kissinger: But then we need to have *something* to talk about next year! (Laughter)

Foreign Minister Ch'iao (in English): If we didn't, Moynihan would be unemployed! (Laughter)

Secretary Kissinger: I can't imagine the titanic struggle when Moynihan and Huang Hua clash at the UN. I will tell Moynihan not to be the aggressor.

I am advised that some television people are outside. It is not necessary for you to say something to them. We didn't put them there. I think it is ABC.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I will meet them, but I won't talk.

(The Chinese arose to depart. There was some light chatter and exchanges of farewells as the American side escorted the Chinese party down the hall to the elevator.)

120. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, October 17, 1975, 9:30–10:47 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

SUBJECTS

China; Middle East; Sadat Visit

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to China.]

Kissinger: On my China trip [October 19–23],[2] I would propose negotiating the communiqué of your trip so you don't have to do it. The Shanghai one had three parts: unilateral statements, an anti-hegemony statement, and a bilateral section—including statements on Taiwan. That language was ingenious.

What can come from your visit? There can't be complete normalization, although Nixon promised we would do it by 1976. But we can strengthen the anti-hegemony statement. On Taiwan, we have two options: One is to let the PRC state its position including peaceful change, we state our desire for normalization, and we note their view and our desire to work for a solution on the principle of one China. My staff likes this—I don't. They will reject it and then we will need a fallback. If they do, there will be pressure for full normalization because they will have approved peaceful change. The second option is to restate the Shanghai Communiqué but instead of saying "the U.S. does not challenge this position," we would affirm the one-China idea. That is unilateral and can be withdrawn. It would reduce our ability to recognize an independent Taiwan, but we could do that only in the context of a massive confrontation with the PRC anyway.

The President: Which formulation is better here politically?

Kissinger: I think mine is.

Scowcroft: I think there is no question about it.

Kissinger: The first option is the unanimous position of my advisors, but I don't support it. Once you accept it, we will be under pres-

---

[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser Memcons, Box 16, July–October 1975. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Oval Office.

[2] Brackets are in the original.

sure to move because they have accepted peaceful change. We'll have all the liberals on us.

The President: What would the Japanese say if the Chinese tried to take over Taiwan?

Kissinger: They want us to protect Taiwan while they trade with Taiwan. The present situation where we protect Taiwan is best for everyone.

The President: What will we be doing for 4½ days in China?

Kissinger: They move at a leisurely pace. They will want to hear at length from you about the world situation—there is no substitute for that. They will expect a long session on the Soviet Union, Europe, Asia. If you get there Monday, they will give a dinner Monday night; on the following events there will be one cultural show, a reciprocal dinner, and then one evening free.

The President: How about Chou's health?

Kissinger: He may be on his last legs. You will meet with Mao. Soochow is nice; Hangchow is also. They will certainly want you to go to Shanghai.

The President: The first trip of Nixon was a tremendous extravaganza. There was massive television coverage. I think it would be good to do something different. What is there which is dramatic? See if you can find something different.

Kissinger: Why don't I suggest to them that you would like something Nixon didn't do? Sian is the first capital and there is excavating there.

The President: That might attract the television.

[Omitted here is discussion of the Middle East.]

121. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Beijing, October 20, 1975, 10:00–11:40 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

China
Teng Hsiao-ping, Vice Premier of the State Council
Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Foreign Minister
Huang Chen, Chief, PRCLO, Washington, D. C.
Wang Hai-jung, Vice Foreign Minister
Lin P'ing, Director of American Oceanic Affairs, Foreign Ministry
T'ang Wen-sheng, Deputy Director of American Oceanic Affairs (translator)
Ting Yuan-hung, Director for U.S. Affairs, American and Oceanic Affairs, Foreign Ministry
Chao Chi-hua, Deputy Director for U.S. Affairs, American and Oceanic Affairs, Foreign Ministry
Shih Yen-hua, Translator
plus two notetakers

United States
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Ambassador George H. Bush, Chief, United States Liaison Office, Peking
Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department
Mr. Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Mr. Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff
Mr. William Gleysteen, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Miss Karlene G. Knieps, Notetaker

Teng: Anyway, we welcome you on your eighth visit to Peking.[2]

Kissinger: This room is very familiar to me—I have been here quite often.

Teng: It is almost a year, eleven months actually, since your last visit. It should be said that there have been quite a few changes in the world in these eleven months and therefore there is a need to exchange views on these changed circumstances.

Kissinger: It is always useful for us to exchange views.

Teng: It doesn't matter even if we quarrel a bit.

Kissinger: It gives the press something to write about.

Teng: Yes, and I believe they are immediately going to report that sentence.

---

[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, 1974–76, Box 2, China Memcons and Reports, October 19–23, 1975, Kissinger's Trip. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Great Hall of the People.

[2] Deng welcomed the U.S. party and briefly chatted with Kissinger the previous evening. (Memorandum of conversation, October 19; ibid.)

Kissinger: We should ask the Foreign Minister to fire the empty cannon; then they would have even more to report.

Teng: They are all men of letters and they have very deft hands.

Now, since the press have left, the Doctor is free to express his views.

Kissinger: Now we can say what we really think of each other.

Teng: Yes.

Kissinger: How does the Vice Premier propose that we proceed?

Teng: What is your idea?

Kissinger: We have a number of topics to discuss. As the Foreign Minister said yesterday, we have to prepare for the President's trip, and we should discuss that from the point of view of substance and procedure. With respect to substance, we would like to discuss both the public and the private aspect. That is, the sort of speeches that will be made and the sort of communiqué that will emerge. With respect to procedures, it is just a matter of where the President will go and what your proposals are. The second (topic) is a review of the world situation. The third is our bilateral topics.

And we would like with respect to the first topic to agree on an outline of a communiqué on this trip so that we avoid any possible misunderstandings during the President's trip.

Teng: As for the question of the communiqué, I believe you said last night that you have prepared a draft you would like to show to us. We can ask that you and our Foreign Minister first discuss the particular details (of a draft communiqué).

As to the places the President would like to visit, since he has been here before, we would like to defer to his preferences. I believe that is easy.

As for what we will say to each other after he comes, we can say whatever we want to say to each other. For instance, I have said before this to visiting American friends that it will be all right if we have discussions; also all right if we do not. It will be all right if our minds meet, or if they do not. We will welcome him.

Kissinger: There are two aspects to our discussions—the public and the private. The private discussions should be a very frank review of the world situation and our bilateral relations. (In the case of the public discussions,) it would serve the interests of neither side if it would appear that we were quarreling. I think we should reserve that for the UN and not for a Presidential visit.

Teng: There is still time for further discussions on that . . . for further concrete discussions. I suppose you mean the communiqué?

Kissinger: Quite frankly—and we can discuss it more privately on some occasion—I have in mind partly the communiqué and partly

what our newspapers will be writing. What binds us together is our common concern about hegemonial aspirations. It is our hope that the visit will be properly understood by our public.

Teng: I believe we will touch upon such matters during our discussions here.

Kissinger: At the end of this meeting perhaps we could leave five or ten minutes and I will give our communiqué draft to the Foreign Minister and I will explain what we are trying to do so that you can adjust it in the direction that is appropriate for you.

Teng: Alright.

Kissinger: The present plan, if this is agreeable to you, would be for the President to arrive here Monday, December 1 in the afternoon. And then to leave the following Saturday afternoon. That would be the 6th.

Teng: There is nothing inconvenient about the time with us.

Kissinger: And he will not visit any other countries in Asia while he is on this trip. (Earlier) I indicated to the Chief of your Liaison Office, who, I understand speaks perfect English now, that we might visit Indonesia but we have found that the press of preparing the budget and the State of the Union Address and other matters require the President's return immediately via Hawaii.

For your information, we plan that the Vice President visit Asia in February or March instead of the President.

Would it be convenient for you if, assuming we agree on major things here, that we send a technical advance party here the first week of November for about a week? My paper here says the advance people would number 65 people, but that cannot be true. We will reduce the numbers, but at any rate we will need an advance party and we will agree on the numbers. That is ridiculous—65 people.

Teng: It is not a great matter. It will be alright if you send 100.

Kissinger: The first time that I came here Prime Minister Chou En Lai asked me how many people would come with the President. I had no idea and I said maybe 50. I didn't realize that there were more than 50 security people alone. Eventually about 500 came, if I remember correctly.

We will, then, send the technical advance people the first week of November?

Teng: That is agreed upon.

Kissinger: Alright. And we will be in touch with the Liaison Office about the precise times and numbers.

Teng: Fine.

Kissinger: And we recommend that the television networks work out their own arrangements with you rather than through us, if that is agreeable to you.

Teng: I think that is alright.

Kissinger: They will also get in touch with the Liaison Office.

Shall we assume that the total numbers will be comparable to the Nixon visit on our side, including press?

Teng: I think that would be possible. A little bit more or less would not be of consequence to us.

Kissinger: There is no need to arrange separate meetings for the Secretary of State on this trip. All right. Shall we discuss other matters now?

Teng: Please.

Kissinger: Maybe a brief review of the international situation and the issues that we face?

Teng: Fine.

Kissinger: We have never had any illusions about our differences. And in any event the Foreign Minister is always there to remind us of them. But we also believe that we were brought together by certain strategic necessities. And therefore to us our relationship is not that of two enemies using each other but of two countries having a similar problem and working on it cooperatively. The strategic necessity which we both face is that of the Soviet threat. I think it is important to understand that here we face three problems: one, the overall strategy; second, the tactics that we have to pursue; and third, our relationship as it relates to the overall international situation.

As far as our strategic assessment is concerned we believe that the Soviet Union is gaining in strength and that at some point it may be tempted to translate that strength into political adventures. We think it is gaining in strength, not as a result of détente policies, but as a result of the development of technology and the general state of the economy. Since the Soviet Union is both a European and an Asian country, it is important to prevent it from achieving hegemony in either place. And since we are the principal element of defense against the Soviet Union, we have to be strong in both places. As I have said to your Foreign Minister, I do not know which theory is correct—whether they are feinting in the East to attack in the West or feinting in the West to attack in the East. I do not think it makes any difference, because if they attack in the West and succeed, the East will eventually face a much more massive force; and if they attack in the East, then the West will eventually face a much more massive force. So, as far as the United States is concerned, the problem is not significantly different. Our strategy is to attempt to maintain the world equilibrium to prevent attacks in either the West or the East.

This leads to the second question: the tactics to be pursued in carrying out the strategy. And here, there is obviously a difference

between us, although some of it arises from the difference in our geographic situation and our domestic situation. You believe in taking a public posture of great intransigence, though you do not necessarily act, for a variety of reasons, in every part of the world. We believe in taking a more flexible posture publicly, but we resist in any part of the world towards where the Soviet Union stretches out its hands. Therefore, in the Middle East, in Angola, in Portugal and in other places we have been quite active in order to prevent Soviet expansion, even when we had to do it alone and even when we were criticized for doing it.

In order to pursue this policy after the domestic upheavals we have had in America as a result of Vietnam and Watergate, it is absolutely essential for us that we are in a public posture at home that we are being provoked rather than causing the tension. You have to understand that those in America who talk most toughly are most likely to produce a paralysis of action in the various places around the world where we are now acting. The very people who are attacking us, now and then, for détente—I am speaking of Americans, I will speak of foreigners later—are also telling us what is wrong in the Middle East is that we are not settling it cooperatively with the Soviet Union—which has been our whole policy to avoid. You have seen enough of our people here so that you can form your own judgment. But if we had, for example, done what Mr. Vance and his crew recommended; namely, to renounce the first use of nuclear weapons, then the effect on our relative power rationale would lead to the Finlandization of Western Europe. But it cannot be, and we do not believe it can be in the interests of any country to allow the Soviet Union to believe we would accept a major strategic change—whether it is in the East or the West—concerning the use of nuclear weapons. It is in our interest to make the Soviet Union believe that we will not acquiesce in an overturning of the equilibrium no matter what weapons are involved. I cite this as an example of our position.

These are tactics for the conduct of our strategy. You need have no concern that we are conducting détente with illusions; we are conducting it as the best method for resisting Soviet expansionism. And we are not prepared to pay any significant price for it. Our being in this position enables us to maintain high military budgets year after year and to act as a brake on our allies.

Let me in this connection talk about some of our allies. With respect to Western Europe we think there are contradictory trends. On the one hand, our relations with the principal Western European countries have greatly improved. We have very many leadership meetings now at the highest levels, including the President and the Foreign Minister, where we have intimate exchanges.

On the other hand, we believe that in many European countries there is a tendency to base foreign policy on illusions. In many of them

there is the temptation to substitute goodwill for strength. And in some of them parties controlled by Moscow are strong enough to influence foreign policy, as in Italy and to some extent France.

We greatly welcome the many visits of European leaders to the People's Republic of China, and we appreciate your willingness to give them your perception of the international environment. We think, therefore, that the visit of the German Chancellor here next week can be of great significance. Our assessment is that within the Social Democratic Party he is by far the most realistic. And he is much less of a vague and sentimental mind than his predecessor. So, he would greatly benefit from your perceptions. It would strengthen him domestically and I think it would benefit the whole European situation, since he also has great influence with Giscard.

But, as I pointed out, in Europe we have the problem of perhaps especially optimistic assessments of foreign policy and we are also concerned with a leftist trend—anti-defense rather than ideological—which invites a weak defense posture. We have had difficulties on the southern flank in the Mediterranean. Some of them caused by our own domestic situation, with which our Ambassador is no doubt fully familiar. No country can afford a weakening, extending over years, of its central authority without paying some price for it over the next years. But we are in the process of rectifying this, and if you separate the debate from the votes, you will see we have lately been winning on the votes in Congress, which is a reflection of public opinion.

We have improved the situation in Portugal and we hope that within the next four–six months we can solve or make major progress on the Turkish/Greek/Cyprus problem.

You are familiar with the situation in the Middle East. We believe that the Soviet Union has suffered a major setback, President Sadat is coming to Washington next week to continue the development of a common strategy. But here again it is an area where it is important for us to understand the relationship between strategy and tactics. We recognize that the best way to prevent hegemonistic desires in the Middle East is to bring about a permanent settlement. But we also realize that one cannot bring about a permanent settlement by rhetoric or by putting forward plans. Permanent settlement has a local component; it has an international component; and it has an American domestic component. Our problem is to synchronize these three aspects. We cannot master the local component unless we demonstrate the Soviet Union cannot bring about a conclusion. So that whenever the Soviet Union interferes, we have to go through a period of demonstrating its impotence. We also have to teach the Soviet clients in the Middle East that the only road to a settlement leads through Washington.

The second necessity we have is to get our domestic opinion used to a more even-handed policy between the Arabs and Israelis—as

Chairman Mao suggested when I saw him two years ago. Every previous comprehensive American effort has failed because of the inability to mobilize our domestic support. We now believe the objective conditions exist for a comprehensive settlement for the first time under American leadership. And we intend to move in that direction immediately after our elections.

In the meantime we will take interim steps to alleviate the situation. And in any event, no one else has any realistic alternatives. But it is our fixed policy to move towards a comprehensive settlement. The major danger now is Arab disunity exploited by the Soviet Union. And whatever influence other countries may have, especially on Syria, would be of great importance.

There are other issues: Japan, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Korea. But we have several days to discuss them. I want to say one thing about Korea where we clearly have different views. We are not opposed to reunification and we are not opposed to a dialogue, but we are opposed to having separate talks with North Korea to the exclusion of South Korea. I would also like to say that it is possible that by forcing the pace of events too far, geopolitical realities could be created that are not always to the benefit of those who force the pace.

Let me say a word about our bilateral relations. On normalization, we have made clear our continuing commitment to the principles of the Shanghai Communiqué, and we will suggest to you some formulations in the communiqué which suggest some progress in that direction. We think it is important to show some vitality and forward movement in our bilateral relationship. We do not do this because we particularly care about the level of trade between the United States and China, and we believe also that China, having survived 2,000 years of its history without extensive contact with the United States, may manage to stagger on for many more years without extensive exchange between our various cultural troupes. We can even survive your favorite songs without revolution. But to us that is not the issue. To us the issue is how to be in the best position to resist hegemonial aspirations in the West as well as in the East. And if that is the case, it is important that we show some movement in our relationship. It is difficult to gain public support for what may have to be done if China is not an important element in American consciousness, and it cannot be unless there is some improvement in our bilateral relationship. This is entirely up to you. We have nothing very material to gain from it. But if there is an inequality in American public consciousness between relations with China and the Soviet Union, it is because nothing very substantial is happening in our relationship.

While I am here, Mr. Habib is prepared to meet with anybody you designate to discuss this relationship, if you are interested. It is up to you.

To sum up, we consider our relations with the People's Republic of China, as I have now said on two public occasions, a very significant element in our overall policy. It is that, because of our assessment of the world situation. It is that, because we believe it is important to maintain the overall situation against aspirations to hegemony. We are not doing it in order to be able to divide up the world in two with the Soviet Union—an opportunity which has often been offered to us, and which we have always rejected because we would become the ultimate victim of such a procedure. We told you about the treaty that Brezhnev offered to the President in Vladivostok.

So we are bound to have our differences in ideology and in specific countries, but I also believe we have some important common interests and it is those common interests which have brought me here eight times, I believe, for more extensive visits than to any other country. There are many other points we will want to discuss. I am sure you want to discuss Japan. And I have already discussed Angola with your Foreign Minister, where we would find it helpful if Tanzania would release some of your arms that they are blocking. But we can discuss that during the course of my visit here. You will have noticed that as a former professor, I spoke exactly fifty minutes.

Teng: Are you finished?

Kissinger: I have another fifty minutes at least, but I want to give you an opportunity first.

Teng: So, shall we first invite you to finish your speech and then we will give our opinion? You can go on to the next fifty minutes.

Kissinger: No. I have substantially stated my overall views. There is one additional point I wish to make. You must not judge the mood of the United States by the atmosphere in Washington. And you must not judge the attitudes of America by the mood of the most unrepresentative Congress we have ever had. This last Congress was elected in the immediate aftermath of the resignation of President Nixon when those who had been for him were very demoralized. I have been traveling through the country systematically and I am certain that we will get wide support for the policy that I have described to you. Your Liaison Office may not see that (mood) in Washington. It is no reflection on your Liaison Office—it is simply a reflection on Washington. This is all I have to say now and I will make more comments after I have heard from you.

Teng: I have listened carefully to the views and points regarding the international situation that the Doctor has given. There is a question I would like to ask. How much grain are you selling to the Soviet Union this year?

Kissinger: (Laughter) Let me explain the grain policy. I was going to mention it later. In the past the Soviet Union has bought grain in

emergencies from the United States. Given the organization of our economy, we have no technical way of preventing this. So in 1972 they bought 20 million tons of grain. In subsequent years they bought very little. That means when they bought grain they have had an extremely disruptive effect on our economy. Also, we have had the problem of how to use their need for grain in order to bring about policies that are compatible with our interest, and how to do this in an economy that has no technical means of preventing the sale and to prevent pressures on us from our own agricultural interests. I want to explain our thinking to you so that you can understand it. So what we did this year is the following: they have a very bad harvest. We sold them about 9.8 million tons of grain. We then brought about a stoppage of further sales by pressure on the private companies, which caused us enormous domestic difficulties. We used this period of stoppage to force the Soviet Union to ship a substantial part of the grain in American ships, at about double the world rate, and giving us an opportunity to control the rate of delivery. We then insisted on a long-term grain agreement which will probably be signed today or tomorrow.

Teng: The annual amount?

Kissinger: About 6 million tons for five years.

Teng: The total is 6 million?

Kissinger: Annually 6 million tons. But the important point is that it forces them to buy when they don't need it, and it places a ceiling on what we have to sell when they are in an emergency.

Teng: Do you think that this massive buying of grain not only from the United States but also other quarters is only to fill their stomachs but also for strategic reserves?

Kissinger: We believe that they have had a catastrophic crop this year. It is about 160 million tons, below the normal of about 225. At Helsinki Brezhnev asked to buy 15 million tons from us on top of the 9.8 million he had already bought, but we are only going to sell him about 5 million more this year. All our information is that they will have to slaughter cattle this year to reduce their livestock because they are short of feed grains to feed them.

Teng: May I ask another question? That is, how are the negotiations about sales of American modern equipment and technology to the Soviet Union coming along?

Kissinger: What modern equipment and technology?

Teng: I believe you have constant communication with them on this.

Kissinger: They have constant interest in modern equipment and technology. We are not selling a great deal at this moment. Nothing of any significance.

Teng: We have noticed that France has been engaging in negotiations with them for long-term agreements involving about 2.5 million Francs.

Kissinger: While we have talked more than we have done in economic credits, the Europeans have done more than they have said. They have given altogether—between the Federal Republic and France—about $7.5 billion in credit. We have given them about 500 million over years.

Teng: $7 billion?

Kissinger: Yes. We have used the prospect of technology to moderate their foreign policy conduct and we are trying to employ a strategy of keeping the Soviets dependent by not selling plans but parts to them. It is the folly of the European countries that they are selling plans. Unfortunately the small amount of U.S. credits has had the effect of throwing the business into the hands of the Europeans who have no strategy at all. For us it is not a business proposition. We are doing it for a strategic proposition.

Teng: We have seen from publications that the amount of such dealings between the United States and the Soviet Union seems to have exceeded that of the European and other countries.

Kissinger: That is totally incorrect. The amount of dealings we can control; that is, governmental credits, have been less than $500 million. There may be another three or four hundred million of private credits. In any event, the things we can control we do in such a manner that they can always be shut off and that they do not have rapid completion dates.

Teng: May I ask another question? What is the Doctor's assessment of the consequences of the Helsinki Conference?

Kissinger: I do not believe . . . It is one point where I do not agree, where our assessments are totally different. We sometimes disagree on tactics. I do not agree the Helsinki Conference was a significant event. In America it has had no impact whatever and insofar as it is known in America, it is as a device to ask the Soviet Union to ease their control over Eastern Europe and over their own people.

In Western Europe if one looks at (specific) countries, it may have had some minor negative impact in a minority of countries. In France, Britain, and the Federal Republic it has had no impact. In Eastern Europe it is the countries like Yugoslavia, Romania and Poland which most want to be independent of the Soviet Union which have been the most active supporters of the Helsinki Conference. I do not think we should proclaim Soviet victories that do not exist. Our role in the European Security Conference, as I told you last year, was essentially passive. We do not believe it has had a major impact.

Teng: But we have noticed that those who have been most enthusiastic in proclaiming the so-called victories of the European Security Conference are first of all the Soviet Union and secondly the United States.

Kissinger: No. First of all the Soviet Union and secondly our domestic opponents in the United States. The United States Government has not claimed any great achievements for the European Security Conference. The Soviet Union has . . . must claim success since it pursued this policy for fifteen years.

Our indications are that the Soviet Union may feel—whatever they say publicly—that they have miscalculated with respect to the European Security Conference. All they got from the West were general statements about matters that had already been settled in the past while we have obtained means of very specific pressures on matters of practical issues.

There were no unsettled frontiers in Europe. The Balkan frontiers were settled in 1946–47 in the peace conferences in Paris. The Eastern frontier of Poland was settled at Yalta. The Western frontier of Poland was recognized by both German states. There are no frontiers in Europe that are not recognized. Not all of our politicians know this but this is legally a fact.

Teng: So shall we call it a morning and continue this afternoon?

Kissinger: Alright.

Teng: And we can give our opinions.

Kissinger: Shall I give the communiqué to the Foreign Minister?

Teng: Alright. Perhaps you could explain it here.

Kissinger: May I explain a few points? In the spirit of what I said earlier we expressed the most positive things which can be said which you may want to moderate. But leaving aside the rhetorical aspects of any communiqué there are three categories in our relationship which attract attention: one is what we say about hegemony; second is what we say about normalization; and the third is what we say about our bilateral relations. With respect to hegemony, what we say may help ease public opinion problems of some other countries, especially if we don't put it in the preamble. What we have attempted to do with respect to both hegemony and normalization is to go some steps beyond the Shanghai Communiqué.

Teng: One moment please. (Teng leaves the room.) You can continue. Please wait. Excuse us for a moment.

(Teng returns to the room.)

Kissinger: We did the same with the bilateral things. Since we don't know your thinking we put in everything that could conceivably be put down but to us the primary significance is symbolic. One or two

things on the bilateral things I would like to explain in a more restricted meeting as I explained to the Foreign Minister yesterday in the car. More restricted on our side. I do not care who participates on your side.

[Secretary hands Communiqué to the Foreign Minister. Attached.][3]

Kissinger: Is two copies enough for you?

Teng: I think that is enough.

Kissinger: The last time I gave the Foreign Minister a three page Communiqué, he came back with three lines.

(Laughter)

Teng: If what you want to discuss in a restricted group is what you mentioned to the Foreign Minister in the car, if it is of that nature, then as Chairman Mao has made our position very clear to you in his discussions before, especially in the visit of 1973, it is our view that perhaps such restrictive talks will not be necessary.

Kissinger: It is up to you.

Teng: As for the Communiqué draft we will look it over and then we can further consult each other. I heard you have an idea you would like to . . . that you want to go to the Palace Museum this afternoon with your wife. Perhaps we should begin later. At 4:00 p.m.

Kissinger: Good.

Teng: So we shall agree upon meeting at 4:00 p.m. this afternoon. In this same room. Because this is very close to the Palace Museum.

Kissinger: That's fine.

Meeting ended at 11:40 a.m.

[3] The draft communiqué is attached but not printed. Brackets are in the original.

122. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Beijing, October 20, 1975, 4:15–6:35 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Vice Premier of the State Council, People's Republic of China
Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Wang Hai-jung, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
Huang Chen, Chief of the PRC Liaison Office, Washington
Lin P'ing, Director, Department of American and Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
T'ang Wen-sheng, Deputy Director, Department of American and Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Tsien Ta-yung, Political Counselor, PRC Liaison Office, Washington
Ting Yuan-hung, Director, United States Office, Department of American and Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Chao Chi-hua, Deputy Director, United States Office, Department of American and Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Shih Yen-hua (Interpreter)

Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
George Bush, Chief of the United States Liaison Office, Peking
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
William H. Gleysteen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Oscar V. Armstrong, Director, People's Republic of China and Mongolian Affairs, Department of State
Richard H. Solomon, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council

SUBJECT

Global Strategy for Dealing with the Soviet Union; the Historical Lessons of the 1930s

Vice Premier Teng: You visited the Forbidden City?!

Secretary Kissinger: I love to visit there. During my last trip I escaped my keepers and visited there by myself.

I appreciate all the arrangements you have made.

Vice Premier Teng: It seems to me that of all emperors and kings [in the world], the Chinese emperors did not know how to enjoy life.

Secretary Kissinger: Didn't know how to enjoy life?

Vice Premier Teng: In terms of food and clothing, yes; but in terms of the quality of their residences they did not know how to enjoy life.

---

[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, 1974–76, Box 2, China Memcons and Reports, October 19–23, 1975, Kissinger's Trip. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Great Hall of the People. All brackets are in the original.

One other thing is that the Chinese emperors changed their clothes every day—new clothes every day! Do you think they would be very comfortable wearing new clothes every day? And at every meal the emperor would have 99 courses. Actually they could only take whatever was close to them.

Secretary Kissinger: It doesn't sound like trouble or hardship to me. If you give me one corner [of the Forbidden City] I would be comforable.

Vice Premier Teng: That was built by the Empress Dowager.

And the other feature of the Chinese emperors was that whatever [food] they thought of they would try to get immediately. The Imperial cooks would only give them food that was most obtainable. They didn't give them any other dishes, otherwise the emperor would kill the cooks!

Secretary Kissinger: Why was that?

Vice Premier Teng: Because the cooks could only get the things that were available in that season. If the emperor liked a dish and asked for it but could not get it, he would kill the cook.

Secretary Kissinger: That is what my staff does in the State Department. They try to limit my choices.

Vice Premier Teng: Let's turn to the subjects we are going to discuss. I will first explain our views.

Our relations were started in February, 1972. That was during President Nixon's visit to China. And before that Doctor made visits to Peking to prepare for President Nixon's visit to China. And we have stated on more than one occasion that we appreciate the first remarks by former President Nixon to Chairman Mao. When he met the Chairman he said, "I have come to China out of our national interest." We also appreciate that President Nixon took this courageous step. And we also understand the sincerity of President Nixon when he said that he had come to China out of the national interest of the United States. We believe this is not diplomatic talk.

And thereafter, the Doctor made several visits to China, and Chairman Mao told President Nixon, as well as the Doctor, that we have common points which were reflected in the Shanghai Communiqué. Our common aim is to fix the polar bear, deal with the polar bear.

I believe the Doctor also remembers that when in talking about the Middle East, Chairman Mao also advised the United States to use two hands. You should not only use one hand to help Israel, but also the other hand to help the Arab countries, especially Egypt. In the talk, Chairman Mao emphasized that China supported the Arab countries. And this position of China is different from that of the United States. But we can also see a common ground—that is we can both fix the polar bear.

Chairman Mao stressed on many occasions that between us there are certain problems of bilateral relations, but what is more important are the international problems. On international issues, we think we should look at the international problems from a political point of view. Only in this way can we have a common view, can we have coordination in some respects. And exactly on this point we appreciate the statesmanship of President Nixon. We have never attached any importance to what you call the Watergate event. By political problems I mean how we should deal with the Soviet Union. This is a question of strategy—a question of global strategy.

And this morning I listened attentively to the Doctor's remarks,[2] and according to what you said this morning the United States has a clear world view with regard to strategy, and now you are only thinking of tactics. As I understand it, tactics are guided by strategy and serve strategy. The tactics manifest in various fields may conform to the strategy and may also deviate from strategy.

The Doctor seems to believe that the Chinese are intransigent in tactics, and I know what you are referring to. You put stress on flexibility. If we are to make an assessment of ourselves, we can say that we have never been intransigent. We think that flexibility must conform to strategic needs. Too much flexibility leads people to wonder what the strategy really is.

This morning the Doctor first talked about strategy towards the Soviet Union. There exist differences between us in this respect. We believe the focus of the Soviet strategy is in the West, in Europe—in the Middle East, the Mediterranean, and the Persian Gulf—all the places linked to Europe.

Although the Soviet Union has stationed one million troops along the 7,200 kilometer border [between Russian an China] the Soviet strategy remains toward the West. The Soviet strategy is to make a feint toward the East while attacking in the West.

In this regard, the U.S. has stressed to us on many occasions the danger of a Soviet attack against China. I believe that the Doctor still remembers that Chairman Mao had a deep talk with you in this regard. He concluded that the polar bear is out to fix the United States.

We have heard, on not less than one occasion, that the Doctor has said that whether the Soviet Union was making a feint in the East while attacking the West, or making a feint in the West while attacking in the East, this makes not much difference.

We hold different views. How to assess Soviet strategy? This is not a matter of rhetoric but a matter of substance. This assessment is the

---

[2] See Document 121.

starting point of the tactics formulated to deal with international matters.

We say that the focus of the Soviet strategy is in the West and it is out to fix the United States. Even the one million Soviet troops stationed in the East are directed against the U.S. Seventh Fleet first of all and not merely against China. First we say that the Soviet troops are directed against the Seventh Fleet, and then Japan, and then China. Also we say that the Soviet focus is in the West.

We are also making solid preparations. But one should by no means be under the false impression that when China proposes this theory that China wants to direct the Soviet Union Westward so that the Soviet Union will not go to the East.

I heard that during your first trip to China, prior to President Nixon's visit, Premier Chou talked to you. I was not present, but he said China's strategy was to get prepared to deal with aggression from all sides. At that time we did not have the Shanghai Communiqué yet. Well, although I have read the verbal record of your talk, I do not remember what the original words were; but anyway, the Premier told you that even if the Soviet Union siezes the land north of the Yellow River, and Japan grabs the northeast, the United States the east, and India grabs Tibet, we are not afraid. That was what we thought at that time.

After the Shanghai Communiqué, we made no reference to these words. We have always believed that we should rely on our independent strength to deal with the Soviet Union, and we have never cherished any illusions about this. We have told this to the Doctor as well as to visiting American friends. We do not depend on nuclear weapons; even less on nuclear protection [by other countries]. We depend on two things: First is the perseverance of the 800 million Chinese people. If the Soviet Union wants to attack China it must be prepared to fight for at least two decades. We mainly depend on millet plus rifles. Of course, this millet plus rifles is different from what we had during Yenan times. We pursue a policy of self-reliance in our economic construction and also in our strategic problems.

As I said just now, we are not directing the evil of the Soviet Union Westward, but we are concerned about the West because if the Soviet Union is to make trouble its focal point is in the West. Naturally we are concerned about it. It is precisely proceeding from this assessment that we are interested in a unified and strong Europe—including the improvement of relations between Europe and the United States.

It is also precisely proceeded from this strategic assessment that we advised you to use both of your hands in dealing with Arabs and Israelis.

It is also precisely out of this strategic assessment that we expressed that we did not understand the attitude of the United States in the case when the Soviet Union and India dismembered Pakistan.

These are political problems as well as strategic problems, and these include tactics under the guidance of these problems, these strategic problems—for instance, when we advised you to use both of your hands [in the Middle East] this was tactics.

It was also precisely out of this strategic assessment that we have often told you, as well as Japan, that Japan should put a first priority on relations between Japan and the United States and then between Japan and China. This not only concerns the West but also the East.

On this point, we have advised our American friends on many occasions that the United States should formulate its own focus of strategy. We have often said the United States was keeping ten fleas under its ten fingers and that the United States should not let itself bog down in the quagmire of Indochina.

And out of this strategic consideration, when the United States was building its military base in Diego Garcia on the Indian Ocean China did not criticize this.

On these questions and a number of other issues we proceed from political and strategic considerations to deal with international problems as well as our bilateral relations. We have made our assessment of Soviet strategy after careful study of the international situation. In our talks with the Europeans, they have constantly raised the [following] question: "If there is trouble in Europe, what will be the attitude of the United States?" I will be very candid with the Doctor, the Europeans are very apprehensive on this point.

Secretary Kissinger: But *our* question is what will be the attitude of the *Europeans*?

Vice Premier Teng: Perhaps this has something to do with your relations with the Europeans. The Doctor may recall that in 1973 Chairman Mao asked you whether it was possible for the new isolationism to emerge in the United States.[3] You answered in the affirmative, negative term. You said no.

Secretary Kissinger: I just now said to Mr. Lord that I knew I was tricky, but I am not *that* tricky—to answer "affirmatively no." (Laughter)

Vice Premier Teng: But from that you can assess what Chairman Mao is thinking, what we are thinking about. This observation of the situation dates back as early as the first nuclear arms talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. Those talks took place in 1963. That

[3] See Document 58.

treaty was prepared by three countries, and it left a deep impression on me at that time. I made my last visit to the Soviet Union as head of the delegation of the Chinese Communist Party to negotiate with the Russians, and it [the non-proliferation treaty] was made public on the day when we left [Moscow].

At that time our talks with the Soviet Union were completely bankrupt, and we were certain that a most important part of the treaty was directed against China. I don't doubt that at that time the attitude of the United States and the British was to restrain the Soviet Union from nuclear development. Of course this is a strategic problem and, in terms of tactics, after more than nine years—nearly ten years—in this period things have changed. They show that the aim—the purpose—of these tactics has failed to be achieved.

In 1972, when you reached the second [SALT] agreement, the Soviet Union drastically quickened their pace in the development of nuclear arms. Their pace was quicker than the United States. When the third agreement [on prevention of nuclear war] was reached between your countries, it [the strategic balance] had reached equilibrium. In November last year when we met [after the Vladivostok meeting], the Doctor informed us that the number of Soviet missiles had not yet reached the ceiling, and this morning you told us that the number of Soviet missiles had exceeded the ceiling—leaving aside the quality.

This is our observation from one angle. And in the race between the Soviet Union and the United States, the United States has not gained. In terms of conventional weapons, the Soviet Union has far exceeded you and Europe.

It is almost eleven months since we met last year. During this period we have again made our observations. And through our observations we have got the impression that the Helsinki Conference is an indication—and not only the Helsinki Conference, but things before the Helsinki Conference—that it is worthwhile to recall history.

Secretary Kissinger: What things?

Vice Premier Teng: Well, problems of various descriptions [mentioned] earlier.

By recalling history, I mean the period prior to the Second World War—the period 1936 to 1939, which is particularly worthwhile to recall. The Doctor studies history and I think is more knowledgable than I.

As I understand, the Doctor once said that in actuality the Soviet Union has gone beyond the Rhineland. This shows that the Doctor has made a study of it. After the Germans entered into the Rhineland you may recall what was the attitude of the British and French, and what

was the policy pursued by Chamberlain and Daladier. They pursued a policy of appeasement towards Hitler, and shortly after that the Munich agreement was concluded.

In pursuing such policies the purpose of Chamberlain and Daladier was obvious. They wanted to direct the peril Eastward, and their first aim was to appease Hitler so that he would not take rash actions. Their second aim was to direct the peril toward the East. The stark historical realities have brought out the failure of the policies carried out by Chamberlain and Daladier. Their policies have gone to the opposite of their wishes. They neither got international peace and stability nor achieved their purpose of directing the peril of Hitler to the East. Instead, the spearhead of Hitler was directed to the West—Czechoslovakia and Poland. These countries were in the West, and they [the Germans] did not attack the Soviet Union first.

If I remember correctly from what I read in newspapers, when Chamberlain visited Germany he carried an umbrella. But it neither shaded him from the moon or the sun—no, the rain or the sun. At that time France boasted that they had the Maginot line. But Germany did not attack the Maginot line. They attacked from Belgium and attacked France, and France collapsed and Chamberlain gave up all resistance. He mobilized all the ships to move from Dunkirk—that is, he wanted to slip away.

So in fact this appeasement policy led to an earlier break out of the Second World War. In our contacts with quite a number of Europeans they often raise the lessons of Munich. According to our observations, we may say that the danger of such historical tragedy is increasing.

The Doctor asked just now what were other things apart from the Helsinki Conference. I raised three questions to you this morning. This shows there were other things apart from the Helsinki Conference.

In terms of strategy, Soviet weapons have far exceeded those of the West. Also you have reached the equilibrium of weapons. In terms of total military strength, the Soviet Union has a greater military strength than the United States and the European countries put together. But the Soviet Union has two big weaknesses: One, they lack food grains; the second is that their industrial equipment and technology is backward. In the long run although the Soviet Union has a greater military strength, these two weaknesses have put the Soviet Union in a weak position. It is limited in its strength so that when a war breaks out the Soviet Union cannot hold out long.

Therefore, we do not understand why the United States and the West have used their strong points to make up for the Soviet weakness. If the United States and Europe have taken advantage of the weaknesses of the Soviet Union you might have been in a stronger negotiating position.

As for our views on the Helsinki Conference, I think you know our views, which differ from yours. We call it the European *Insecurity* Conference and you call it the European *Security* Conference. The Munich agreement pulled the wool over the eyes of Chamberlain, Daladier, and some European people. And in the case when you supply them, make up for the weak points of the Soviet Union, you help the Soviet Union to overcome its weaknesses. You can say you pulled the wool over the eyes of the West and demoralized the Western people and let them slacken their pace. We have a Chinese saying: A donkey is made to push the mill stone because when you make the donkey to push around the mill stone you have to blindfold it.

This is a political or we may say a strategic problem in the present situation which people are most concerned with. And we are now speaking our views on these problems very candidly.

As for the Russians, they now feel you cannot restrain them. They are not reliable and cannot be restrained. And, of course, in the West—including the United States—there are two schools of public opinion. A greater part of the public opinion has clearly seen this. A considerable, greater part of the public opinion has seen this. We understand that the Americans, Europeans, and including the Japanese, do not want a war because they have gone through two World Wars. This we can understand. They fear a war.

We always feel that to rely on the European Security Conference, or anything else in an attempt to appease the Russians, will fail. These things will be counter productive. For example, the Europeans fear war day and night. They hope to obtain peace for a certain period of time at any price. Exactly because of that, we should not blindfold them by the evolution of détente. We should remind them of the possibility of attack from the polar bear. So every time Chairman Mao meets foreign guests he advises them to get prepared. Without preparation they would suffer. The most effective way to deal with the possible attack from the Russians is not what you call agreements or treaties, [not] what is written on paper, but actual preparations.

As for China, we have told you on many occasions, and I will [again] tell you frankly, that China fears nothing under heaven or on earth. China will not ask favors from anyone. We depend on the digging of tunnels. We rely on millet plus rifles to deal with all problems internationally and locally, including the problems in the East.

There is an argument in the world to the effect that China is afraid of an attack by the Russians. As a friend, I will be candid and tell you that this assessment is wrong.

Today we are only talking about strategic problems. The Doctor was a former professor. I have taken my 50 minutes to talk and I have gone beyond 50 minutes. That was because I am only a soldier. It is

not easy to confine oneself within 50 minutes. I once taught in a school. I gave a lecture for 50 minutes, but I have never been a professor. I have taken too much of your time.

Secretary Kissinger: No, it was interesting and important.

Can we take a five minute break, and maybe I will make a few observations?

Vice Premier Teng: Yes.

(There was a short break at this point.)

Secretary Kissinger: Do you want me to make some observations now, or how do you propose to proceed?

Vice Premier Teng: Yes. Please go ahead.

Secretary Kissinger: I listened with great interest to the Vice Premier's presentation and I would like to make a few observations.

First, I have noticed the frequent reference to President Nixon. I have worked very closely with President Nixon. And I think it is correct to say that we jointly designed the policy to which you referred approvingly. It is also the case that I am still in touch with him every two or three weeks at some length, so I know his views very precisely. I can safely say that the policy we are pursuing today is the policy that President Nixon would pursue if it had not been for Watergate. The policy toward the Soviet Union that is being pursued today was designed by President Nixon and myself and is the same that is being pursued today. There is no difference between President Nixon's policy toward the Soviet Union and President Ford's. If anything, President Ford is a nuance tougher toward the Soviet Union. And I say this as the one man in public life who has maintained contact with President Nixon and never criticized him and has stated publicly that he has made a great contribution in matters of foreign policy.

Leaving this aside, I must say I listened to the Vice Premier's presentation with some sadness. I had thought, obviously incorrectly, that some of the public statements which I had heard were said for public effect. But this is obviously not the case. Now what I regret is that I can understand two countries, operating from the same perception, can operate using different tactics—and can understand each other's tactics. That causes me no difficulty. But if there is not a common strategic perception, then one wonders what exactly the basis of our policy is. If you seriously think that we are trying to push the Soviet Union to attack in the East, then we are in grave danger of frittering away all our efforts—with yourself and everyone else.

The Vice Premier was kind enough to point out the lessons of history between 1936 and 1939. He pointed out that those in the West who tried to push the aggressor towards the East became the first victims of the attack; and that is true. But it is also true that those in the East

who sought to escape their dilemma by pushing their aggressor toward the West eventually became the objects of the aggressor anyway.

And when we say that the West and the East have essentially the same strategic problem, we don't say this because we have an interest in participating in the defense of the East. Anyone who knows the American domestic situation must know that this cannot be our overwhelming ambition. We say it because strategically wherever the attack occurs it will affect the other. And you act on these assumptions too.

And we are saying this not to do you any favors, because you are not all that helpful to us in other parts of the world. We are doing this out of our own national interest.

In 1971, in January of 1971, before we had been in China, during the crisis in India, when India had dismembered Pakistan, I talked to your Ambassador in New York on a Friday evening. He told me that China always fights as long as it has one rifle. I then told him we would move an aircraft carrier into the Bay of Bengal. On Sunday morning, when we were on the way to the Azores to meet President Pompidou, we received a message that your Ambassador in New York wanted to see us; and we sent General Haig to see him. We thought then that you might be taking some military action. And we decided that even though we had no diplomatic relations—President Nixon and I decided—that if you moved, and if the Soviet Union brought pressure on you, we would resist and assist you, even though you had not asked us to. We did that out of our conviction of the national interest.

And we have said recently again to the Prime Minister of Pakistan—because he asked us about this—we said that we would not be indifferent if the Soviet Union brought pressure on China because of the Indian situation. He must have told you this. And again, you have not asked us to do this, nor did we do this as a favor to China.

So, since I have been in Washington we have gone to a confrontation with the Soviet Union three times: Once over a nuclear submarine base in Cuba; once over the Syrian invasion of Jordan; once over the question of the alert in the Middle East in 1973 and—no, four times—once on the question of access routes to Berlin. We did all of these things on our own, without knowing what any other country, much less China, would do.

The Vice Premier referred to the spirit of Munich. I have studied that period and I lived through it, as a victim, so I know it rather well. The Munich policy was conducted by governments who denied that there was a danger, and who attempted to avoid their problems by denying that they existed. The current United States policy, as we have attempted to tell you, has no illusions about the danger, but it attempts to find the most effective means of resistance given the realities we

face. A country that spends $110 billion a year for defense cannot be said to be pursing the spirit of Munich. But the reality we face is a certain attitude that has developed in the United States and an attitude that exists also in Europe even much more.

I know some of the Europeans who you talk about. Some are personally good friends of mine. But there is no European of any standing that has any question about what the United States will do. In any threat, we will be there. Our concern is whether the *Europeans* will be there. It is the United States that organizes the defense of the North Atlantic and that brings about the only cohesion that exists. It was not the United States that advocated the European Security Conference. It was, rather, to ease some of the pressures on the European governments that we reluctantly agreed to it in 1971.

Now the Vice Premier is quite correct, this is a problem that greatly concerns us, whether the policy that is being pursued may lead to confusion. This is a serious concern. But the Vice Premier should also consider that the policy we are pursuing is the best means we have to rally resistance. If we pursued some other approach, the left wing parties in Europe might split the United States from Europe with the argument that the United States is a threat to the peace of the world.

If you follow the present investigations that are going on in America, you will see that it was the present Administration, including myself, that has used methods to prevent the Soviet Union from stretching out its hands—even if these are not your preferred methods.

And if we were slow in our disengagement from Indochina—and this was not a situation that we created—it was precisely to prevent the mood of neoisolationism from developing that Chairman Mao talked of. We do not rely on the European Security Conference. And we do not rely on détente. Nor is everyone in the United States who talks against détente a reliable opponent of the Soviet Union, because without a strategic grasp of the situation much of it [anti-détente talk] is simply politics. To talk tough is easy—to act with strength and maintain support for a strong policy over a period of time in a democracy is a difficult problem.

If the Soviet Union should stretch out its hands, we will be brutal in our response, no matter where it occurs—and we won't ask people whether they share our assessment when we resist. But to be able to do this we have to prepare our public by our own methods, and by methods that will enable us to sustain this policy over many years, and not go like Dulles from a period of intransigence to a period of excessive conciliation.

The Administration in the '50's started out not willing to shake hands with Communists [translated as, "with China"] and wound up almost giving away Berlin—had it not been for Khrushchev's clumsiness.

Our strategy is exactly as we discussed it with Chairman Mao three years ago. It has not changed, and it has the strategic advantage. But we have to be the best judge of the means appropriate to our situation. And we will not stand still for a strategic advance by the Soviet Union.

And we do not separate the fronts into East and West. If the Soviet Union feels strong enough to attack in either the West or the East, the policy will already have failed. The Soviet Union must not be in a position where it feels strong enough to attack at all.

Now I would like to correct a few other misapprehensions which the Vice Premier voiced, and then I will make one other observation.

One thing has to do with relative military strength. It is perfectly true that the Soviet Union has gained in relative strength in the last decade. This is not the result of the agreements that have been signed. This is the result of changes in technology, and the erroneous decision of the Administration that was in office in the 60's when the Soviet Union was building up its strategic forces. If you analyze the result of the [SALT] agreement of 1972, since 1972 the strategic strength of the United States has increased considerably relative to that of the Soviet Union. It is also true that after some point in the field of strategic weapons, it is difficult to translate military superiority into a political advantage.

With respect to the second agreement, the Vladivostok agreement, you must have translated what I said incorrectly from the German. There has been no change in the Soviet strength since Vladivostok. Since the Soviet Union does not dismantle their obsolete units, they have 2,700 units and they have had those for five years. After Vladivostok they would have to get rid of 200. Since we *do* get rid of our obsolete units we have somewhat less than 2,400. But numbers are not so important anyway, as each [U.S.] unit can carry more warheads. We have gone ahead by a ratio of 6 or 7 to 1. Moreover, since the Soviets like big things which take room, they have about 85 to 90 percent of their forces on land, where they are vulnerable because the accuracy of our forces is improved. Less than 20 percent of our forces are on land, and they are less vulnerable. So it is not true that in the strategic balance we are behind, even though there are many newspaper articles in America written for political purposes that assert this.

In 1960 President Kennedy was elected by speaking of the missile gap, even though the Soviet Union had only 30 missiles, each of which took ten hours to get ready to fire and we had 1,200 airplanes. Ever since then it has been the secret dream of every American presidential candidate to run on a missile gap campaign, so we are in danger of this issue erupting every four years.

In 1970 when we confronted the Soviets on the submarine base in Cuba, in 1970 in Jordan, in 1970 in Berlin, and in 1973 in the Middle

East, they always yielded within 36 hours when we made a military move. Their military calculations are not as optimistic as some of our European friends fear—such as Denmark.

On the question of food grains: We have moved at the slowest pace that is politically possible for us, and have even held up our grain sales —even while Canada, Australia, Argentina, and Western Europe have cleared out their bins in selling to the Soviets. The long term program we are now negotiating precisely prevents them from storing large quantities because it puts a ceiling on what they can buy in one year on the American market.

So our policy is quite clear, and in pursuing it we have not asked anything from China. We have kept you informed by our many discussions, but I don't recall that we have ever asked for anything from the People's Republic of China. Of course, China pursues its own policies, and we respect your independence. I hope you will make the positions which you made clear to us clear to every European visitor who comes here. We do not object to your public posture. We think it is essentially correct, and indeed it is even helpful. We *do* object when you direct it against us, when you accuse us of betraying our allies and endangering the security of the world by deliberately promoting war and standing on the side lines, when in fact we are doing actual things to prevent a war and preserve the world equilibrium.

And you should also consider that if the United States public finds too much discouragement around the world, and if everywhere we move we find the opposition of every country, then precisely this mood of isolationism which concerns so many other countries will develop.

We attach great significance to our relationship with the People's Republic of China because we believe you conduct a serious policy and because we believe your word counts. And we believe that the world is one entity from a strategic point of view and a political point of view.

We are prepared to coordinate actions along the lines of my conversations with Chairman Mao two years ago. But the world situation is extremely complex, and the domestic situations around the world are also extremely complex. It is important that you have a correct perception of our objectives. If you think we are engaged in petty tactical maneuvers then that would be a pity for both of us. You do not ask for favors, and we do not ask for favors. The basis of a correct policy is an accurate perception of the national interest and respect by each side for the perception of the national interest of the other.

This is why we think a visit by the President here would be useful, and that is the purpose of our policy. We don't need theater, and we don't need you to divert Soviet energies—that would be a total misconception and it might lead to the same catastrophe as in the 1930s.

After all we resisted Soviet expansion when we were allies, and we will resist it for our own reasons as you resist it for your own reasons.

I repeat, we attach great significance to our relations. We are prepared to coordinate. We think you are serious, and we are equally serious. On that basis I think we can have a useful relationship.

As I have not used up 50 minutes, I will use the remainder tomorrow.

Vice Premier Teng: Yes. It is quite late—shall we go on tomorrow afternoon?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Vice Premier Teng: As to the time, we can discuss it later.

Secretary Kissinger: We are not going anywhere.

Vice Premier Teng: Right.

Secretary Kissinger: Good.

---

123. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Beijing, October 21, 1975, 5:07–6:08 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Vice Premier of the State Council, People's Republic of China
Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Amb. Huang Chen, Chief of PRCLO, Washington
Wang Hai-jung, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
Lin P'ing, Director of American & Oceanic Affairs, MFA
T'ang Wen-sheng, Deputy Director of American & Oceanic Affairs, MFA, (Interpreter)
Chien Ta-yung, Counselor, PRCLO, Washington
Ting Yüan-hung, Director for U.S. Affairs, American & Oceanic Affairs, MFA
Chao Chi-hua, Deputy Director for U.S. Affairs, American & Oceanic Affairs, MFA
Mrs. Shih Yen-hua, MFA, (Interpreter) (plus two notetakers)

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Amb. George H. W. Bush, Chief of USLO, Peking
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff

---

[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, Box 2, China Memcons and Reports, October 19–23, 1975, Kissinger's Trip. Top Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Great Hall of the People. All brackets are in the original.

Amb. Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
William H. Gleysteen, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff
Miss Anne Boddicker, White House (notetaker)

SUBJECT

Southern Flank of Europe

[The press takes photos while the group is seated.]

Kissinger: Not all of us have recovered from the luncheon yet.

Teng: Yes, it seemed very arduous.

As you know, you cannot have a hot pot except in a very relaxed atmosphere because that will take a half hour.

Kissinger: I have not walked so much since I was in the infantry during the war. [Laughter] To me this is a Great March. [Laughter].

Teng: Yes, and when I was on the Long March I walked half the 25,000 li on foot; the other half was on the back of some kind of animal, a horse or such. At that time the highest luxury was to have one horse for each man.

Kissinger: I can imagine.

[The press leaves.]

Teng: So today we still have a bit of time left. Although it isn't very great, we still have the opportunity to have an exchange of views. Yesterday we had the opportunity to exchange opinions with you on questions pertaining to the international situation, policy and strategic. We think the exchange of views was frank, and we feel that such an exchange is beneficial for mutual understanding and also to the further development of possible cooperation between our two sides.

Kissinger: I agree.

Teng: So as for the questions pertaining to strategy, we don't have anything new to say on our side. And if you have nothing new to say on your side, then we can perhaps stop right here on that issue and turn to something else. But if you wish to tell us anything on that or any other position, you can tell us that.

Kissinger: I agree we have covered the issue of strategy and stated the various approaches. I have listed the possible topics yesterday and it is up to the Vice Premier what he thinks is most suitable.

Teng: And you have travelled the world several times in the past year and we are willing to listen to whatever you would like to say to us or whatever you think necessary to tell us, or whatever you find interesting to have an exchange of views on. If you are interested, you might begin with the southern flank of Europe.

Kissinger: All right. Mr. Habib would like me to try to convince you to vote with us on the Korean question, but I don't think I can do

that in one hour. [Laughter] He has approached everyone except the Pope on that. [Laughter]

Well, on the southern flank of Europe, we have Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece and Turkey. Each presenting a different situation.

In the case of Portugal, we find a situation where as a result of forty years of authoritarian rule, the democratic forces are not well organized, and where the political structure is very weak. The military have adopted some of the philosophy of African liberation movements, which they fought for 25 years. And the Communist Party of Cunhal, who spent his exile in Czechoslovakia—which is a curious place as a choice of exile—is very much under the influence of the Soviet Union. [Teng leans down beneath the table and spits into the spittoon beside his chair.]

In this vacuum, the Communist Party that I described achieved disproportionate influence, and for a while it seemed on the verge of dominating the situation. I think this trend has been arrested. And we are working with our West European friends to strengthen the forces that are opposed to Cunhal. Some of these forces unfortunately are better at rhetoric than at organization. But we think that the situation has improved, and we will continue to improve it.

Teng: We heard recent news that some of the military officers formerly under . . .

Chiao: . . . Gonçalves.[2]

Teng: . . . are prepared to stage a coup.

Kissinger: Yes. We had a report this morning they refused to turn over their weapons.

Teng: The news goes that they are preparing to do something on the 11th of November which is the date of the independence of Angola. News so specific as this can't be reliable.

Kissinger: No, I don't believe this. We have the report that there is one military unit that refuses to turn over its weapons. And there is no question Gonçalves is on the side of the Soviet Union. But we hope . . . We have been in touch with a number of other military leaders and we would certainly not approve such a coup and we will certainly oppose it.

Teng: But it is in our view that Portugal will see many reversals.

Kissinger: I agree.

Teng: And many trials of strength.

---

[2] Vasco dos Santos Gonçalves was Prime Minister of Portugal from July 18, 1974, to September 19, 1975.

We are not in a position to do anything else in that part of the world. There is one thing that we have done. They have approached us many times for the establishment of diplomatic relations, which we have not agreed to. Our point of departure is very simple: That is, we do not want to do anything that would be helpful to any Soviet forces gaining the upper hand.

Kissinger: I think that is a very wise policy. We support Antunes and Soares. [Teng leans down and spits again.] Antunes was in Washington a few weeks ago and we are cooperating with him.[3] But I agree with you that there will be many trials of strength. And the difficulty of our West European friends is they relax after a temporary success.

When we come back here in December, we will see the situation more clearly. But we are determined to resist a Soviet takeover there, even if it leads to armed conflict. It will not go easily. I mean, if they are planning a coup it will not be easy for them.

Now in Spain, the situation is more complicated. We have on the one hand a regime on its last legs, because Franco is very old.[4] But on the other hand we do not want to repeat the situation of Portugal in Spain.

We have been approached on a number of occasions by the Spanish Communist Party, but we consider it is controlled from Moscow. What is your assessment?

Teng: There are contradictions between the Spanish Communist Party and the Soviet Union. Among the revisionist Communist parties in Europe it can be said that the contradictions between the Spanish Communist Party and the Dutch Communist Party and the Soviet Union are comparatively deeper.

Kissinger: We have been negotiating a continuation of our base agreement with Spain, as you know. We will probably conclude this agreement within the next six weeks. We do this because we do not believe a shrinkage of American security interests in the Mediterranean is in the security interest of the world. [Teng spits again] Together with this, we are planning to set up a number of committees in the cultural and economic fields so that in the case of a new situation we have organic contacts with many levels of Spanish life.

Ch'iao: You mean after the regime is handed over to [Juan] Carlos?[5]

---

[3] Mario Soares was the leader of the Portuguese Socialist Party. Ernesto Antunes was the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs during 1975 and again in 1975–1976.

[4] Generalissimo Francisco Franco had been the Spanish Head of Government since 1938 and the Head of State since 1939.

[5] Juan Carlos became the designated successor to Franco in 1969, and was proclaimed King of Spain on November 22, 1975.

Kissinger: Yes. We are setting up committees now in connection with the base agreement so that when Franco leaves we will not have to start, as we did in Portugal, looking around for contacts. We will have this infrastructure.

Teng: It is our impression that the influence of the Spanish revisionist party is not so deep as that of the Portuguese in the armed forces. I don't know whether your understanding would be the same.

Kissinger: One reason we need this base agreement is to stay in contact with the Spanish military. Our assessment is at the higher levels there is very little impact of what you call this revisionist party. At the lower levels, we have had some reports they are doing some recruiting.

Teng: The lowest levels do not play such a great role.

Kissinger: We have heard at the level of Captains. But at the commanding levels their influence can't be compared with the Portuguese situation.

Teng: But a captain is a very important man in African forces [laughter] but perhaps not so in Europe.

Kissinger: Not quite so in Europe. [Laughter]

Teng: What is your impression of the Spanish Prince?

Ch'iao: Carlos.

Kissinger: He is a nice man. Naive. He doesn't understand revolution and doesn't understand what he will face. He thinks he can do it with good will. But his intentions are good. He's a nice man. I don't think he is strong enough to manage events by himself.

Teng: We heard that Franco was going to hand over power to him.

Kissinger: We hear that every six months. But Mrs. Franco likes the palace too much to leave. [Laughter]

Teng: He must be in his 80's by now.

Kissinger: Yes, and not very active. In fact, he has a tendency to fall asleep while you are talking to him. [Laughter] I've been there with two Presidents, and he has fallen asleep both times. In fact, he had—when I was there with President Nixon—a hypnotic effect. I saw him falling asleep, so I fell asleep. So the only two people awake were President Nixon and the Spanish Foreign Minister. [Laughter]

No, it would be better if he handed over the power.

Teng: What do you think of Yugoslavia?

Kissinger: We are concerned about Yugoslavia. We are concerned that a number of things could happen after Tito's death. There could be a separatist movement from some of the provinces. There could be a split within the Yugoslav Communist Party. Both of these could be supported by the Soviet Union. And there could be Soviet military intervention.

Teng: During the recent visit of the Yugoslav Prime Minister Mr. Bijedic, we gained from what he said, although in different words, that they are also quite worried about such matters themselves.

Kissinger: In Montenegro—you know this—they discovered Soviet activities within the country.

Teng: Yes, but then they were able to find out about all these espionage activities and do something to end these activities.

Kissinger: Yes, but it shows the tendency of Soviet policy.

Teng: Indeed.

Kissinger: We are very interested in the independence and independent policy of Yugoslavia. And you have noticed that in the last year both the President and I have paid separate visits to Yugoslavia. And we are going to begin selling them military equipment within the next few weeks.

Teng: That will be very good. You must know that this nation is a very militant one. Although there are some contradictions among the various nationalities. And it seems to me that one of their relatively strong points is that they are comparatively clear-minded about the situation they face.

Kissinger: Yes. They will certainly fight if there is an invasion.

Teng: We have also posed this question to our European friends. That is, if there occurs a Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia, what will happen? And they felt that this was a difficult issue. And perhaps a similar question will confront you. Of course I do not ask you for an answer now. [They laugh.]

Kissinger: No, I can give you an answer. It is a difficult question. It is politically a difficult question and it's strategically a difficult question. We are now doing some military planning for this contingency. I can tell you this—you can keep secrets; I am not so convinced about all of my colleagues [laughter]—we have asked General Haig, in his capacity as American Commander, to do some planning.[6]

T'ang: About Yugoslavia?

Kissinger: Yes. [There is some commotion on the Chinese side.]

Teng: The Chairman will be prepared to meet you at 6:30. [The Secretary and Ambassador Bush exchange glances.] So, what . . . you are in a dilemma about your program [because of Ambassador Bush's reception for the Secretary scheduled for the International Club].

Kissinger: No. He [Bush] has a dilemma. I would be delighted.

---

[6] General Alexander M. Haig became Supreme Allied Commander Europe and Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command in December 1974.

T'ang: How many people would you be prepared to take with you?

Kissinger: The Ambassador, Mr. Lord . . .

Wang: Would your wife be going?

Kissinger: Has she been invited?

Wang: It is up to you.

Teng: We are willing to listen to your request or your opinion. It is up to you to suggest whom you would like to take on your side and whom you would like participating in the meeting and whom you would like to have shake hands.

Kissinger: Then I think . . . Can everyone here shake hands, and my wife? And then for the meeting Ambassador Bush, Mr. Lord, and Mr. Habib.

Teng: You mean all those seated here and your wife?

Kissinger: Yes, if you can find my wife. [Laughter] She's probably out shopping.

T'ang: We will try to find her.

Kissinger: If you can find her, it will save me a lot of money. [Laughter]

T'ang: So she is in the shops now?

[The Secretary discusses with Sonnenfeldt where she might be or whether she will have departed for the reception.]

Kissinger: Maybe we can still catch her.

[Wang Hai-jung goes out.]

Teng: So perhaps we can continue for about 15 minutes, and then perhaps you can make various preparations. [He spits into his spittoon.]

Kissinger: What I have said to you about military preparations with respect to Yugoslavia is known only to the top leaders of three European governments. Schmidt knows about it, of course. But it is a very complicated problem logistically. Because our best means of entering is through Italy and that is logistically very difficult. We can perhaps talk about this again when we come back in a few weeks.

Teng: Yes, and recently Italy has returned the B Zone of Trieste to Yugoslavia. We believe this is quite good.

Kissinger: Yes.

[Nancy T'ang gets up to leave. Mrs. Shih moves to the table.]

Shih: She is going to make some preparations. I will take her place.

Teng: So long as they have weapons in their hands, the Yugoslavs will fight.

Kissinger: We think so too. But as I said, we are starting in a few weeks to sell them some anti-tank weapons, and some other equipment.

Teng: We are thinking that in that area the main problem is conventional weapons and not nuclear weapons.

Kissinger: That is correct. Though any conflict that involves us and the Soviet Union is very complicated. It is bound to involve nuclear threats anyway. But the weapons we are selling to Yugoslavia are conventional weapons.

Teng: If the Soviet Union can control Yugoslavia, then the chessboard of Soviet strategy in Europe will become alive. The next will be Romania and Albania.

Kissinger: If the Soviet Union can get away with a military move on Yugoslavia, we will face a very grave situation. [Teng nods emphatically in agreement.] Which will require serious countermeasures.

Teng: For that not only involves military strategy; it will also have a very serious political influence. Its impact at least will spread to the whole of the southern flank.

Kissinger: I think that is correct. It will affect Italy and Germany, and France.

Teng: Also the Mediterranean. And the Middle East.

Kissinger: If this happens, whatever we do in Yugoslavia—which depends on the circumstances in which things develop—will lead to a very serious situation. We would not accept it. It will lead at least to serious countermeasures. It will not be like Czechoslovakia.

[Teng glances at his watch.]

What is your view on the Italian situation?

Teng: Well, one can hardly see the trend of the development of the situation in Italy. To us, it is all blank. We don't know how to look at the situation. Perhaps you know more clearly.

Kissinger: Perhaps the Foreign Minister should stop on the way back from the UN to call on the Pope. Gromyko was there a few weeks ago. [Laughter]

Teng: Really?

Kissinger: Actually you could be helpful in Italy, we think. At least with some of the Socialists. The Christian Democratic Party has very weak leadership. [They nod in agreement.] Their Prime Minister, Moro, also has a tendency to fall asleep when you meet him. [Laughter]

Teng: They change their Prime Ministers several times in a year. I don't know how many times since the War.

Kissinger: Yes, but it's always the same group. But the ruling group of the Christian Democratic Party is not very disciplined.

We totally oppose what is called in Italy the "historic compromise." We do not give visas to Italian Communists to come to the United States.

[Secretary Kissinger and Mr. Sonnenfeldt confer.]

Teng: In my view the so-called "historic compromise" cannot succeed.

Kissinger: Well, it can succeed, but it will lead to a disaster for the non-Communist parties.

I've just been handed a telegram that they have put a Communist into an Italian Parliamentary delegation that is coming to Washington, that we didn't select.

But that is a secondary issue. We will totally oppose it.

Teng: We think, with regard to the situation in Italy, where our two sides differ is that we don't attach so much importance to whether the Communist Party of Italy gets the power. It is not significant.

Kissinger: No, it is of importance because it will have an effect on France and even in the Federal Republic. And it is of significance to the support that America can give to NATO if there is a government there with a large Communist Party in the government.

Teng: [Laughs] Such a so-called "historic compromise" was once effected by the French. That was shortly after the War, when De Gaulle was in power. He let the Communist Party of France take part in the government, and Thorez was in power.[7]

Kissinger: But that was in a totally different situation. At that time they were declining, and not increasing.

Teng: The French Communist Party got several seats in the French Cabinet. One of them was the Minister of the Air Force, who was a Communist. [He laughs.] The decision to bomb Algeria was made by this man exactly. This we call their "performance on the stage."

Shall we end our talk here today? And prepare to meet the Chairman?

Kissinger: Can we leave from here?

Teng: Yes. We can take a short rest.

Kissinger: Okay.

Teng: But we will leave from here directly and meet you there.

[The meeting ended. The American party moved to another room to await Mrs. Kissinger, who arrived shortly, and then to depart for Changnanhai for the meeting with Chairman Mao Tsetung.]

---

[7] Maurice Thorez was the Deputy Premier of France from 1946 to 1947, a period during which the Communist Party cooperated with the Socialist Party to form a government.

124. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Beijing, October 21, 1975, 6:25–8:05 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman Mao Tse-tung
Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Vice Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China
Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Amb. Huang Chen, Chief of the PRC Liaison Office, Washington
Wang Hai-jung, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
T'ang Wen-sheng, Deputy Director, Department of American and Oceanic Affairs and interpreter
Chang Han-chih, Deputy Director, Department of American and Oceanic Affairs

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador George Bush, Chief of U.S. Liaison Office, Peking
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State

At 5:45 p.m. during a meeting with Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping, Secretary Kissinger was informed that Chairman Mao would like to see him at 6:30. He was asked to name those members of his party, including his wife, whom he would like to have greeted by the Chairman, as well as those two officials who would accompany him to the talks themselves. The meeting with Teng lasted another 15 minutes. Then Dr. Kissinger and his party rested until 6:15, when they went from the Great Hall of the People to the Chairman's residence.

Each of the following were introduced to the Chairman in turn and exchanged brief greetings while photographs and movies were taken: Secretary Kissinger, Mrs. Kissinger, Amb. Bush, Counselor Sonnenfeldt, Assistant Secretary Habib, Director Winston Lord, Mr. William Gleysteen, Mr. Peter Rodman (NSC), and Ms. Anne Boddicker (NSC). The Chairman stood and talked with considerable difficulty. When he saw Mrs. Kissinger, he sat down and asked for a note pad and wrote out the comment that she towered over Secretary Kissinger. He then got up again and greeted the rest of the party. Then the guests were escorted out of the room except for Secretary Kissinger, Ambassador Bush and Mr. Lord.

The participants sat in arm chairs in a semi-circle. Throughout the conversation the Chairman would either speak with great difficulty,

---

[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, Box 2, China Memcons and Reports, October 19–23, 1975, Kissinger's Trip. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in Chairman Mao's residence.

with Miss Tang and Miss Wang repeating what he said for confirmation and then translating, or he would write out his remarks on a note pad held by his nurse. Throughout the conversation the Chairman gestured vigorously with his hands and fingers in order to underline his point.

Chairman Mao: You know I have various ailments all over me. I am going to heaven soon.

Secretary Kissinger: Not soon.

Chairman Mao: Soon. I've already received an invitation from God.

Secretary Kissinger: I hope you won't accept it for a long while.

Chairman Mao: I accept the orders of the Doctor.

Secretary Kissinger: Thank you. The President is looking forward very much to a visit to China and the opportunity to meet the Chairman.

Chairman Mao: He will be very welcome.

Secretary Kissinger: We attach very great significance to our relationship with the People's Republic.

Chairman Mao: There is some significance, not so very great. (Gesturing with his fingers) You are this (wide space between two fingers) and we are this (small space). Because you have the atom bombs, and we don't.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but the Chairman has often said that military power is not the only decisive factor.

Chairman Mao: As Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping has said, millet plus rifles.

Secretary Kissinger: And we have some common opponents.

Chairman Mao: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: You said that in English and wrote it. Can I have it?

Chairman Mao: Yes. (He hands over the note he had written out.)

Secretary Kissinger: I see the Chairman is progressing in learning English.

Chairman Mao: No (holding two fingers close together). So you have quarreled with him (pointing toward Vice Premier Teng).

Secretary Kissinger: Only about the means for a common objective.

Chairman Mao: Yesterday, during your quarrel with the Vice Premier, you said the U.S. asked nothing of China and China asked nothing of the U.S. As I see it, this is partially right and partially wrong. The small issue is Taiwan, the big issue is the world. (He begins coughing and the nurse comes in to help him.) If neither side had anything to ask from the other, why would you be coming to Peking? If neither

side had anything to ask, then why did you want to come to Peking, and why would we want to receive you and the President?

Secretary Kissinger: We come to Peking because we have a common opponent and because we think your perception of the world situation is the clearest of any country we deal with and with which we agree on some . . . many points.

Chairman Mao: That's not reliable. Those words are not reliable. Those words are not reliable because according to your priorities the first is the Soviet Union, the second is Europe and the third is Japan.

Secretary Kissinger: That is not correct.

Chairman Mao: It is in my view. (Counting with his fingers.) America, the Soviet Union, Europe, Japan, China. You see, five (holding up his five fingers).

Secretary Kissinger: That's not correct.

Chairman Mao: So then we quarrel.

Secretary Kissinger: We quarrel. The Soviet Union is a great danger for us, but not a high priority.

Chairman Mao: That's not correct. It is a superpower. There are only two superpowers in the world (counting on his fingers). We are backward (counting on his fingers). America, the Soviet Union, Europe, Japan, China. We come last. America, Soviet Union, Europe, Japan, China—look.

Secretary Kissinger: I know I almost never disagree with the Chairman, but he is not correct on this point—only because it is a matter of our priority.

Chairman Mao: (Tapping both his shoulders) We see that what you are doing is leaping to Moscow by way of our shoulders, and these shoulders are now useless. You see, we are the fifth. We are the small finger.

Secretary Kissinger: We have nothing to gain in Moscow.

Chairman Mao: But you can gain Taiwan in China.

Secretary Kissinger: We can gain Taiwan in China?

Chairman Mao: But you now have the Taiwan of China.

Secretary Kissinger: But we will settle that between us.

Chairman Mao: In a hundred years.

Secretary Kissinger: That's what the Chairman said the last time I was here.

Chairman Mao: Exactly.

Secretary Kissinger: It won't take a hundred years. Much less.

Chairman Mao: It's better for it to be in your hands. And if you were to send it back to me now, I would not want it, because it's not wantable. There are a huge bunch of counter-revolutionaries there. A

hundred years hence we will want it (gesturing with his hand), and we are going to fight for it.

Secretary Kissinger: Not a hundred years.

Chairman Mao: (Gesturing with his hand, counting) It is hard to say. Five years, ten, twenty, a hundred years. It's hard to say. (Points toward the ceiling) And when I go to heaven to see God, I'll tell him it's better to have Taiwan under the care of the United States now.

Secretary Kissinger: He'll be very astonished to hear that from the Chairman.

Chairman Mao: No, because God blesses you, not us. God does not like us (waves his hands) because I am a militant warlord, also a communist. That's why he doesn't like me. (Pointing to the three Americans) He likes you and you and you.

Secretary Kissinger: I've never had the pleasure of meeting him, so I'm not sure.

Chairman Mao: I'm sure. I'm 82 years old now. (Points toward Secretary Kissinger) And how old are you? 50 maybe.

Secretary Kissinger: 51.

Chairman Mao: (Pointing toward Vice Premier Teng) He's 71. (Waving his hands) And after we're all dead, myself, him (Teng), Chou En-lai, and Yeh Chien-ying, you will still be alive. See? We old ones will not do. We are not going to make it out.

Secretary Kissinger: If I may say one thing about what the Chairman said earlier about our relative priorities.

Chairman Mao: All right.

Secretary Kissinger: Because the Soviet Union is a superpower it is inevitable that it has much priority, and we have to deal with it very frequently. But in terms of strategy we are trying to contain Soviet expansionism, and this is why in strategy China has priority for us. But we don't want to use China to jump to Moscow because that would be suicidal.

Chairman Mao: You've already jumped there, but you no longer need our shoulders.

Secretary Kissinger: We haven't jumped there. It's a tactical phase which the President will also affirm to you.

Chairman Mao: And please convey my regards to your President.

Secretary Kissinger: I will do this.

Chairman Mao: We welcome his visit.

Do you have any way to assist me in curing my present inability to speak clearly?

Secretary Kissinger: You make yourself very well understood even so.

Chairman Mao: This part (pointing to his brain) is working well, and I can eat and sleep. (Patting his knees) These parts are not good. They do not ache, but they are not firm when I walk. I also have some trouble with my lungs. And in one word, I am not well, and majorally (*sic*) unwell.

Secretary Kissinger: It's always a great joy to see the Chairman.

Chairman Mao: You know I'm a showcase exhibit for visitors.

Secretary Kissinger: I've read over our conversation two years ago, Mr. Chairman. I think it was one of the most profound expositions of international affairs, and we take it very seriously.

Chairman Mao: But there's still some things which we must wait to observe. Some of the assessments I made still have to be moved by the objective situation.

Secretary Kissinger: But I think the basic assessment the Chairman made at that time insofar as the situation has developed has proven correct, and we basically agree with it. We've had a difficult period because of the resignation of President Nixon, and we've had to do more maneuvering than we would have liked.

Chairman Mao: I think that can be done. Maneuvering is allowable.

Secretary Kissinger: It was essential, but we are putting that situation behind us.

Chairman Mao: Europe is too soft now.

Secretary Kissinger: We agree with the Chairman—Europe is too soft.

Chairman Mao: They are afraid of the Soviet Union.

Secretary Kissinger: They are afraid of the Soviet Union and their domestic situation.

Chairman Mao: Japan is seeking hegemony.

Secretary Kissinger: Japan is not yet ready to seek hegemony. That will require one more change in leadership. But potentially Japan has the potential for seeking hegemony.

Chairman Mao: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: I think the next generation of leaders, my student Nakasone, he was a student of mine when I was a professor . . . That generation will be more ready to use the power of Japan.

Chairman Mao: Europe is too scattered, too loose.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. We prefer Europe to be unified and stronger.

Chairman Mao: That is also our preference. But it is too loose and spread out, and it is difficult for it to achieve unity.

Secretary Kissinger: Also it does not have too many strong leaders.

Chairman Mao: Oh, yes.

Secretary Kissinger: But Schmidt, who comes here next week, is the strongest of the leaders in Europe today.

Chairman Mao: France is afraid of Germany (counting on his fingers). They are afraid of the reunification of West Germany and East Germany, which would result in a fist.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, France prefers to keep Germany divided.

Chairman Mao: (Nodding yes) That's not good.

Secretary Kissinger: But they may unite on a nationalistic basis, East and West Germany.

Chairman Mao: Yes, we are in favor of reunification.

Secretary Kissinger: It depends under whom.

Chairman Mao: West Germany has a population of 50 million while East Germany has a population of 18 million.

Secretary Kissinger: West Germany is the strongest side materially.

Chairman Mao: But the reunification of Germany now would not be dangerous.

Secretary Kissinger: We favor the reunification of Germany, but right now it would be prevented militarily by the Soviet Union. But the U.S. supports the reunification of Germany.

Chairman Mao: We agree on that, you and we.

Secretary Kissinger: And we are not afraid of a unified Germany, but Soviet power in Europe must be weakened before it can happen.

Chairman Mao: Without a fight the Soviet Union cannot be weakened.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but it is important for us to pick the right moment for this, and during the period of Watergate we were in no position to do it. And that is why we had to maneuver.

Chairman Mao: And it seems it was not necessary to conduct the Watergate affair in that manner.

Secretary Kissinger: It was inexcusable. Inexcusable. (Miss Tang indicates puzzlement.) It was inexcusable to conduct it in that manner. It was a minor event that was played into a national and international tragedy by a group of very shortsighted people. President Nixon was a good President (Chairman Mao nods affirmatively) and I'm still in very frequent contact with him.

Chairman Mao: Please convey my regards to Mr. Nixon.

Secretary Kissinger: I'll call him when I return.

Chairman Mao: So please first of all send my regards to President Ford and secondly my regards to Mr. Nixon.

Secretary Kissinger: I'll do both of these with great pleasure.

Chairman Mao: You're too busy.

Secretary Kissinger: You think I travel too much?

Chairman Mao: I was saying that you are too busy, and it seems that it won't do if you're not so busy. You cannot keep from being so busy. When the wind and rain are coming, the swallows are busy.

Secretary Kissinger: That will take me several days to understand the full significance of that.

Chairman Mao: This world is not tranquil, and a storm—the wind and rain—are coming. And at the approach of the rain and wind the swallows are busy.

Miss Tang: He (the Chairman) asks me how one says "swallow" in English and what is "sparrow". Then I said it is a different kind of bird.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but I hope we have a little more effect on the storm than the swallows do on the wind and rain.

Chairman Mao: It is possible to postpone the arrival of the wind and rain, but it's difficult to obstruct the coming.

Secretary Kissinger: But it's important to be in the best position to deal with it when it does come, and that is not a trivial matter. We agree with you that the wind and rain are coming or may come, and we try to put ourselves in the best possible position, not to avoid it but to overcome it.

Chairman Mao: Dunkirk.

Secretary Kissinger: Not for us.

Chairman Mao: That is not reliable. You can see that that is not the case for you now.

Secretary Kissinger: That will not be the case for us in the future.

Chairman Mao: That is not reliable. A military correspondent for *The New York Times* put out a book in August.[2]

Secretary Kissinger: Who is he?

Miss Tang: (After consultations among the Chinese) We'll look it up and tell you.

Chairman Mao: Do you think that the 300,000 troops the U.S. has in Europe at the present time are able to resist a Soviet attack?

Secretary Kissinger: The weakness in Europe is not our troops but European troops. I think with nuclear weapons we can resist the attack.

Chairman Mao: That correspondent did not believe the U.S. would use nuclear weapons.

Secretary Kissinger: *The New York Times* has had a vested interest in American defeats the last ten years. If there's a substantial attack in Western Europe, we'll certainly use nuclear weapons. We have 7,000

---

[2] William Burr suggests that Mao was referring to Drew Middleton's book, *Can America Win the Next War?* (*The Kissinger Transcripts*, pp. 421–438)

weapons in Europe, and they are not there to be captured. That is in Europe. In the U.S. we have many more.

Chairman Mao: But there is a considerable portion of Americans who do not believe you'll use them. They do not believe Americans will be willing to die for Europe.

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Chairman, we've come through a very difficult domestic period, partly caused by Indochina, partly caused by Watergate, in which many defeatist elements have been public. But if you watch what we've done the last five years, we always confront the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union always backs down. And I can assure you, as the President will reassure you, if the Soviet Union attacks Europe, we'll certainly use nuclear weapons. And the Soviet Union must never believe otherwise—it's too dangerous.

Chairman Mao: You have confidence, you believe in, nuclear weapons. You do not have confidence in your own army.

Secretary Kissinger: We have to face the reality that we will not have so large an army as the Soviet Union. That is a fact. And the most important fact is that no European country will build a large army. If they did, then there would not be a problem. And, therefore, we must build a strategy which is suited to that reality.

Chairman Mao: The Dunkirk strategy is not undesirable either.

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Chairman, finally we have to have a minimum confidence in each other's statements. There will be no Dunkirk strategy, either in the West or in the East. And if there is an attack, once we have stopped the attack, after we have mobilized, we are certain to win a war against the Soviet Union.

Chairman Mao: (Gesturing with his fingers) We adopt the Dunkirk strategy, that is we will allow them to occupy Peking, Tientsin, Wuhan, and Shanghai, and in that way through such tactics we will become victorious and the enemy will be defeated. Both world wars, the first and the second, were conducted in that way and victory was obtained only later.

Secretary Kissinger: It is my belief that if there is a massive Soviet attack anywhere in the world, the U.S. will become involved very quickly. And it is also my conviction that the U.S. will never withdraw from Europe without a nuclear war.

Chairman Mao: There are two possibilities. One is your possibility, the other is that of *The New York Times.* That is also reflected in Senator Goldwater's speech of June 3 in the Senate.[3]

---

[3] Goldwater's speech is printed in the *Congressional Record,* vol. 121, pp. 16671–16674. For an account of the speech and the Senate debate of which it was a part, see Richard L. Madden, "Senators Differ on Arms Cutback as Debate Closes," *The New York Times,* June 4, 1975, pp. 1, 12.

Secretary Kissinger: What did he say?

Miss Tang: We will send you a copy. It was during the foreign policy debate in the Senate on June 3.

Secretary Kissinger: But what was the main point?

Chairman Mao: His disbelief in Europe.

Secretary Kissinger: You have to understand, Mr. Chairman, that it is the year before the election and much of what is said is said for domestic effect. *The New York Times* has had a certain position for 20 years and it has an unparalleled record for being wrong.

Chairman Mao: It is said that *The New York Times* is controlled by a Jewish family.

Secretary Kissinger: That is true.

Chairman Mao: And also the *Washington Post.*

Secretary Kissinger: The *Washington Post*—it is no longer true. (He then conferred with Ambassador Bush who pointed out that Mrs. Graham was Jewish, the daughter of Mr. Meyer.) You are right.

Chairman Mao: The proprietess is Jewish.

This Ambassador (looking toward Bush) is in a dire plight in Peking. Why don't you come and look me up?

Ambassador Bush: I am very honored to be here tonight. I think you are busy and don't have the time to see a plain Chief of the Liaison Office.

Chairman Mao: I am not busy, because I do not have to look over all the routine affairs. I only read the international news.

Secretary Kissinger: But the Chairman knows more about what is being written in America than I do. I didn't know about the book by *The New York Times* man or Senator Goldwater's speech.

Chairman Mao: You don't have the time. You are too busy.

(To Lord) Mr. Lord, you have now been promoted.

Mr. Lord: Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Mao: (To Bush and Lord) You have both been promoted.

Secretary Kissinger: He (Bush) not yet. He will be in 1980.

Chairman Mao: He can be President.

Secretary Kissinger: In 1980.

Chairman Mao: You don't know my temperament. I like people to curse me (raising his voice and hitting his chair with his hand). You must say that Chairman Mao is an old bureaucrat and in that case I will speed up and meet you. In such a case I will make haste to see you. If you don't curse me, I won't see you, and I will just sleep peacefully.

Secretary Kissinger: That is difficult for us to do, particularly to call you a bureaucrat.

Chairman Mao: I ratify that (slamming his chair with his hand). I will only be happy when all foreigners slam on tables and curse me.

Secretary Kissinger: We will think about it, but it will not come naturally to us. If we call the Chairman a bureaucrat, it will be a tactical maneuver separate from strategy.

Chairman Mao: But I am a bureaucrat. Moreover I am also a warlord. That was the title I was given by the Soviet Union and the title "bureaucrat" was given me by the Soviet Union.

Secretary Kissinger: But I haven't seen any Soviet visitors here lately.

Chairman Mao: They are cursing us every day. Every day.

Secretary Kissinger: But we don't share the Soviet assessment of China.

Chairman Mao: (Before Secretary Kissinger's sentence is translated) Therefore, I have accepted these two titles, "warlord" and "bureaucrat". No honor could be greater. And you have said that I am a warmonger and an aggressor.

Secretary Kissinger: I?

Chairman Mao: The United States in the UN. The UN passed a resolution which was sponsored by the U.S. in which it was declared that China committed aggression against Korea.

Secretary Kissinger: That was 25 years ago.

Chairman Mao: Yes. So it is not directly linked to you. That was during Truman's time.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. That was a long time ago, and our perception has changed.

Chairman Mao: (Touching the top of his head) But the resolution has not yet been cancelled. I am still wearing this hat "aggressor". I equally consider that the greatest honor which no other honor could excel. It is good, very good.

Secretary Kissinger: But then we shouldn't change the UN resolution?

Chairman Mao: No, don't do that. We have never put forward that request. We prefer to wear this cap of honor. Chiang Kai-shek is saying that we have committed aggression against China. We have no way to deny that. We have indeed committed agression against China, and also in Korea. Will you please assist me on making that statement public, perhaps in one of your briefings? That is, the Soviet Union has conferred upon me the title of "warlord and bureaucrat", and the United States has conferred upon me "warmonger and aggressor".

Secretary Kissinger: I think I will let you make that public. I might not get the historically correct statement.

Chairman Mao: I have already made it public before you. I have also said this to many visiting foreigners, including Europeans. Don't you have freedom of speech?

Secretary Kissinger: Absolutely.

Chairman Mao: I also have freedom of speech, and the cannons I have fired exceed the cannons they have fired.

Secretary Kissinger: That I have noticed.

Miss Tang: You have noticed. . . .

Secretary Kissinger: The Chairman's cannons.

Chairman Mao: Please send my regards to your Secretary of Defense.

Secretary Kissinger: I will do that.

Chairman Mao: I am dissatisfied that he went to Japan without coming to Peking. We want to invite him here for the Soviets to see, but you are too miserly. The U.S. is so rich but on this you are too miserly.

Secretary Kissinger: We can discuss it when the President is here.

Chairman Mao: Bring him along. You can bring a civilian and a military member, with your President, both a civilian and a military man.

Secretary Kissinger: Me as the civilian and Schlesinger as the military?

Chairman Mao: Yes. But I won't interfere in your internal affairs. It is up to your side to decide whom you will send.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, he will not come with the President. Maybe later.

Chairman Mao: We would like to invite him to pay a visit to the northeast of our country, Mongolia and Sinkiang. He perhaps will not go, nor would you have the courage.

Secretary Kissinger: I would go.

Chairman Mao: (Looking toward Bush) He has been.

Secretary Kissinger: I would certainly go.

Chairman Mao: Good.

Secretary Kissinger: And we have tried to suggest to you that we are prepared to advise or help in some of these problems.

Chairman Mao: As for military aspects we should not discuss that now. Such matters should wait until the war breaks out before we consider them.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but you should know that we would be prepared then to consider them.

Chairman Mao: So, shall we call that the end?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger, Ambassador Bush, and Mr. Lord then said goodbye to Chairman Mao. Secretary Kissinger confirmed with Vice Premier Teng that the Chinese would put out a public statement on the meeting and would send the text to the U.S. side immediately. (The Chinese statement is at Tab A.)[4] The Americans then said goodbye to the other Chinese officials and drove away in their cars.

[4] Dated October 21, attached but not printed.

125. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Beijing, October 22, 1975, 3:40–4:45 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Vice Premier of the State Council, People's Republic of China
Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ambassador Huang Chen, Chief of PRCLO, Washington
Wang Hai-jung, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
Lin P'ing, Director of American & Oceanic Affairs, MFA
T'ang Wen-sheng, Deputy Director of American & Oceanic Affairs, MFA, (Interpreter)
Chien Ta-yung, Counselor, PRCLO, Washington
Ting Yüan-hung, Director for U.S. Affairs, American & Oceanic Affairs
Chao Chi-hua, Deputy Director for U.S. Affairs, American & Oceanic Affairs, MFA
Mrs. Shih Yen-hua, MFA (Interpreter) (plus two notetakers)

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador George H. W. Bush, Chief of USLO, Peking
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff
Ambassador Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Richard H. Solomon, NSC Staff

[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Advisor, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, Box 2, China Memcons and Reports, October 19–23, 1975, Kissinger's Trip. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Great Hall of the People. All brackets are in the original.

William H. Gleysteen, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Oscar V. Armstrong, Country Director, EA/PRCM
Robert L. Funseth, Director, Office of Press Relations
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff
Karlene Knieps, Sec. Kissinger's Office (Notetaker)

SUBJECTS

The President's Visit and Communiqué; Bilateral Relations; Indochina MIA; Korea; South Asia

Teng: So you visited the museum?

Kissinger: Yes. It was fascinating.

Teng: It is similar to this building, in relation to the Square. They were both built in the same year.

Kissinger: It is a tremendous achievement to put up two such structures in one year.

Teng: Not two—there were ten built, including the compound guest house.

Kissinger: It's an even greater achievement.

Teng: That was because we were commemorating the tenth anniversary.

Kissinger: Will you put out twenty structures on your twentieth anniversary? [Laughter]

Teng: That is past, and we have not added any more. That is sufficient.

Kissinger: There is only one thing I saw there I do not understand. There was a chariot that always pointed south. I do not understand what happened if you wanted to go north. [Laughter]

Teng: At that time the Emperor was situated in the northern part of China, where he had made his capital, and his attack was aimed at the nationalities in the southern part.

Kissinger: What if he wanted to go home again? [Laughter]

Teng: No. He must go through with his hegemonic aspirations to the end. Finally he won.

The President's Visit and Communiqué

I believe your discussions yesterday with Chairman Mao were very interesting.

Kissinger: And very important.

Teng: Yes, and it can be said that he has put forward all our basic points in an extremely concise manner.

Kissinger: I agree.

Teng: So what do you feel we have left to discuss?

Kissinger: Well, we have to discuss President Ford's visit.

Teng: Would you like to do that?

Kissinger: And your ideas as to the possible outcome. And your proposals as to how it will develop.

T'ang: The ideas or the outcome?

Kissinger: Both. What concretely will happen when he comes here.

Teng: We have said before that we think it would be all right if our minds meet or if they do not, or whether we discuss more or less. Either way will be all right. The importance we attach to this visit is to the visit itself. As for the protocol and other matters, I think there is no need for your President to be worried about such things.

Kissinger: It is difficult to explain to the American public that we are going to China for no other purpose than a visit. For example, what is your reaction to the Communiqué we gave you?

Teng: We will try to give you our draft later this evening. And after that you can have discussions with our Foreign Minister. As we have heard that you are of the opinion that the time may not be enough to complete the entire agreement on the Communiqué, we were thinking you could take back our draft for further study, and if, after reading our draft, you think it would be easy to reach a common view, then you can have discussions with our Foreign Minister this evening.

Kissinger: If I do not think we can agree, what will happen?

Teng: Further consultations!

Kissinger: I cannot make a judgment until I have read the Foreign Minister's draft.

Teng: Indeed. But there are some concrete issues in the matters in your draft that perhaps are not yet realistic, as can be seen from this morning's session between Director Lin P'ing and Director Habib.[2] Because, generally speaking, under circumstances where relations between states have not been normalized, it is not the normal practice to sign certain agreements between states, for example, commercial and navigation agreements, and on air traffic. We think it should be mainly the political aspect that should be able to manifest the significance of the visit. Of course, it should show that we are prepared to continue the move forward according to the principles of the Shanghai Communiqué; and of course, other matters such as trade, people-to-people exchanges, cultural exchanges, and things like that, can also be put into the Communiqué.

The important issue between us bilaterally is the Taiwan issue. And it seems to be that at present you are not yet prepared to put any

---

[2] The counterpart talks between Habib and Lin P'ing covered financial claims and "people to people" exchanges. Memoranda of conversation are ibid.

essentially new language into the Communiqué. Under these circumstances we think it is appropriate to reiterate the language of the Shanghai Communiqué.

Kissinger: We thought we had put some changes into the Communiqué.[3]

Teng: There is a bit. We have noticed that. We noticed one phrase: "We agreed with that view," something like that. [The Vice Premier leans down beside his chair and spits into his spittoon.]

Kissinger: But that is not a minor change. It picks up the principle of the November 1973 Communiqué.

Ch'iao: Of course, on the one hand it is slightly new; on the other side, it is not entirely. Because in the Shanghai Communiqué you have already stated that you did not challenge that view.

Kissinger: True. It is a nuance. It is related to our November 1973 Communiqué.

Teng: Anyway, when your President comes, we will be able to have a candid exchange of views, which might also be considered as a continuation of the exchange of views between the two sides during your visit this time.

Kissinger: The problem I think for both of us to consider is whether the points that have been made in today's various discussions about the balance in our international relationship, and whether we do certain things in order to gain favor somewhere or whether we do them for tactical reasons, that these problems can only be solved—or can be solved at one level more effectively—by showing some progress in Sino-American relations. We did not ask for it. We did not even ask for the visit, particularly. If we cannot show some progress, then given the way our media will report the visit, the only way to solve it is to show concrete progress in our relations.

Teng: As for the Presidential visit, it was the proposal put forward by the Doctor during your last visit to China last November. But we do not attach such great importance to who raised the visit. We anyway express our welcome.

Kissinger: I think it is very difficult to discuss this in the abstract. And relationships can progress anyway only with the concurrence of both sides. We have, therefore, to see what—we will have to look at your draft before we can make any conclusions.

---

[3] The U.S. draft communiqué, which Kissinger gave to Qiao Guanhua on October 20, stated, "The United States side, recognizing that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China, expressed its agreement with that view. In affirming the principle of one China, the United States reiterated its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves." See footnote 3, Document 121.

Bilateral Relations

Teng: Do you have any concrete ideas about any issues that you would like to have settled? Apart from those which I just now raised, which were unrealistic only because of the fact that relations between our two countries are not normalized?

Kissinger: We put what we thought were soluble into our draft of the Communiqué. But we do not insist on any one in particular. I do not have any beyond those I have mentioned. Those two or three are not important. And they do not all require formal agreement.

Our basic concern, Mr. Vice Premier, is not what is in those proposals, because the essence of our relationship does not depend on any of this. But the question we discussed yesterday[4]—the symbolism of whether China is our fifth priority, or a higher priority, which is what I would say—would be reflected, if we can find some concrete expression of it. I do not think China is our fifth priority, and I think we know our priorities better than anyone else knows them. If we want to give our public a stake in this relationship, then there has to be some concrete expression of it at some time. But we are willing to listen to any other proposals.

Teng: Of course there are certain issues like, for instance, the assets and private claims and so on, which might be where agreements might be reached. But according to my knowledge of this morning's session, each side was still at its original position. The words were not new at all. But this is not an issue we are concerned about; as we have said, it won't matter if it is not settled in one hundred years.

Kissinger: The claims issue too?

Teng: We were saying that it would be all right if it was not settled in one hundred years, but if you think it possible to reach an agreement and settle it during the President's visit, we would not oppose that. As for the Most-Favored-Nation treatment and so on, Chairman Mao has explained our view. He said we do not need such things. As long as you do not give it to that bastard. [Laughter] And there always exists the possibility that one hundred years might be cut down to one and a half months.

There also was the issue you raised in your previous visits about the search for American military men missing in China, due to the Vietnam war. There also have been some initial discoveries, but they are too few. Each side can just state this to each other. It is too small to be put into the Communiqué.

Kissinger: On the claims and assets . . . of course, we are primarily concerned with enabling the Foreign Minister to come to New

[4] See Document 124.

York via Anchorage in a Chinese aircraft, which will ease his discomfort when he arrives. [Laughter]

Teng: I believe a trial flight was made before I was planning to go for the Special Session.

Kissinger: And we had some legal complications.

But the sums themselves are trivial. We are not interested in the sums that are involved here. It is not a commercial problem with us. Mr. Habib put forward our latest thinking on the subject, this morning. Which represented some modification of our previous position.

Ch'iao: Too marginal to be perceived.

Teng: Our perception is that it is basically the same position. And as you just now mentioned, we do not think a few dollars more or less is of any importance, and we do not think it necessary to get involved in legal terms to express a settlement. If the terms and if these two points can be worked out, that would be a settlement. And if it is, as you have mentioned before, that without getting involved with legal terms one cannot settle such issues as Most-Favored-Nation and the legal status, we are willing to give them up.

Kissinger: Is it true . . . one of our newsmen told me he asked last year how you would react to a Jackson amendment in regard to Most-Favored-Nation and one of the Chinese said to him: "Anytime you want fifty million Chinese, we are ready."

That was a joke. It was told by a Chinese, not by us. [Laughter]

The basic obstacle to Most-Favored-Nation for the Chinese side is the claims problem. There is no other. There are no other obstacles.

Teng: I do not think it is necessary to get entangled in the legal matters of the Most-Favored-Nation status issue. We can just say that both of us agreed to settle it in one stroke.

Kissinger: To settle what?

Teng: To cancel the claims in one stroke. To just let it go with the wind.

Kissinger: Mr. Habib is afraid we will deprive him of his profession if we do that. [Laughter] If you can find some complicated way of expressing that same thought, he will probably be satisfied.

Teng: We can continue to study the problem. Anyway, we are not very interested or very concerned with the Most-Favored-Nation status issue. There is only one thing that is clear; it cannot be stated anywhere in any settlement that Chinese are required to observe American laws.

Kissinger: That is a very reasonable proposition, which is not self-evident to our Congress.

Teng: You can continue your study.

Indochina MIA

Kissinger: You said you had some information on missing in action. That would be of some interest to us if you could give us whatever you know.

T'ang: You mean now?

Kissinger: Whenever. Either now or later. It does not have to be expressed in a Communiqué.

Teng: There is no need to make a Communiqué for that.

Kissinger: No, but we would appreciate if there is any information that we could give to the families.

Teng: Yes, I think it perhaps would be most appropriate for us to give you the material and the information we have on these issues during your next visit.

Kissinger: All right. If you can use your influence on occasion with the Vietnamese, we would also appreciate that; but we do not have to know what you are doing. On the issue of the missing in action.

[Teng leans down again and spits into the spittoon.]

Teng: As I think I mentioned to you last time during your previous visit, we do not think our saying anything would be of any use, and it is our policy not to raise any such questions of such a nature.

Korea

Kissinger: About Korea . . . Let me get a few other housekeeping things done. The Foreign Minister and I will have to agree on a Communiqué for this visit.

Teng: You mean an announcement of the date of the President's visit?

Kissinger: I do not know whether there is any need to say anything about my trip here. The trip we are now concluding.

[The Chinese side confers.]

Teng: I think what is needed is just the announcement of the date of the President's visit. Everything else is already in the press.

Kissinger: Plus some things that did not happen. [Laughter] [To Funseth:] Where did you get Growald [Richard Growald of UPI]?

Funseth: He is from the White House.

Kissinger: [To Teng] I think we probably want to do that in Washington and not from here.

Teng: You mean to discuss it?

Kissinger: No, the announcement of the President's visit should be made from Washington.

T'ang: And discuss it later on?

Kissinger: No. We can agree on a text here. We can agree later on a time of the announcement.

T'ang: After your return?

Kissinger: Yes. We can agree on the text here, and then set the time of the announcement after we return to Washington. It makes no difference to you on the time of the announcement?

Teng: Anytime will be all right for us.

Ch'iao: Yes, we can decide on the text of the announcement here and you can just tell us when you want to have it announced after your return. Any time will be all right with us.

Kissinger: All right. That's how we'll do it.

Ch'iao: Good.

Kissinger: Now, on Korea: We have said that we are prepared to talk to North Korea, in any forum that includes South Korea.

Teng: I think the views of each side are very clear by now to the other. I think you have several sufficient channels leading to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. They have an observer at the United Nations.

Kissinger: Who is extremely active. [Laughter] He thinks David Rockefeller runs the United States. [Laughter] So I hear from him periodically.

Teng: You have others.

Kissinger: We can communicate with them. We just want you to know our position.

Teng: I understand your position.

Kissinger: What is your understanding of how the legal position can be fixed in Korea if the UN Command is abolished?

Teng: You are asking . . . ?

Kissinger: As I read your Foreign Minister's speech at the UN, he said it is an easy problem, but he did not tell us how to solve it.[5] [Laughter]

Ch'iao: That is to say that an armistice and a cessation of hostilities—an armistice agreement—cannot go on forever. There is bound to come a day when it will be turned into a situation of peace. That can be said. Our view is that once the Armistice Agreement is replaced by a peace agreement, it will not be difficult to settle the issue in principle.

Kissinger: Yes, but if the UN Command is abolished and before there is a peace agreement, there will be no legal status at all.

Ch'iao: Our understanding of the position of our Korean friends is that these two things are connected, that is, that the Armistice Agreement will be replaced by a peace agreement.

---

[5] See footnote 2, Document 119.

Kissinger: Yes, but their position is also that the UN Command should be abolished.

Ch'iao: As for the concrete issue of dissolving the UN Command, I think it is something for you to discuss with Korea. And it seems that the time is not yet ripe for the solving of this issue.

Kissinger: I hope we will all not fire too many cannons in the debate that is now ahead of us. [Laughter]

Teng: It seems that it won't do if certain cannons are not fired. I think it is a saying with you, you also have a considerable number of cannons. [Laughter]

Kissinger: Yes, but we lack the eloquence of some of our critics. [Laughter] And Mr. Habib is very sensitive, because he was Ambassador in Korea. [Laughter]

South Asia

On South Asia, we are often asked by Pakistan about our attitudes. The Chief of the Pakistan Air Staff is coming to visit us the end of November, and we will begin selling some equipment to them then. And we have also warned the Soviet Union against military pressure against Pakistan by them or their friends.

Teng: That is good. We have given them a bit of what we have, but that is very backward. I think that what they need more is things that you can give them.

Kissinger: And we will begin it after the visit of the Air Marshal. We have already agreed to sell them some anti-tank weapons and I think some artillery.

Teng: How is your work going on with India?

Kissinger: They are very eager to improve their relations with us. Their Foreign Minister visited Washington a few weeks ago. Our basic assessment is that in the next five years they may bring pressure on both Bangladesh and Pakistan, and maybe attack them both. Our information is that they are seriously considering engineering a coup in Bangladesh or seriously considering engineering refugees to give them an excuse to bring pressure on Bangladesh.

Teng: I think we still have to wait to see the development of events.

Kissinger: They would be more active if they were not also pacificists. [Laughter]

Teng: Aren't they the origin of all peace? [Laughter] They have also been very eager to improve their relations with us.

Kissinger: Yes, they told us.

Teng: And want first of all to exchange Ambassadors. And during the recent visit of the Yugoslav Prime Minister Bijedic to China, he also brought us a message from India and we gave him a message back. It

consisted of no other content than of asking Madame Gandhi to improve her relations and policies toward neighboring countries.

Kissinger: They have asked us to be helpful with you. But I assume they have many channels to you.

Teng: Yes, there are plenty of direct channels. On the evening of May Day 1971, when the Chairman met with their Chargé d'Affaires on Tien An Men, he had already said to him we do not think the present state of relations between our two countries can continue forever like this. That shows that the channels in Peking are not clogged up.

Kissinger: It is not a matter of primary concern to the United States.

Teng: Correct. But there is one point that seems to be worth noting. It seems the dissatisfaction among the people about Soviet control of India has considerably mounted.

Kissinger: Yes. I am assuming that the desire to improve relations with you and us reflects a public necessity. And we favor anything that lessens Soviet influence in India.

Teng: It is my personal impression that there will inevitably come the day when the Indians are going to rebel against the Soviet Union.

Kissinger: It seems to be the Soviet destiny whenever they have close relationships. [Laughter] The ability to maintain allies is not one of their specialities. [Teng nods agreement.]

Teng: So what else do we have to discuss? I think the main issue is still the Communiqué, which I will leave to our Foreign Minister to discuss with you at a later hour.

Kissinger: Yes.

Teng: As for the discussions we have had, especially the discussion you have had with Chairman Mao, we believe them to be of positive significance.

Kissinger: So do I.

Teng: We will be seeing each other very soon.

Kissinger: That's right. Very soon.

Teng: As for the announcement about your visit this time, perhaps we can save some of the words for the next visit, and use them for the next visit.

Kissinger: I agree. You save the words for the next visit. There is no need to say anything substantive.

Teng: So, do you think that will be about all for the talks?

Kissinger: Yes, I think so.

Teng: We will be seeing each other later on.

Kissinger: Yes, we will be seeing each other.

[The Secretary confers with Bush and Habib.]

All right.

Teng: We will see each other at half past seven.

Kissinger: Yes, half past seven.

[The Chinese side hands over an advance text of the Foreign Minister's banquet toast for that evening.]

Teng: Just words of gratefulness for your banquet this evening.

Kissinger: Thank you.

[The meeting adjourned.]

---

126. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Beijing, October 23, 1975, 12:35–2:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Ch'iao Kuan-hua, PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs
Lin P'ing, Director, Department of American and Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
T'ang Wen-sheng, Deputy Director, Department of American and Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ting Yuan-hung, Director, United States Office, Department of American and Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Chao Chi-hua, Deputy Director, United States Office, Department of American and Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Shih Yen-hua (Interpreter)

Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
William H. Gleysteen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Richard H. Solomon, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council
Karlene Knieps (Notetaker)

SUBJECT

Discussion of the Draft Communiqué for the President's Visit

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, I thought I might give you our reaction to the PRC draft communiqué (attached at the end of

---

[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, Box 2, China Memcons and Reports, October 19–23, 1975, Kissinger's Trip. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in Guest House #5. All brackets are in the original.

this memcon)[2] and in the very brief time left before our departure, you might think about it if you want to make a response.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I will first listen to your reaction and then I will tell you our reaction to your draft.

Secretary Kissinger: We received your draft near midnight. This does not permit serious consideration.

There is no point in discussing procedural matters that are now beyond repair. Let me therefore deal with substance.

The purpose of the communiqué is to explain to the world and to our people why the President of the United States visited China. We do not agree that just coming to China can be the purpose of a political move; there must be some [substantive] reason for it.

Now—going through your draft. I find it, quite frankly, difficult to find a reason [for the President's visit]. The draft follows the outline of the Shanghai Communiqué, but in almost every significant category it represents a step back from the Shanghai Communiqué. In no category is there a step forward.

In the Shanghai Communiqué, it was the first contact that the United States and the People's Republic had had in over 20 years. In rather abstracted ideas the two sides stated their diametrically opposite views at the beginning [of the document].

I would like to remind the Foreign Minister that at that time the Prime Minister was generous enough to take out of the Chinese section language that we considered particularly offensive—although these words later appeared in the Foreign Minister's public statements [at the United Nations]. However, it was your speech, it was not a document signed jointly with the United States.

In all frankness, the American people will ask why the President came here to sign a document which says, "The peoples of the third world countries have won a series of significant victories in their struggle against colonialism, imperialism and hegemonism." We are of that "imperialist" school I suppose. "The contention between the superpowers for world hegemony has become ever more intense." That seems inconsistent with us selling out to the Soviets. One of those two propositions cannot be correct. You can't do both a Munich and a world war simultaneously.

Above all, we cannot sign a document which accuses us of this, even if it is stated by just one party.

---

[2] The Chinese draft communiqué, given to U.S. officials on October 22, is attached but not printed.

Two paragraphs state some positive things, but they are better stated in the Shanghai Communiqué. They just repeat the Shanghai Communiqué in a shortened version.

Then, the Taiwan issue. We understand that the Chinese side repeats its Shanghai Communiqué position. It presents no problem, but the Foreign Minister knows very well that several sentences, several clauses, have been added which sharpen the Chinese position. These sentences will greatly complicate our efforts to move to full normalization—which we have said we would do.

And what your draft says regarding bilateral matters is insignificant.

So then, we have enormous difficulties with such a document. In fact, quite candidly, it presents an impossibility of explaining to our people what we were doing here. I hate to do this in so short a time before my departure, but we did not have the document so I had no opportunity. This document is completely unacceptable, even as a basis for discussion.

Let's leave aside the document. Let me make several general statements. We gave you a document, but we did not expect you to accept it in its [initial] form. We allowed three days for discussions. We were prepared to discuss it, change it, negotiate it. That opportunity did not present itself. But we made a very serious effort to show serious movement on issues of great concern to the Chinese side, such as the issue of hegemony, on world positions, as well as some other negotiations that you are conducting [with the Japanese]. And what we said about the principle of one China in the Taiwan section of our communiqué—stating it twice and affirmatively—was a serious attempt on our part to indicate movement on an issue that is leading to inevitable consequences over a measurable period of time.

So, that was our intention. Underlying this [present situation, however] may be a more profound understanding. That is, [you may think] we want to come here to use the shoulders of China to reach Moscow, or that we want something here.

Our assessment here, which has to be our policy, is to prevent Soviet expansionism. This we will do with or without China. It is also in China's interest to prevent Soviet expansionism for your own reasons. So we have parallel objectives here. We have refused all overtures from the Soviet Union that could have been used against the People's Republic, and I explained very frankly to Chairman Mao yesterday that we have a domestic situation which requires us to put more emphasis on tactics and maneuvers than we like.[3]

---

[3] See Document 124.

But we have dealt openly with you and you have always known what we did—especially regarding the Soviets, because we thought we had a parallel conception with you on world affairs. But if that is misunderstood, then we cannot be in a position of being supplicants, and of giving the impression that we need this relationship more than you do.

So I have spoken very frankly, because the foreign policy measure I have been most proud of has been our relations with China. We cannot accept either the position or the substance of this communiqué.

Therefore, I ask the Foreign Minister's opinion on where we go from here.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Okay, now I will give you my impressions. First, our reaction to your draft: As you had time to prepare [the draft U.S. document (attached at the end of this memcon)][4] when you handed it to us on the 20th, we studied it seriously. We also think that your document as a whole is unacceptable to us. The spirit of the Shanghai Communiqué is that neither side should conceal its views or policy. So, at the outset of the Shanghai Communiqué, each side stated its differences from the other so that the world knows both the differences and the common points.

But your draft has concealed the real views of our two sides on international affairs. This does not conform to reality. Since you have dealt with us for a long time you know that we speak facts. Our words count. The main defect in your draft is it is contrary to what you have said. Your draft has failed to include the views of our two sides on the international issues. In other words, the two sides have not stated the differences between us in your draft.

If one expects to go beyond the Shanghai Communiqué, it is necessary for the two sides to state their respective views. Because time is progressing, and the world is changing, and, of course, the views of the two sides may also change from the Shanghai Communiqué. This is the first point I would like to make.

(Ambassador Bush comes in. The Secretary says to him, "I asked you to come in to be a mediator. We have a little difference of opinion on the two sides." (Laughter))

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: A second point, on the Taiwan issue: The Taiwan section in your draft shows no substantial progress from the Shanghai Communiqué and what is more, there is a contradiction in logic.

Secretary Kissinger: I'll accept the first criticism, but for a Kantian the second is a little bit hard to take.

---

[4] Attached but not printed.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I will not go into details.

Secretary Kissinger: But you will give us a hint that we can think about.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: As a matter of fact, there is nothing new in your draft on the Taiwan section apart from repeating the Shanghai Communiqué. The only change is in the word "does not challenge" to "agree." One phrase is active, the other one passive, but it doesn't change the meaning.

As for our draft, there are many ideas in our draft which go beyond the Shanghai Communiqué.

Secretary Kissinger: In the wrong direction.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: In the correct direction. We speak facts. Yesterday you met with Chairman Mao. You said that we had a common opponent. With respect to our views on the third world, the position of the superpowers, we have stated our views on many occasions. We do not conceal our views.

These are our views on the current world situation. They also conform to the current realities more than the Shanghai Communiqué. According to the tradition of the Shanghai Communiqué, each side can state its views. The U.S. side can state anything [it wishes to state]. We have no objection. This is not rhetoric.

I do not agree with what Mr. Secretary said that almost every paragraph in the Chinese draft is a step backwards from the Shanghai Communiqué. We have reaffirmed all the principles agreed upon by our two sides in the Shanghai Communiqué, we have reaffirmed the Shanghai Communiqué and stressed opposition to world hegemony.

As for the Taiwan issue, we have put our views in a nutshell in two sentences and we have added two sentences. I think our position is also very clear to you. We are not being honest if we do not state our views like this.

As I said just now, there is nothing new in the Taiwan section except a repetition of the views of the Shanghai Communiqué.

As for our present bilateral relations, we also stated the present position in very brief words which also conform to present reality. In other words, what is said in this draft is more brief than what was said in the Shanghai Communiqué, and the substance is the same.

Secretary Kissinger: On bilateral relations?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Yes.

I would like to repeat that the Chinese draft was presented to you after full consideration in a short priod of time. We are not rash.

Mr. Secretary of State, you raised a fundamental question just now that the purpose of the communiqué is to explain why your President should visit China and I remember your saying that [his visit] was un-

conditional. I remember discussing this matter in another building in this compound [during your last visit to Peking]. I suggested a visit by your Secretary of Defense, and you replied with the suggestion of a visit by the President. We expressed welcome [to the President]. Thereafter, on many occasions we said it would be all right if they did not meet. Anyway, we express our welcome to your President's visit. Our Vice Premier has said that a visit by your President is itself a political move. In our opinion, a communiqué is not important. Who invented this communiqué form?

Secretary Kissinger: It must be a Chinese invention. They have long had diplomacy. (Laughter)

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: There is no such thing in Chinese history. If we have a communiqué we don't object. If there is no communiqué, that is not of much significance.

I have very frankly and very briefly presented our views. In such a short period of time it was impossible for us to discuss [our two draft communiqués] word-by-word as we did in 1972. So I suggest that you leave your draft with us, and take our draft with you and continue to consider our draft.

Secretary Kissinger: I can tell you now we can consider your draft for two more months and we will not change our position. We will not change our fundamental opinion. It is an impossibility for the President to agree to such a communiqué both for international and domestic reasons. It would be suicide for him to do it. Sometimes [a situation is created where] there are no decisions to make.

His opponents on the right would absolutely destroy him. This is a reality. Even from a foreign policy point of view, with respect to hegemony, what we would do is meet your point of view. This is not a Japanese situation. We want to go forward. We are prepared to find a formula which will help your Japanese problem, not complicate it.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Judging from your draft, you have confused the original ideas in the Shanghai Communiqué on hegemony. If this is what you mean by strengthening the statement on hegemony, we don't need it.

As for our relations with Japan, we know how to handle them. It is evident that they are bowing to pressure at home and abroad. The Japanese are making trouble. It does not matter to us. We are not in a hurry.

Secretary Kissinger: We do not consider our hegemony clause essential. We don't have any problem with yours as it is in the Shanghai Communiqué. It only raises the question of what is the necessity of saying it again. We have no objection to it. We can say it again.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: In our opinion, in our draft we have reaffirmed all the principles in the Shanghai Communiqué, and we have

stressed two points. One is our bilateral relations, the other is opposition to hegemony in world affairs, because they constitute the main common points between us.

Secretary Kissinger: We have no problem reaffirming the Shanghai Communiqué statement on hegemony; this is not a problem.

On Taiwan, our impression is that we made a step forward. That certainly was our intention.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: On the Taiwan issue, yesterday Chairman Mao very thoroughly stated what our views are. You owe us a debt. This is your responsibility, not ours.

As we have discussed this problem many times, we are not constrained to tell you what our views are.

On the sentence on hegemony [in the U.S. draft], I have said that you have confused the conception. The section in your draft has different implications which we are opposed to, such as the words "whatever the source, whether in the East or the West." And I think our Vice Premier has discussed this with you.

Secretary Kissinger: Do you think that hegemony should be resisted only in the West? We do not consider this an important—

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Look at our draft. "Each side is opposed to . . ." We stated that neither side should seek hegemony in any part of the world.

Secretary Kissinger: We can accept your language. We sincerely thought that you would find that interesting. We can drop that clause. The hegemony clause is not a problem. Our views are substantially the same.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: In the first place this was raised by you.

Secretary Kissinger: This is quite true, but we thought that we were meeting your concerns. We are not gaining anything for ourselves. We don't need it. It makes no difference to us. We will drop that clause or go back to your clause.

What do you think should be done now?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: We have stated our views very thoroughly. It is very good if we have [a communiqué]; we have no objection to having one. But if our two sides cannot agree, what will we do?

Secretary Kissinger: If we can't agree on the language, then there is no common position.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: We have a common point on hegemony. You stressed this to the Chairman yesterday.

Secretary Kissinger: It does not seem to have been taken very seriously. But your communiqué is 98 percent disagreement, and only 2 percent agreement which is already in the other communiqué.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: This is the reality, the problem of first priority at the moment. Why do the two sides have to come together? Why can't we speak it out?

Secretary Kissinger: We have no trouble with this. It is the five pages of disagreement you have to state before you can state one sentence of agreement.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: There are only four pages.

Secretary Kissinger: We will do it on our typewriter. (Laughter)

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Last year you said that our draft was too short. This year you say that our side's is too long.

Secretary Kissinger: But you have not included the U.S. position [which will expand the length considerably].

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: You are free to express your views. We won't object.

Secretary Kissinger (with irony): Thank you. I appreciate that very much, but my point is that the impression [created by the Chinese draft] is that the President of the United States travelled 8,000 miles to express 98 percent disagreement in order to express one sentence of agreement and this after his Secretary of State already spent considerable time discussing these issues in October.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: The importance [of the document] should not be weighed by the number of words.

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, I am always astonished by how well informed you are. You saw what our press did on the first evening with your toast. What will they do with this document? It will damage our relationship! Therefore, both sides must consider the psychology of the other side.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: We don't think it beneficial to cover up our differences. This will lead people astray. Indeed, as everyone knows, we really have great differences, but we have common points as well.

Secretary Kissinger: But it is simply a different situation when the President comes a second time, when there has been no return visit [to the United States] by a Chinese leader for understandable reasons, to restate these differences.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: This is a reality. We have so many common points, and so many differences.

Secretary Kissinger: We have stated only one common point.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: We are not discussing these documents in detail, but discussing the growth in exchanges and in friendship.

Secretary Kissinger: We can accept your point on social imperialism.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I would suggest that you consider our draft. It is not possible for us to have detailed discussions today.

Secretary Kissinger: We cannot accept this draft. I can't leave you in any doubt [about this point]. What modifications are possible we are willing to explore. There is no possibility of accepting this draft no matter how long we negotiate it.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: We won't moderate it.

Secretary Kissinger: Basically are you saying either no communiqué or this?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: In our draft we have basically stated our views, but you have not put in your views yet.

Secretary Kissinger: Let me understand you correctly. We can add our views. This is unchallenged. Are you saying that this communiqué with American views added, or no communiqué at all? Is this your position?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: In substance. Our draft was drawn up after serious discussion.

Secretary Kissinger: So was ours.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I repeat what the Vice Premier said. I suggest you take back our draft and have a more serious consideration of it.

Secretary Kissinger: I want to understand your position. Are you saying either your draft or no communiqué or are you prepared to consider middle ground?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Basically this is our position. Of course, this is a document [prepared] by our two sides. We can discuss it, but we won't change its substance.

We are used to calling a spade a spade. Since 1972 there has been no basic change in our relations. This is reality. The communiqué should reflect this. As for concrete wording, we can discuss this.

Secretary Kissinger: How shall we proceed since the opportunity for direct exchanges is no longer practical?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: What are your ideas?

Secretary Kissinger: I was not prepared to be this far apart on the last evening. I thought that as in October, 1971 we would have a basic document by now.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Shall we discuss this when you come again next time with the President?

Secretary Kissinger: I will have to discuss with the President what he wants to do.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: There are two questions. One is the general pattern of the communiqué. There are two points here. The two sides can state their own views, and then their common points. The second question is concrete wording of the communiqué. We can discuss this later.

We cannot agree that we cannot state our differences. This is only to deceive people. This is no good. Our people won't accept it.

Secretary Kissinger: Neither will ours.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Actually what we need is to state the differences. This is objective reality. Of course, you have your problems and you cannot say we do not understand it fully.

For instance in the period before the Shanghai Communiqué [was signed] was your press so used to our words? They were not so used [to them]. So we say that you admit that the Shanghai Communiqué was a new example [of a diplomatic document].

Secretary Kissinger: I have stated many times in public in the United States that the way the Shanghai Communiqué was drafted was a tribute to the wisdom of the Chinese side, and a new way of negotiating. But that was a different occasion. It was the first contact at a top level between the U.S. and Chinese sides. That in itself was an historic event.

If we add as much as you have written [in your draft], this document will be six pages long.

I do not exclude stating some disagreement, but I think the balance between the two is not appropriate at this moment.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: You are too much used to counting the words. Why not weigh the value of a document? As you have often said, you have often read many communiqués full of rhetoric. They are long, but people don't want to read them as they do not conform to reality.

Secretary Kissinger: Well—we will take into account your desire to state opposing views. We can send you what we think is an appropriate balance, maybe through Ambassador Bush, or your Ambassador. Then if we can agree in principle, we can work out the wording when we are here, as we did the last time.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao (with alacrity): Yes, we agree to your suggestion.

Secretary Kissinger: I think the Foreign Minister understands that what we will propose is a shortening of some key paragraphs. But he can give us his reaction later.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Three lines like mine? (Laughter)

Secretary Kissinger: Three lines.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Because you want to shorten the key paragraph.

Secretary Kissinger: Two–three lines each. Yes. I will do to you what you did to me last year.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Last year you complained we gave you too short a draft, so this year we gave you more.

Secretary Kissinger: You can be sure the statement about social imperialism will be in it.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I agree to your suggestion.

Secretary Kissinger: Let's . . . we will have Ambassador Bush give further drafts to you.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Okay.

Secretary Kissinger: And after that we can make a decision after we receive it.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: This is not a big problem, the communiqué. The importance is the substance.

Secretary Kissinger: Given our [domestic] situation, if we have to spend the next two months defending ourselves on why we went to China, it will be of no help to you or the policy we are attempting to pursue and it will be totally counterproductive. And it will liberate all those [domestic political] forces that have been contained since 1971.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Merely because we have stated our views in this manner?

Secretary Kissinger: No, not because you have stated your views. It depends on the whole context, on the balance between the agreements and disagreements and overall tone. And I think the Foreign Minister, who is more subtle than I am, understands what I am talking about.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: You are too polite. Okay. We accept your suggestion that you will give instructions to your Ambassador. Is there anything further you would like to say?

Secretary Kissinger: No. I assume in the meantime we will both consider each other's views. We will say to the press that we have had preliminary discussions about a communiqué but we will not discuss our disagreements or any substance.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: It is not necessary to go into details. You can tell your press that we have had discussions about the communiqué but we will not tell them the substance.

Secretary Kissinger: That will be our position.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Your press is really a problem. What if we cannot reach an agreement on the communiqué? What if there is no communiqué at all? What will we tell them?

Secretary Kissinger: That is why it is impossible. Even if I agree with you, no one will remember all of the communiqués I have worked on since I became one of the key figures in our foreign policy. I remember only two. One of them is the Shanghai Communiqué.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: And the other one?

Secretary Kissinger: I knew you were going to ask that! It was the visit of the Swiss President to the United States. (Laughter)

It is not possible, unfortunately, for us to have no communiqué. We face a practical problem, not to turn this into a crisis—because you are quite right, the essence of our relationship is not dependent on one sentence. We do not delude ourselves and neither do you. But for the essence—what to me—quite frankly, I consider the matters Habib discussed with your associate [Lin P'ing] of secondary importance. But for our public, unless there is some progress in tone we cannot rely on it to give impetus to the essence of the relationship, which is the hegemony problem.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Some questions cannot be settled at the moment.

Secretary Kissinger: I understand this. The fact of the matter is this: There are certain kinds of hegemonic moves which may now appear quite improbable, but if they ever arise it will require—it is necessary to prepare a more or less psychological framework. They [the hegemonic moves] may never arise. But apart from this purpose, the President's and my interest in these bilateral matters end. You notice I never raise them with you. But they will be used by our public to judge the degree of our relationship, and they give us the possibility to enlist support for political issues rather than economic and technical issues.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: But there must be something practical. But if there is nothing practical in our bilateral relations, but only things of a symbolic nature, there is no reason for these things.

Secretary Kissinger: We agree, but we hope we will have things of both a symbolic as well as a practical significance.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: That is a problem that confronts us both.

Secretary Kissinger: That is correct, and they is why I believe that with the talent available to both of us we should be able to produce something. I would be glad to assign Habib from tormenting me to doing something constructive. (Laughter)

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: What I mean is that if in our bilateral relations we could put in the draft something substantial, that would be good; but at the moment we do not have such things. No talent can create things like this, including Mr. Habib. They tried this morning.

Secretary Kissinger: The Chairman gave me this yesterday (the Secretary hands a small piece of paper to Ch'iao with the word "yes" written on it) and if you teach Lin P'ing to say this, you can make rapid progress. (Laughter)

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: This was given by the Chairman to you, so you should learn this.

Secretary Kissinger: I have learned. Maybe we can give it to him (Lin P'ing). I think we understand each other's necessities.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Okay. Is there anything left for us to discuss?

Secretary Kissinger: Did I see you show something to the Vice Premier—an announcement of the President's visit that you had in mind?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: A very brief announcement. Only stating the date. (A copy is handed to Secretary Kissinger.)[5]

Secretary Kissinger: This is the style that I am used to. It has been a great tradition since you became Foreign Minister.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: It has been the tradition since I started out.

Secretary Kissinger: What did we say when President Nixon's visit was announced? The same thing? Can we state our view on this matter separately?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: It never hurts to listen to other views.

Secretary Kissinger: Can we have a Chinese and an American version?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Here is the Chinese version.

Secretary Kissinger: It is a good translation. (Laughter) If we have any views, which I doubt, we will let you know. And we will settle on this after we have had the next exchange—after Mr. Bush has talked to you next week. It is not an official visit unless we have one late night meeting.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: It is better not to have a communiqué. We did the same last time when President Nixon was here.

Secretary Kissinger: I remember. Several nights. If we agree on the framework, we will probably have to do the final discussion when President Ford is here.

The meeting ended at 2:25 a.m.

---

[5] The undated announcement stating that President Ford would visit China December 1–6, is in the Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, Box 2, China Memcons and Reports, October 19–23, 1975, Kissinger's Trip.

127. Memorandum From Secretary of State Kissinger to President Ford[1]

Washington, October 24, 1975.

SUBJECT

Possible Approaches to Your China Trip

As I have indicated in my reports to you,[2] I believe that our relationship with China has cooled. Certainly Peking wishes to sustain our relations: a pronounced souring or break would expose the Chinese even further to Moscow; we remain their only real option as a counterweight. Accordingly, the Chinese will maintain our connection at about present levels. But they will not be willing to show much progress in bilateral relations or cooperation on international issues; and they will stress our differences and keep up their ideological criticism of us in the public domain. They are ready, in short, to continue their recent phase of correctness, without warmth or much vitality.

This Chinese attitude has been the general pattern of recent months. In hindsight its origins can probably be traced back to the end of 1973 when several factors coincided: the initial impact of Watergate and the first instances of Congressional hobbling of Executive authority in foreign affairs; the beginning of the fading of the authority of Chou En-lai, the chief architect of the American opening; and our goofs in sending a high-level Ambassador to Taiwan and opening up two new Chinese Nationalist consulates in the U.S. shortly after my November trip to Peking and its positive communiqué, including a reasonable Chinese formulation on Taiwan.

Since then by far the key factor has been the Chinese perception of the erosion of our domestic foundation and loss of clout on the world scene. Furthermore, during my visit last year, I foreshadowed for the first time the unlikelihood of major progress on the Taiwan issue before 1977 unless China explicitly renounced the use of force. Since then détente has run into trouble, reducing our leverage with Peking—our best period in Chinese relations, 1971–3, was also our most active phase with the Soviet Union. We suffered a major setback in Indochina, which however ideologically pleasing to Peking, pointed up our domestic

---

[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, Box 2, China Memcons and Reports, October 19–23, 1975, Kissinger's Trip. Secret; Sensitive. There are no notations on the memorandum that indicate that Ford saw it.

[2] Ford received and initialed Kissinger's reports on his visit to China. (Memoranda from Scowcroft to Ford, October 19, 20, and 21; ibid.)

vulnerabilities and was a geopolitical reversal for the Chinese. In Europe the Chinese see the unravelling of the Southern flank of NATO and the lulling of the continent generally by what they call the "European Insecurity Conference." And the Congressional investigations and pre-election politicking have picked up steam. Finally, there has been intensive pre-succession jockeying in China itself, and their domestic politics has probably made them more musclebound in their decision-making, and perhaps includes criticism of policy toward America.

These cumulative factors over the past two years now add up to China's taking us less seriously as a world power that is capable of resisting a Soviet Union that continues to increase its military strength and expand its political influence. This changed attitude was clearly reflected in the scenario of my visit to China this time:

—Their Foreign Minister slammed us hard in the United Nations on the eve of my trip. They also needled us on the issues of Tibet and Puerto Rico.

—At the first night's banquet in Peking, their Foreign Minister publicly criticized our détente policy, knowing full well that this was bound to get major attention.

—The conversations with Vice Premier Teng were on the whole desultory, with their showing little interest in our perception of the world scene, except for the Soviet Union and Europe where they said we were following the policies of Munich and Dunkirk.

—Chairman Mao reinforced these themes in our conversation, clearly questioning our reliability as a serious power.

—For the first time they declined to hear some special briefings, perhaps partly because of their fear of leaks in the U.S., but also presumably to keep their distance.

—The contentious nature of both the content of their draft communiqué for your visit and their procedure was their most disdainful performance so far in our relationship. On substance they indicated that they want to highlight our differences and show little advance in our relations. And they waited until just a few hours before my departure before tabling their draft—when they had known for several weeks that we wanted to reach essential agreement on the outcome of your visit during my trip; their response was a complete rejection of our approach; and they did not give us any warning at all of the chasm during three days of talks during meetings, banquets, and sightseeing.

All of this is annoying, even somewhat disturbing. It is not a major crisis, however, and should be kept in perspective. They have no real strategic options at this time to continuing our relationship. They clearly are eager to have you visit China. The forces that brought us together remain basically at work. They still treat Moscow as the principal enemy and will maintain some restraint in their posture toward

us. And for all our domestic problems, they know full well that we remain the strongest power in the world and are not to be trifled with.

The General Prospects

Against this background let me explore the outlook for your own trip and how I believe we should now proceed. You have my telegraphed account of our final evening in Peking and the exchanges we had on the unacceptable Chinese draft communiqué.[3] On the way to the airport Thursday[4] morning, the Foreign Minister indicated they would make an effort to meet our concerns when they get our new draft next week, though he reiterated they must have their three principles on Taiwan and the section on concrete bilateral relations would remain truncated. He said their first preference is no communiqué, and he doesn't understand why we think we need one. The political symbolism of your visit is the central factor in their view. He also suggested the promising possibility of a joint press statement in place of a communiqué. This could be a less contentious and more positive document describing the talks—instead of a formal document between two countries which would oblige them to state their principled views. I left it that we would be in touch with them early in the week through Ambassador Bush.

I made certain during my visit that you would receive a courteous and appropriate welcome. It is not in the Chinese interest to embarrass you in terms of hospitality or decorum. At the same time, it is now very clear, as we suspected all along, that there will be little drama and minimum results. We will not gain Chinese acceptance of a positive communiqué showing significant movement in our relations. No matter what course we pursue, we can expect domestic and international carping over the worth of a second Presidential visit to China that produces meager concrete results—notwithstanding the fact that we believe that your trip is justified by the symbolism of an ongoing relationship; the chance to exchange authoritative views on the international situation; the Soviet factor; the opportunity to size up the post-Mao, post-Chou leadership of the world's most populous nation; and whatever modest outcome we can achieve.

Options

We now have the following options:

(1) Push for the most positive communiqué we can get.

(2) Settle for a very brief, bland communiqué or none at all.

---

[3] Ford initialed the communiqué, which he received from Scowcroft. (Ibid.) The Chinese draft was given to U.S. officials on October 22; see Document 126 and footnote 2 thereto.

[4] October 23.

(3) Work toward a relatively brief but more upbeat joint press statement.

(4) Cancel your trip.

In considering our course of action we need to keep in mind the Chinese view of us; the Soviet reaction; our general international posture; and the American domestic reaction.

Let me briefly discuss each of the options in turn.

Positive Communiqué. This has been our objective. The weightier the results of the trip, of course, the more solid our bilateral relationship looks to the world, and the Soviet Union in particular, and the more justifiable your travels look to the domestic audience. We have emphasized that signs of a vital connection with Peking are required to maintain public support for our China policy and thus any help to Peking in case of Soviet pressures. On the other hand, it is now amply clear that the Chinese will continue to keep our relationship at the present level—alive enough to suit their geopolitical purposes but without significant progress so long as we are not able to complete normalization. More fundamentally, because of our domestic weaknesses they take us less seriously as a world power, and they see our relations with Moscow as being in trouble, which reduces our leverage. Either they do not understand our need to show continued momentum, or they find it impossible to move for ideological and domestic political reasons. And they insist on underlining our differences as well as areas of common agreement.

These factors mean that we cannot expect to work out a positive communiqué. We went for the maximum document in our draft, and the unacceptable Chinese response demonstrates their clashing view. With maximum effort we may be able to eliminate some of the negative aspects of their version and add a few positive elements. But the starting point is so bleak and the Chinese position so firm that the very best we could come out with is a carbon copy of the Shanghai Communiqué and that after major bargaining right down to the wire. Even this outcome would be criticized as a stalling out of our relations after three years, and the value of your journey would be questioned.

Brief Communiqué or None at All. This approach would recognize the impossibility of a positive outcome and forego the arduous task of battling with the Chinese over drafts to little avail. It would state neither agreements nor disagreements but simply use adjectives to describe the conversations. We would clearly indicate in advance of your visit that the emphasis will be on your private discussions with the new leadership in Peking and major movement was neither necessary nor to be expected at this stage of our relations. This would fit the Chinese mood. And it would look more honest to our various

audiences, including the domestic one, than a lengthy replay of three years ago.

On the other hand, it would be very difficult to explain a second President's going all the way to China, holding several days of discussions, and then having nothing to announce in terms of mutual agreement. Foreign and domestic audiences would probably interpret this as signifying a stagnated relationship and question the purpose of your trip. The Soviets might take heart that we were going nowhere in our Chinese opening.

Joint Press Statement. As I said, Chiao floated this concept as allowing the Chinese to be more flexible in their presentations. The document would be informal and descriptive, rather than a formal taking of positions which would inevitably involve a more extensive cataloging of differences. Its overall character would be blander—but also more positive—than a communiqué. Another advantage would be that, unlike a communiqué, it would not be comparable to the Shanghai document and thus less susceptible to comparisons. It would thus be more extensive than a brief communiqué (or none at all) without many of the headaches of a lengthy communiqué.

The drawbacks would be the inevitable carping over lack of results. By definition there would be no specific agreements, only a narrative of the discussions with a positive sense of direction. It would probably be brief. Various audiences, including Moscow, would take it as a sign that our relationship with Peking was not progressing rapidly but they would not conclude that it was in bad shape.

Cancel the Trip. This is an option that should also be considered. Clearly little concrete can be expected to result from your journey. The sharper public rhetoric of the Chinese recently; their refusal to be visibly identified with us; the Middle Kingdom psychology of getting a second President to come to China even though he knew little would be achieved; and the disdainful way that they treated us and the communiqué process during my visit—all these suggest postponement of your trip should at least be considered. Your various audiences at home and abroad, including the Soviets might well consider your cancellation an act of strength. The Chinese might secretly respect such a move. You would explain that our relations with Peking are proceeding satisfactorily, but based on our exploratory contacts you decided that a summit meeting was not really required or justified at this juncture. You look forward to going when conditions were more ripe, and meanwhile we would sustain our relationship through established channels. It could be argued that this course would invite no more criticism of failure than a trip that seemed purely cosmetic, or even highlighted our divergences.

On the other hand, a cancellation of your trip—after all the firm expectations for a full year—would be a major event, no matter how low-keyed we tried to treat it. It would be seen probably as a major crisis in our relationship—either on general grounds or because of specific issues like détente or Taiwan. Coupled with the postponement of the Brezhnev summit, many would trumpet a general failure of our foreign policy, particularly in East-West relations. The Russians would certainly be pleased—though they might well be impressed with your sang-froid and would probably not attempt to exploit the event in strategic fashion. Finally it might well kill off the China opening. No matter how annoying some of the Chinese practices, they have made it amply clear that they look forward to your visit, and your cancellation would be a significant rebuff.

Conclusions

I look forward to discussing these issues with you. As of now, I lean strongly toward the following procedure:

—Reduce your China trip effectively to three-plus working days in Peking only. You would arrive on Monday afternoon, December 1 and leave Friday morning, December 5. It would be billed as a business-like exchange of views in the capital, with limited sightseeing and no visits to other cities.

—Work for a joint press statement which would eliminate most contentious language and be moderately upbeat.

—Proceed to the Philippines and Indonesia for a day each and return to the U.S. on Monday, December 8.

This course has the following advantages:

—It would indicate that our relationship with the PRC is being sustained and marginally advanced because of our mutual interests, though our respective differences prevent a major breakthrough.

—The stop in China could be seen as a working session with the new leader of a quarter of humanity without an extended sojourn, side trips or frills.

—The reduction of the China trip and the adding of two other countries would be an appropriate riposte to the general Chinese attitude and communiqué ploy. It would place them into a general Asian context rather than have the President travel all the way to Peking for meetings he knew would be marginal.

—We would strengthen our relations with the two key countries in Southeast Asia.

—Your trip (which would still only last one week), would become an Asian, rather than merely a Communist China, journey and would thus have a weightier and more balanced nature.

I recommend we proceed as follows. Ambassador Bush would present a draft of a joint press statement along the lines of Tab A.[5] (For reference the Chinese draft communiqué is at Tab B.)[6] He would be instructed to tell the Chinese the following:

(1) After reflecting on the exchanges during my trip and studying their communiqué, we decided that it would be impossible to work out an acceptable communiqué; in order to agree to some of their language spelling out our differences we would need a great deal of positive content elsewhere in the document—which they have made clear they are not prepared to accept. Therefore, per my conversation with the Foreign Minister on the way to the airport, we have decided that a joint press statement is the best outcome; being less formal, it would not require explicit and divisive taking of positions. Our draft picks up the positive aspects of their draft communiqué in verbatim fashion and expresses other sections (e.g. Taiwan) in as objective a manner as we can. Frankly we consider their positive elements inadequate, but we can live with them in a press statement that drops their contentious language.

(2) We believe it makes sense to make a working visit, keeping in mind the Chinese view that the trip itself is the significant political factor. Therefore you plan to arrive on Monday afternoon in Peking, leave Friday morning, and visit no other Chinese cities.

(3) You are reconsidering the possibility of visiting a couple of friendly Asian capitals after China; otherwise your travels would have an unbalanced coloration.

(4) We wish to announce the dates for the trip on Monday, November 3, so we need their response very quickly.

(5) Our advance team would proceed to Peking a week or so later.

---

[5] Tab A, attached but not printed, is the U.S. draft of the joint press statement as approved and revised by Kissinger. It was sent to the USLO in an undated backchannel message. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, Box 5, China, unnumbered items (22), 10/25/75–10/31/75)

[6] Tab B is attached but not printed.

128. Paper Prepared by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lord)[1]

Washington, undated.

Analysis/Highlights of Secretary Kissinger's Meeting with Chairman Mao, October 21, 1975

The Main Themes

This meeting was on the whole disturbing, signifying *a cooling of our relationship linked to the Chinese perception of the U.S. as a fading strategic power in the face of Soviet advance.* Though the session was cordial, it was considerably less so than previous encounters. In November 1973 the conversation was described by the Chinese as "friendly," "wide-ranging," and "far-sighted." This time the third adjective was omitted.[2] We both still have a "common opponent" but whereas before there was a feeling of working in parallel to counter this threat, this time the message was that the U.S. could not be counted upon to resist pressures and therefore China was going to have to go it alone.

To sum up the major theme in one sentence: The U.S. is "not reliable," Europe is "soft," Japan seeks "hegemony," and therefore China will dig tunnels, store millet and oppose the Soviet Union on its own, even as a naive and appeasing world curses the Chinese as "warlords" for sounding the alarm.

The Soviet Union therefore is still the enemy. *The U.S. is not so much hostile as it is ineffectual* (which perhaps is more insulting). For example, if Europe is attacked we would pull a Dunkirk and get out, rather than either seeing our heavily outnumbered troops get overwhelmed or resorting to nuclear weapons. If this is true in Europe, by extension it is true in Asia as well; China should not count on our defending it in a crunch; we need not discuss military matters as on previous occasions. In any event China is down the list of our priorities, and even our allies in Europe and Japan get less attention than the Soviet Union in our policies.

---

[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables for President Ford, Presidential Trips File, Box 19, 11/28–12/7/75, Far East, Briefing Book, Peking, Meeting with Chairman Mao, President's copy (3). Secret; Sensitive. A handwritten note at the top of the first page reads: "(Lord memo) HAK handed to President. 10/25/75." Kissinger gave this paper to Ford during a 9:30 a.m. meeting in the Oval Office. See Document 129.

[2] The Chinese press release, dated October 21, is attached but not printed.

In our relations with Moscow the theme of appeasement (Teng used the Munich analogy) *has overtaken* the one of *collusion.* Détente is dangerous not so much because it represents ganging up on China as it undermines the morale and defenses of the West through false illusions, thus increasing the pressures on the PRC. It is true that we "stood on the shoulders" of China to gain leverage on Moscow in the 1971–3 period, but that is "useless" now—presumably both because China won't let itself be used and because détente is in trouble. Thus our policy now is marked by maneuvering and Dr. Kissinger's very busy travels. We are flailing away in a rear guard action against the Soviet hegemonic tide which is sweeping toward war: we are "swallows" who are "busy" before "the wind and rain" come. We may be able to postpone the Soviet storm, but it is inescapably on its way.

The source of our troubles is domestic. "Not reliable" can refer to a failure of nerve, a general withdrawal from the fray, the release of classified documents, the incomprehensible (to the Chinese) destruction of a strong President over a minor incident. Our policies are increasingly hamstrung by a combination of the liberal appeasing establishment symbolized by *The New York Times,* and traditional conservative isolationists (and anti-PRC to boot) symbolized by Senator Goldwater.

This turbulent international situation is much more crucial than Taiwan. For now it is better to have the U.S. keep the island under control rather than having it go independent or toward Moscow or Tokyo. The Chinese can wait patiently until the time is ripe, but then they will have to use force. By implication, the U.S. should not ask for peaceful assurances, but it can take its time letting Taiwan go.

The future of China's policies is uncertain. Mao and his followers—Premier Chou, Marshal Yeh, and (noticeably) Vice Premier Teng—are all old and "will not do," "will not make it out." There is criticism, perhaps internal, of Mao as being a "warlord" (too anti-Russian?) and a "bureaucrat" (too much emphasis on production?).

Thus China will go it alone—"rifles and millet." Let all the world curse it as a "warlord" or "warmonger." That only makes Mao happy. The Chinese will prepare for "the wind and the rain." And if Moscow attacks, Peking will suck the Russians in, let them occupy the big cities à la Napoleon, and mobilize for a victorious counter-attack.

Some Specific Points

Mao is very sick. He looked it, despite his mental agility. He was unable to walk us to the door as on previous occasions. He had much more trouble standing. He was just about unable to speak at all, making most of his points on paper or in obscure grunts. He is "going to heaven" soon, and has an "invitation from God" (points he has made previously, however). And he described his various ailments all over him.

Mao is in charge of general international strategy. He was well briefed and he had clearly given Teng his script the day before. He hit all the major themes of their foreign policy. On the other hand, he is clearly incapable of detailed or sustained work; he himself said that he ignored "routine" affairs and suggested he confined himself to international matters.

Teng is the key official now. Mao referred to him several times in the conversation. He is certainly Chou's replacement, and perhaps Mao's. On the other hand Mao pointed to his age, grouped him with himself, Chou and Yeh, and suggested that they would all be soon irrelevant.

The U.S. (and Kissinger) are "not reliable." See the general themes above. We are "swallows" before the storm. We are "maneuvering" and "busy"—though both are allowable, they are apparently at best delaying actions. We are prone to "Dunkirks." We won't use nuclear weapons. We are no longer "far-sighted."

Our domestic structure is weak. Watergate was mishandled and magnified. Our media (*Times*) and our Congress (Goldwater) are sapping our strength.

China is relatively backward—both in strength and in our priorities. After America comes Russia, Europe, Japan and then China.

"Europe is too soft now." They are afraid of the Soviet Union. Europe is too "scattered," "loose," "spread out." East and West Germany should unite under West German domination (so as to pressure the Soviet Union).

"Japan is seeking hegemony."

U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union is confused and ineffectual. It is variously described as "Dunkirk" appeasement, frantic maneuvering, using China to get to Moscow, joining Moscow in hurling epithets at the PRC. At the same time Moscow remains a "common opponent" of both China and the U.S. and when war breaks out, then (but only then) we should consider joint cooperation.

In any event Schlesinger should come to China and visit the areas near the Soviet Union (so as to push us towards confrontation with Moscow). He is presumably welcome because he makes preparations and cries out rather than flying around like a "swallow."

"The small issue is Taiwan, the big issue is the world." They can wait 100 years, for Taiwan is "unwantable," indigestible ("full of counter-revolutionaries"). It's better for the U.S. to keep the island under control for the time being.

China will rely on itself. "Rifles and millet." The Dunkirk strategy if necessary. The Chairman likes to be cursed (unlike Americans who worry about their image?); only then does he pay attention to someone. Dr. Kissinger should go ahead and publicize Chinese aggression

against China (Taiwan) and Korea. "I will only be happy when all foreigners slam on tables and curse me." China needs to know its enemies (including the U.S.?) so as to be vigilant: "If you don't curse me, I won't see you, and I will just sleep peacefully."

Concluding Caveat

Finally, *let us not pretend that we can fathom everything* the Chairman had to say. Some passages might have had layers that we are incapable of sensing; others might merely be literal; others might be haphazard, even meaningless.

The Chairman's basic message and principal themes were clear. They clearly formed the strategic framework for the Kissinger visit, indeed for the evolution in our relations in the past couple of years. But there were several cryptic passages that are unclear. The tendency is to dig for the subtleties, the deeper meanings behind the Chairman's laconic, earthy prose. In most instances the larger meaning is apparent. In others, however, there may be nothing particularly significant, or a somewhat senile man might have been wandering aimlessly for a moment. After all, he is a very frail 82. His words were either translated with great difficulty (and probably smoothed over and elaborated at times) by the three girls or written down. Chiao volunteered his own interpretation the next day, which is unprecedented, playing down the collusion theme and underlining the "common enemy" leverage.

To cite just one example of ambiguity: "Do you have any way to assist me in curing my present inability to speak clearly?" The odds are that this was basically small talk about his own health. It is very doubtful that he was seriously asking for medical assistance. But was the Chairman saying that his voice within China (or in the world) was not being heard, that his influence is being circumscribed, and that he wants U.S. help to strengthen his position through our policies? Does he want us to help him "speak clearly" in this larger sense?

There were several other obscure passages in the talk, e.g. the reference to the anti-Chinese Korean resolution, the cracks against Jewish influence in the American media, the invitation to Bush to pay a call on the Chairman. *These might have meant,* in turn, that the Chinese don't want to get involved in the Korean problem; that Jews are traditionally appeasers in history and are a major element in eroding American steadfastness; and that the U.S. should pay more attention to China.

Equally the passages may have had no deeper meaning whatsoever, despite the Chairman's well deserved reputation for the use of aphorism and symbolism and never wasting his words.

129. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, October 25, 1975, 9:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Gerald Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

[Omitted here is discussion of the loigistics and timetable for the President's proposed visit to East Asia, and of other matters unrelated to China.]

[The Secretary hands the President a summary/analysis of his conversation with Mao.][2]

President: How is Mao's health?

Kissinger: When you see him you think he is finished; he can hardly articulate. He speaks a few words of English but it is impossible to understand. The interpreter has to guess at the words until he nods—or he writes out the words. Mao's theme is our weakness. We are the "swallow before the storm." We are ineffectual. What we say is not reliable. He thinks we won't use nuclear weapons in Europe and would suffer another Dunkirk. He says we can no longer stand on Chinese shoulders to reach the Soviet Union. "China must be self-reliant." It is sort of admirable. These are the same people of the Long March.

I said we had a common opponent. He said he likes Schlesinger's view of the Soviet Union better than mine. They wanted Schlesinger to visit. That would drive the Soviet Union wild. But I said we could have military exchanges to see what we could do. He said, "No. After the war starts we will talk, not before the war." They want to do the same as Stalin did in World War II—be sure that a war starts in the West so both will be exhausted by the time China has to get in.

I guarantee you that if we do go into confrontation with the Soviet Union, they will attack us and the Soviet Union and draw the Third World around them. Good relations with the Soviet Union are the best for our Chinese relations—and vice versa. Our weakness is the problem—they see us in trouble with SALT and détente. That plays into their hands.

---

[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, National Security Adviser Memcons, Box 16, July–October 1975. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. All brackets are in the original, except those bracketed insertions describing the omission of material. According to the President's Daily Diary, Ford, Kissinger, and Scowcroft met from 9:35 until 11:05 a.m. (Ibid.)

[2] Document 128.

They can't understand the Congress—what the Congress did on Turkey, Hawk missiles, etc.

I think you can't take any guff from them, and you have to be cooler than Nixon in your toast.

[Discussion of schedule.]

Kissinger: I don't think you should not just go to China. People will say what did you go for? Then they will have you by the balls in terms of making it look worthwhile. The best thing you can do is something in contrast with Nixon: Don't stay long, don't go to another city. Any other city visit, even if it's different from where Nixon went, will look like a repeat to the American people.

When I saw the communiqué my first reaction was to cancel your trip. Bush's reaction was the same. But when we thought about it, we changed our minds. It would lose us all our leverage with the Soviet Union. It would upset the Japanese. It would give the Chinese a chance to invite all the Democratic candidates over to say you screwed up the Chinese policy.

President: How about adding India?

Kissinger: No. That's too big a shock. Manila and Djakarta is just a jab at them. India and Pakistan would add two days minimum. Manila/Djakarta bolsters our friends, and you'll get a big reception in Manila.

President: I agree. Manila will please the Conservatives. I think you are probably right. Let me think it over just a bit and I'll let you know.

[He hands the President the U.S. draft press statement on the China trip.][3]

President: It sounds all right. This sentence about peaceful settlement of Taiwan by the Chinese themselves—this is what we have said before, isn't it?

Kissinger: Yes. The conservatives will like it; the PRC won't like it much.

President: How is George Bush doing?

Kissinger: Magnificently. I am very, very impressed with him. I was not enthusiastic about his appointment, but he has grown into the job and I think he will one day be a considerable national leader. He is a big cut above Moynihan—who is turning into a disaster. To call Brazil a fascist dictatorship [because of its vote on the anti-Zionism resolution] . . .

President: When did he do that?

---

[3] See footnote 5, Document 127.

Kissinger: He is going wild about the Israeli issues. [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

President: I agree with you about George. He is a fine man.

Kissinger: [Reads parts from the analysis of the Mao conversation.]

President: What is going to happen when Mao dies?

Kissinger: There is no way anyone can know that. He is on the verge of becoming a vegetable, but he has the uncanny ability to go right to the heart of things. No small talk, in the sense that everything has meaning.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to China.]

---

130. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, October 31, 1975.

PARTICIPANTS

President Gerald R. Ford
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Kissinger: The Chinese turned down our statement but accepted the cut-down version of the trip. They stressed that you would be received with courtesy. They need us more than we need them. They may be doing this to prove their manhood; having done so they may give you a good trip. These are two options: cancel, or else go but get the word out that we don't expect anything of substance but that it is important to exchange views.

The President: I think we should do the latter.

Kissinger: Then I would tell the Chinese we find their communiqué unacceptable and since we submitted the last draft it is up to them to offer modifications. Ask them: Why does it serve their purpose to have the visit end on a statement advertising our differences? But say we are prepared to do without a statement. Then I think we

---

[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSA Memcons, Box 16, July–October 1975. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. According to the President's Daily Diary, it lasted from 9:18 to 10:10 a.m., with Scowcroft joining at 9:25. (Ibid.) All brackets are in the original, except the bracketed insertion describing the omission of material.

should get to Indonesia and the Philippines and announce it all next Tuesday. [Discussed the sequence of Jakarta–Manila.]

The President: Is there any diplomatic difference?

Kissinger: I don't know which way it would be easier to get out the crowds.

The President: Let's go to Jakarta first if there isn't any difference.

Kissinger: Okay. Let's notify all of them and say we want to announce it at noon here on Tuesday.[2] We will do a note to the Chinese: Since we have submitted something to them, could they submit their version of a press statement? Also could they tell us how to make our version acceptable. It is in the interest of both of us not to end on the point of our differences.

Actually the Chinese note was fairly conciliatory. Bush thinks it is best not to have a communiqué.

The President: I think to cancel it would be a disaster both internationally and with the left and right.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to China.]

---

[2] November 4.

---

131. Backchannel Message From the Chief of the Liaison Office in China (Bush) to Secretary of State Kissinger[1]

Beijing, November 6, 1975, 0855Z.

133. Subject: The President's Visit. The mood in our recent brief meetings with Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua has been noticeably chilly. There has been no small talk and no relaxed opening sentences, only: "Let's proceed with the business at hand." On Tuesday,[2] Chiao delivered the PRC reply delaying the advance and the announcement and offered a seemingly gratuitous lecture on the need for airing differences. He rejected our communiqué draft out of hand, said again he would not care if there were no communiqué, and seemed to move

---

[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, Box 5, China, unnumbered items (23), 11/1/75–11/6/75. Secret; Sensitive; Handle Via Voyager Channel. A stamped notation in the upper right hand corner of the first page indicates that the President saw this message.

[2] November 4.

away from the "we have time" theme to the hoary "you owe us a debt."[3] (His emphasis on this last point seemed curiously out of step with that of Chairman Mao on the Taiwan question.)

All this may merely be tactical posturing designed to strengthen the PRC negotiating position prior to the visit. However, I doubt this is the case, and it would be prudent in any case to assume that the Chinese will employ some fairly unpleasant language, both in public and in private, during the President's visit. Given the probable cost at home to the President for having to subject himself to this and the limited likelihood that there will be any forward movement on Sino-U.S. relations, I would incline toward postponing the visit if there were a genuinely legitimate reason to do so. (At this late date, of course, this seems highly unlikely and I do not advocate putting the visit off.)

The question at hand is how to best respond to tough Chinese statements on their view of the world scene, détente, and the Taiwan issue in a way that minimizes the dangers for the President without unduly disturbing our bilateral relationship. I would suggest the President come armed with a general exposition of U.S. support for the Shanghai Communiqué and hopes for the world—peace, freedom, equality, etc.—and our effort toward those goals which he could use both publicly and privately. This would not only have some propaganda value, it would also make it clear that the President formulates U.S. foreign policy based on his perception of right and the national interest and not in response to Chinese carping about our policies. Public Chinese criticism of détente could be handled as a portion of the banquet toast, perhaps by sharpening your theme that the United States has for many years taken and will continue to take firm action to oppose expansionism rather than rely on inflated rhetoric. If the Chinese raise the Taiwan issue along the lines of their draft communiqué, I believe the President would have to respond with a slightly embroidered exposition of our stand in the Shanghai Communiqué. If the Chinese escalate further by openly suggesting they may use military force to "liberate" Taiwan, it seems to me there is no alternative to the President's insisting that any settlement will have to be by peaceful means. The President can hardly afford to subject himself to public or private Chinese tirades on these critical issues without replying in some way, but we see no reason to spend our time merely responding to their statements. We should also be prepared to react if the Chinese decide to feed their line to the press through their underlings. (In this regard, you should know that shortly after the news of Schlesinger's

[3] The Chinese message was transmitted in backchannel message 129 from Beijing, November 4. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, Box 5, China, unnumbered items (23), 11/1/75–11/6/75)

departure was carried by the wire services,[4] the MFA press man Ma Yu-chen gave a foreign correspondent here a lengthy pep talk of the PRC's great respect for Schlesinger and implied that he was the only person in the USG who fully understood the Soviet threat.)

Given the current Chinese frostiness, I think the President in both his private and public statements should strive to leave the Chinese leaders and the world audience with the unmistakable impression that Gerald Ford is a straight-talking man, contemptuous of overblown rhetoric, and a man who sets policy based on our own view of what is right and of our interests. All should know that the President is a good decent man, but one who can be tough as nails with the Soviets, the Chinese, or others when necessary. Needless to say, he (and other members of the party) should avoid effusive praise of the Chinese and their system or too many diplomatic niceties during banquet speeches which may be in answer to or followed by Chinese lectures on the poor state of the world and American impotence.

Warm regards

George Bush

---

[4] On November 2, Ford accepted Schlesinger's resignation as Secretary of Defense, Kissinger's as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and Colby's as Director of Central Intelligence in a major realignment of his administration. They were replaced by Rumsfeld, Scowcroft, and Bush, respectively. Ford announced the changes on November 3; see *Public Papers: Ford, 1975,* vol. II, pp. 1791–1792.

---

132. Memorandum From Secretary of State Kissinger to President Ford[1]

Washington, November 20, 1975.

SUBJECT

Your Trip to the People's Republic of China: A Scope Analysis for Your Discussions with Chinese Leaders

---

[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables for President Ford, Presidential Trips File, Box 20, 11/28–12/7/75, Far East, General. Top Secret; Nodis. This memorandum was attached to a November 22 covering memorandum from Scowcroft to the President, which noted, "It was prepared jointly by the NSC Staff and Department of State. It is meant to pull together the many aspects of U.S.–PRC relations that you will be reviewing in the other briefing materials we have sent."

As a basis for your preparations for your forthcoming trip to the People's Republic of China (PRC) we have prepared, in coordination with the NSC, the following analytical paper. It is intended to be a general scope analysis, and is designed to give you a comprehensive sense of the political context of your discussions with Chinese leaders. It reviews the manner in which our relations with the PRC have evolved over the past five years, and lays out in summary form the primary objectives of your meetings with Chairman Mao and Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing.

This scope analysis should also give you the kind of overview which will make more productive your reading of the other background materials being prepared for your trip by the Department, NSC, and CIA on international and bilateral issues.

The Political Context of Your Visit

Your trip to China comes at an important juncture. Our relations with the PRC are showing the first significant signs of strain since we initiated a direct dialogue with Chinese leaders during my secret trip to Peking in the summer of 1971. At the same time, both sides continue to see maintenance of the present relationship as in their respective interests. This situation will make your trip somewhat more difficult and less immediately productive than we had originally hoped. But it makes the visit all the more important if we are to sustain a relationship which has brought substantial strategic benefits to the foreign policy of the United States.

The U.S. Role in the World. There are several reasons for the current tension in our relationship with the Chinese. Probably the primary cause is a growing doubt in Peking that the United States is capable of playing the kind of major world role which will provide an effective counterweight to Moscow's efforts to project the Soviet presence abroad and to bring about a geo-political encirclement of China. In the wake of the Communist victories in Indochina this past spring, PRC media began to express in explicit terms a concern with the "strategic passivity" of the United States. Peking apparently believes that our domestic political situation is in such turmoil—as a result of the troubles of the last decade, the resignation of President Nixon, the increasingly assertive role of Congress in hobbling Executive Branch foreign policy actions, and the nihilistic mood of our press—that the United States is increasingly incapable of playing a coherent role in world affairs. To the degree that the Chinese downgrade our importance as a world power, or develop doubts about our ability to pursue our own interests abroad, they will question the significance of the relationship we have established over the past four years.

U.S.-Soviet Relations. A related factor prompting the Chinese to question the value of their relations with us is substantial concern about

the effects on PRC interests of our détente policies for dealing with the Soviet Union. Chinese leaders seem to be reassessing—within limits—the impact on their interests of such developments as the Helsinki Conference, sales of American grain and technology to Russia, and our continuing efforts to pursue strategic arms limitation agreements with Moscow. Privately the Chinese fear that these developments will tend to isolate them politically and strengthen their major enemy. Publicly Peking is characterizing détente as outright appeasement of a growing Soviet threat to the security of the U.S. and Europe (and the PRC). Their media portray the West as repeating the mistakes of Chamberlain and Daladier in the 1930s in underestimating the menace of Hitler.

As much as the Chinese are concerned with détente, this issue itself cannot be the primary reason for Peking's current coolness, for the most active period of our relations with Moscow in 1972–73 was also the most positive period in the new U.S.–PRC relationship. While the Chinese did express to us privately in those years their concerns about some of our negotiations with the Russians—particularly the agreement on the prevention of nuclear war—Peking at least saw us capable of taking strong action against the Soviets, as we did in the Indian subcontinent in 1971 and Middle East alert of 1973. Thus the Chinese concern appears derived from the combination of increasing uncertainty about our world role and détente policies pursued from a position of apparent weakness rather than strength.

Of course it is self-serving for the Chinese to urge us toward more frontal opposition to the Soviets. Such a policy would clearly serve Peking's own interests, as it would strengthen Western counterpressures against the Russians and force Moscow to concentrate its military and political energies against the U.S. and Europe. Nevertheless the strongest incentive to the Chinese to cooperate with us comes from a combination of American forcefulness in international affairs, coupled with improving U.S. relations with Moscow. In this situation, the Chinese will at once have some assurance that the U.S. is capable of countering Soviet expansionist actions, and at the same time they will fear "falling behind" Moscow in developing constructive relations with us and being left isolated as the only critic of détente.

Your Approach to the Soviet Issue. Thus, much of your discussions with PRC leaders will undoubtedly focus on the central problem of the Soviet threat and our respective approaches to dealing with it. Our underlying position is that we will follow our national interests as we see them, and that neither Peking nor Moscow can presume to define those for us or lecture us on our policies. Your objective should be to forcefully assert your confidence in the overall approach you have adopted for coping with Moscow; to indicate that we have absolutely no illusions about Soviet intentions; but that our policies best serve American

interests. You should say forthrightly that we will continue to seek agreements with Moscow which will lower tensions, reduce the dangers of war, and contribute to the evolution of a stable international equilibrium. You can emphasize that the American people are not deluded by détente (as our domestic debate clearly indicates), but that our efforts to encourage restrained behavior on the part of the Russians place us in the best position to mobilize the support of our people for resistance to Soviet expansionism. Only by demonstrating to our public that we have explored reasonable approaches with Moscow can we rally backing for firm actions when they are required.

You can state directly to Chinese leaders that we know they do not agree with our position, but emphasize that this is a disagreement over tactics rather than any difference in our fundamental assessment of the primary threat to the national security of either of our countries. You should recall that it was the problem of Soviet "hegemony" which first brought us together, that we continue to share a basic concern with this problem, and that because we basically agree about the source of expansionistic pressures in the world we can honestly disagree on a strategy for coping with it. While emphasizing that we will continue to pursue policies which we believe serve our own interests, the Administration will—as we have done since 1971—weigh the impact of our policies on China's interests, take no actions that are directed against the Chinese and actively consult with them.

Normalization. A third reason for some strain in our relations with Peking at this time appears to be reaction against the lack of movement toward full normalization of U.S.–PRC relations. As with their questions about détente, the concern of senior Chinese leaders regarding normalization is not simply a matter of disagreement with our current position on this issue; it is also our evident inability to act and implement policies which affect their interests.

From the very beginning of our relationship with Peking, the Chinese have clearly laid primary emphasis on strategic international considerations. These have always been the primary emphasis of our discussions in Peking. As recently as my conversation with Mao last month,[2] he said that the big issue is the international situation and the small issue is Taiwan. Nevertheless, they attach considerable significance to our position on Taiwan, and to whether we will move to recognize them as the sole legal government of China. This is a basic issue of principle for Peking, one with considerable domestic political weight, and which they view as an indicator of how seriously we take our relationship with them.

---

[2] See Document 124.

In addition, the Chinese had been led by President Nixon to expect that a major effort would be made before 1976 to resolve the Taiwan question and establish diplomatic relations. Since 1973 they have patiently worked to put us in a position where we would have to deal with this complex of issues on China's own terms (what Peking now likes to characterize as the "Japanese model" for normalization: breaking diplomatic relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan; withdrawal of all U.S. troops from the island; and abrogation of the U.S.–ROC defense treaty). Now there appears to be considerable uncertainty about our ability and willingness to follow through on the normalization question.

The Chinese leadership appears cross-pressured on Taiwan between a rational assessment of their strategic needs vis-à-vis the United States and the emotional weight of an issue of considerable domestic political impact. When your trip was set up in November of 1974, I had an inconclusive discussion with Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing on normalization.[3] It was clearly agreed that your trip would be without preconditions on Taiwan or any other issue. The Chinese may nevertheless have hoped a year ago that conditions would be such that you would be in a position to make some progress on this issue.

This past June, in the wake of the spring developments in Indochina, the Chinese appeared anxious that you might postpone your visit to the PRC out of concern that you would be pressured on normalization. They clearly wanted to preserve your visit. To pre-empt a decision to postpone it, Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing publicly told a group of visiting American newspaper editors on June 2 that you would be welcomed in Peking whether or not you had major business to transact.[4] Since that time, Chinese leaders have clearly and repeatedly stated—both privately and publicly—that they look forward to your visit even in the absence of progress toward full normalization (because of the desire to sustain a relationship with us for the larger security purposes it serves).

All the senior PRC leaders we have been dealing with—Chairman Mao, Vice Premier Teng, and Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua—have repeatedly stated that they are prepared to be patient on the timing of normalization and resolution of the Taiwan question. During my most recent visit to Peking, Chairman Mao told me (perhaps with some measure of irony) that it is better for the present that the U.S. maintain control over Taiwan (presumably to keep the island from declaring itself an independent state, and to keep the Soviets out of the picture).

---

[3] See Document 93.

[4] See footnote 18, Document 112.

At the same time Teng and Ch'iao Kuan-hua recently have been righteously telling us that the U.S. owes China a "debt" for their patience on this issue.[5] The stated position of the leadership in Peking on this question may well contrast with their real feelings on the issue.

There would seem to be a number of reasons for Peking's current attitude apart from any unhappiness with the lack of progress according to President Nixon's timetable. Chairman Mao, at 82, is nearing the end of his days as one of China's great political figures, and—despite his protestations of patience regarding Taiwan—no doubt would have liked to crown his career by fully unifying China. We also believe that the leadership in Peking is under some degree of pressure from their domestic political constituency for signs of progress on the Taiwan question. We cannot verify by intelligence means whether this is simply a matter of lower-level Party officials feeling that China has not gained anything from the U.S. on an important issue for their country, or whether there are important divisions of opinion within the central leadership coalition. But it stands to reason that with questions being raised about the value to China of relations with the U.S. on security matters, and without movement on normalization, ambitious political figures in China may be pressing the Mao/Chou/Teng leadership to justify the wisdom of their opening to the United States.

Whether or not there are serious differences within the Chinese leadership over the value of their relationship with us, we think there must be quite strong opposition within China to making any further bilateral accommodations in the absence of agreement on full normalization of relations. This would help explain Peking's total lack of responsiveness during my October visit to our suggestion that we take certain partial steps to improve our bilateral relations in such areas as a hot line or trade or cultural/scientific exchanges as a way of demonstrating some vitality in our relationship.

The Chinese Domestic Dimensions. The exact manner in which the play of forces within the Chinese leadership affects this situation, however, is something we do not clearly understand. Chairman Mao, by all evidence, continues to set the major orientation in China's foreign policy; he is clearly the author of the current concern with our détente policies; and he also has been the primary articulator of policy on Taiwan. We are confident that Premier Chou En-lai was close to Mao in both formulating and implementing the opening to the U.S. Chou, however, now appears to be out of the picture as an active leader because of a serious illness. Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing has taken over Chou's role as the principal implementor of Peking's foreign policies.

---

[5] See Document 131.

We believe that Chairman Mao was responsible for the 1973 political rehabilitation of Teng Hsiao-p'ing (who was purged in 1967 during the Cultural Revolution), but we have other indications that Teng may be the object of a political challenge. Moreover, there have been signs that Mao himself has his differences with other leaders, particularly those in the military. The precise relationship between these domestic political factors and Peking's current foreign policy orientation, however, is not known. (The CIA analysis prepared for your visit will give you our best estimate of the interplay within the Chinese leadership and its impact on foreign policy.)[6]

Your Approach to the Normalization Issue. We do believe, however, that there is an element of tactics in Peking's current hardening in their dealings with us. The Chinese do not want us to become complacent about the relationship, and probably hope to extract from you some sense of how you might handle the normalization issue after 1976 (as well as to challenge your approach to dealing with the Soviets). They also probably seek to narrow our already limited range of options for handling the Taiwan question.

During the past year of our discussions on normalization, the Chinese have tried to turn issues we hope to resolve with them on a mutual basis into unilateral American requirements. They have brushed aside, for example, suggestions that we must find some mutually acceptable position on the question of a peaceful resolution of Taiwan's future. Teng Hsiao-p'ing's attitude has been that we owe China a "debt" for their patience on this issue; that China has no problems normalizing with the U.S. but we still "need" Taiwan; and that ultimately we must meet the PRC's terms. In addition, in the draft communiqué submitted by the Chinese side during my October visit to Peking, new language was added to the Shanghai Communiqué formulation on normalization which was both highly polemical in phrasing and also more restrictive of our options (such as the new position that our military forces must be withdrawn from "the Taiwan Strait area" as well as from the island, and the explicit condition that we must abrogate "the U.S.–Chiang 'joint defense treaty'.")

Thus a second major element of your discussions in Peking will be to convince the Chinese that we are not just stringing them along on Taiwan, and that we are prepared to seriously confront the question of normalization if a mutually acceptable way can be worked out, particularly of assuring that the future of Taiwan will be resolved by peaceful means. At the same time, the Chinese understand clearly that you are not prepared to resolve this matter during your forthcoming visit.

---

[6] Not found.

The Chinese Desire to Maintain the Relationship. Despite these areas of policy difference—as well as the evident ideological chasm between us, and our very different perspectives on specific international issues—we believe that the Chinese leadership still sees it in the interest of their country to maintain an official dialogue with the U.S. Frankly, during my October visit to the PRC and in its aftermath—when we exchanged messages with Peking on the question of a communiqué or press statement to be issued at the conclusion of your visit—the Chinese, by their insolent behavior and self-righteous lack of responsiveness in discussing international and bilateral issues, seemed to be daring us to postpone your visit. They appeared to have tried to put us on the psychological defensive, presumably in hopes of forcing us to re-evaluate some of our positions which they dislike, and creating a situation where we appeared to need a relationship with them more then they with us.

Their request of November 4 for a delay in announcing the date of your trip apparently was an effort to buy time in order to re-evaluate their position regarding the visit in the wake of your Cabinet changes.[7] The fact that they responded to us affirmatively on November 8—in a context where we had clearly indicated in a prior message the prospect of a postponement of your trip if they did not give us a favorable reply by that date—indicates that they had made a basic decision not to break off the official dialogue. Having thus exposed their position, there may now be a more healthy psychological balance in the relationship which will enable you to present your positions forcefully and to emphasize the need for mutual efforts in coping with international security questions of common concern and in completing the normalization process.

This does not mean, however, that they will not press you on Administration positions that disturb them. But it does mean that you can go to Peking confident that the Chinese see the need for a continuing relationship with the U.S. As Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua said in a message of November 4—a statement otherwise filled with sarcastic comments about our relationship—"the Chinese side has always felt that the issuance of a joint communiqué of the nature of the Shanghai Communiqué, which shows the world that our two countries each maintains its principled position while sharing common points, would be helpful in dealing with international problems of common concern and moving towards normalization. The impact of the Shanghai Communiqué has clearly borne this out."[8]

---

[7] See Document 131.

[8] See footnote 3, Document 131.

The Evolving Pattern of U.S.–PRC Relations

The above analysis describes the immediate context of your visit to Peking. The following chronological review of the pattern of our dealings over the past several years should be helpful in giving you a sense of the importance and historical place of your discussions with PRC leaders.

The Opening: 1969–1971. During the decades of the 1950s and '60s—beginning with the Korean War and President Truman's "neutralization" of Taiwan with the Seventh Fleet, and running through the sterile ambassadorial-level talks at Geneva and Warsaw—the U.S. posture towards the PRC was one of "containment and isolation." For much of the period, we saw China as little more than an extension of Soviet power. For their part, the Chinese took the view that they would not even talk with the U.S. about establishing a normal relationship until we had returned Taiwan to their [control?].

Peking's position changed only when Sino-Soviet relations had deteriorated to the point where Peking felt its major security problem lay in Moscow, not in Washington. After the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968, and serious border clashes on the Sino-Soviet frontier in the spring and summer of 1969, the Chinese shifted their order of priorities. They decided to deal with us on strategic matters, while assuming that resolution of our bilateral differences would follow from cooperation on the more basic issue of a common concern with the Soviet threat and development of a positive "China mood" in the U.S.

In 1969 the Chinese leaders had strong incentives for re-establishing authoritative contact with the U.S. China was emerging from the self-imposed isolation of the Cultural Revolution period and was very apprehensive about its exposed position in the face of the Soviet threat. In June of that year Brezhnev had expressed his intention of creating an "Asian Collective Security System" that was demonstrably anti-Chinese in purpose. Japan had become the third major industrial state, and Chinese leaders were concerned that a power that had invaded their country in the 1930s might take the road of rearmament, or ally itself with a hostile power. In addition, India was an unfriendly state (with whom the Chinese had had a border war in 1962) and the Soviets had been trying to establish an active political relationship with New Delhi for almost a decade. In sum, six years ago the international environment confronting the PRC seemed increasingly threatening, yet fluid and capable of being influenced if China took the initiative.

In this context, the United States seemed the only country with the power to offset the Soviet Union. Despite two decades of confrontation, we presented to the Chinese leaders the least threat with regard

to geography or recent behavior (having clearly indicated in the 1960s, for example, that we were not prepared to encourage military action by the Chiang Kai-shek government against the PRC). Despite two decades of mutual estrangement, there seemed to be a clean slate to write upon. It was obvious by 1969 that major adjustments in the U.S. posture in East Asia were going to occur and that these shifts would be of significance to China. President Nixon had indicated publicly in such statements as his "Guam Doctrine" press conference of July, 1969 that we were re-evaluating our entire position in Asia, from Vietnam to China, Japan, and Korea.[9] This situation was reinforced by the fact that only we could assist them in dealing with the Taiwan problem, and that over time our trade and technology could help China industrialize.

In turn, the United States had many reasons to open up an authoritative dialogue with Peking. This would give us more diplomatic flexibility in a multipolar world. It could give us much greater leverage with Moscow and induce it to establish a more constructive relationship with us. It could help reduce tensions and possible miscalculations in Asia. We also believed it could generate pressures on Hanoi which would move the North Vietnamese toward a reasonable settlement of the Indochina conflicts. And in a larger geo-political and historical framework, elimination of our military confrontation with China—a country embodying a quarter of mankind—at a time when the PRC was still strategically weak and vulnerable, would enable the United States to move away from one front of its two-front cold war of the 1950s and '60s. The hope was that we could, at our own initiative, eliminate the immediate causes of our differences with Peking and establish a relatively positive relationship with the PRC before the country acquired the strategic weaponry to directly threaten America's security.

Accordingly, the Administration purposefully pursued a series of carefully orchestrated moves beginning in early 1969 designed to forge an opening to China. After seeking to establish indirect contact with Peking by way of private messages routed through third parties, and on the basis of a series of unilateral public steps easing trade and travel restrictions, we established a reliable channel to the Chinese leadership through Pakistan in 1970–71. My secret trip to Peking in July 1971 paved the way for President Nixon's visit in February 1972.

The Early Advances: 1971–1973. This first phase in our constructive contacts with the PRC—which can be said to have been initiated with mutual suggestions at the Warsaw talks in January and February, 1970, that an authoritative dialogue in a secure environment would be of mutual benefit—concluded with issuance of the Shanghai Commu-

[9] Reference is to the Nixon Doctrine; see footnote 5, Document 18.

niqué in February of 1972. This document set the direction for the further normalization of relations.

President Nixon and I discovered in our early exchanges with the Chinese that we shared common views on many international issues and could develop parallel action where it served common interests. Both sides had a basic distrust of Soviet intentions, and neither of us saw Russian efforts to bring about a geo-political encirclement of the PRC as in our respective national interests. China was concerned about a weakened Europe, as was the United States; and we both opposed Soviet objectives in the Middle East and South Asia. Peking clearly appreciated, for example, our backing of Pakistan during the Indo-Pak war of 1971—a position we took despite considerable domestic criticism.

At the same time, we found the Chinese responsive to some of our arguments on issues where we had clear public differences. For example, after 1972 Peking shifted its antagonistic stance toward U.S.–Japan relations to one which recognizes that our close ties with Tokyo serve as a restraint on Japanese militarism. As well, the Chinese have been quietly supportive of our negotiating role in the Middle East, despite their public posture of opposition to Israel. At the same time, however, we have retained our differences on such issues as Korea and Cambodia—although even in these cases Peking's apparently hostile public stance appears to be derived from ideology and special circumstances, rather than a complete conflict of American and Chinese objectives. Neither of us wants hostilities on the Korean peninsula; both distrust a powerful Hanoi backed by Moscow.

It was in the larger context of our dialogue on international questions that the Chinese began to show signs of flexibility in their bilateral dealings with us in order to strengthen domestic support in the United States for U.S.–PRC normalization. The active growth of trade after President Nixon's visit to Peking, and the expansion of cultural and scientific exchanges, gave public visibility to this growing relationship.

Privately we reinforced the expectation in Peking that our relations would evolve step-by-step toward diplomatic recognition. We said that we would attempt to complete the normalization process by 1976, and assured them that we would not foster any "two Chinas" situation or a Taiwan independence movement. Moreover, we gave concrete expression to our desire to eliminate the remaining elements of our military confrontation of the cold-war era by unilaterally reducing our troop levels and offensive weaponry and aircraft on Taiwan—particularly after the end of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam war.

For their part, the Chinese have been farsighted enough not to press us unduly on normalization, knowing that had they begun our dialogue by presenting extreme demands the relationship probably would never get off the ground. At the same time, their objective

undoubtedly was to draw us into a sufficiently positive relationship so that the difficult decisions affecting our ties with Taiwan would be weighed against the value of sustaining a positive relationship with the PRC—a relationship that would have strategic as well as bilateral advantages to the U.S.

With the end of America's direct role in the Vietnam war, the Chinese clearly indicated their desire to move to a more active relationship and to accelerate the normalization process. During my February, 1973 visit to Peking—just after the signing of the Paris Agreements—Chairman Mao received me for a long discussion of international developments.[10] The Chinese also agreed to open Liaison Offices in our respective capitals—thus reversing themselves on the long-held position that as long as the Republic of China (ROC) had an embassy in Washington they would not send their officials to our capital.

The Recent Slowdown: 1973–1975. It was in late 1973, however, that certain trends developed on both sides of the U.S.–PRC relationship which were to grow over the next two years into our present cooler dealings. On the American side, the bureaucratic goof of allowing the ROC to open two new consulates in the U.S. in late 1973, and the appointment in early 1974 of a senior FSO as a new ambassador to Taipei, must have raised doubts in Peking about the direction of our policy. Moreover, the evolution of the Watergate problem, coupled with the increasingly assertive role of the Congress in international affairs, gave the Chinese the impression of a weakened and chaotic America, unable to implement a coherent and forceful foreign policy. Peking reacted, for example, to the Congressional cut-off of the bombing in Cambodia (our primary source of influence over the insurgents, and a factor which we could control in coordination with the Chinese to affect the situation) by drawing back from certain helpful steps they had indicated they were prepared to take to stimulate a negotiated resolution of the conflict. Instead, they hardened their attitude toward us and heightened their support for the insurgents. Peking now had minimal incentive to track with us in Indochina because we had lost our major lever for influencing the situation.

The Chinese sense of an increasingly ineffectual United States deepened as the impact of Watergate spread in 1974, leading to the removal of President Nixon—the man who had initiated the opening with them, and a leader for whom they have continued to express admiration. Not only could they not clearly grasp the reasons for this serious weakening of Executive Branch authority, but they now saw us confronted by substantial difficulties in gaining Congressional ap-

[10] See Document 12.

proval for such policy moves which obviously served America's own interests as aid to Turkey and the interim agreement in the Middle East. The Chinese must now see the CIA hearings as a near complete breakdown of internal political discipline because of partisan rivalries.

Compounding this perception was Chinese concern that the agreements we were negotiating with the Russians—the 1973 agreement on limiting the dangers of nuclear war, the Vladivostok understanding of 1974, and the Helsinki Conference—represented an unwarranted trustworthiness in Washington of Soviet intentions and a naive belief in the value of agreements signed with the Russians. They may also have questioned whether we were concluding such accords from a position of weakness: a desire to create the appearance of stability rather than bear the continuing burden of an active defense, and to undercut domestic critics of détente with the argument that the relationship with Moscow was still yielding positive benefits.

At the least, the Chinese began to express concern to us privately in 1973 that we were merely using them against the Russians. As Premier Chou said to me during my February visit, "You want to reach out to the Soviet Union by standing on Chinese shoulders."[11] During the same trip Mao expressed concern that the Europeans were trying to push the Soviet threat eastward (toward China), and that if Russia attacked the PRC the United States would let the two countries fight it out for several years until—in Vietnam fashion—the Soviets had dissipated their strength before using American force to "poke your finger at the Soviet back."[12] While these statements reflected some measure of Chinese posturing for psychological effect, they did seem to reveal a growing concern in Peking about the impact on PRC interests of our approach to dealing with the Soviets.

Paralleling our own domestic difficulties after 1973 were increasing signs of tension in the Peking scene. In the summer of 1973, as PRC leaders prepared for their Tenth Party Congress, Premier Chou En-lai's position appeared to come under attack for rehabilitating formerly disgraced leaders such as Teng Hsiao-p'ing. The Chinese put our exchange program on ice in the second half of the year, apparently in a desire to sort out their own domestic situation before allowing in observant foreigners. There were reports that Chinese doctors and scientists who had visited the U.S. in 1972–73 were subject to criticism by radical elements in the leadership for being too "pro-American"; and the left wing of the Party appeared to appeal to Chinese military leaders for

[11] See Document 8.
[12] See Document 12.

support against the moderate Mao/Chou leadership, which was steadily depriving them of political influence.

At the turn of 1974, in a move to reduce the political influence of the army, Peking shuffled around the major military region commanders to new territorial bases in order to disorganize their local political machines.[13] During the rest of the year, however, there remained signs that the military continued to resist pressures from Mao for the removal of senior commanders considered disloyal to the Chairman's policies and person. Polemics in the PRC's internal media suggested that the military were challenging Mao's foreign policy orientation of dealing with the United States as a way of countering the Soviet threat. We believe that some voices in Peking may have asserted that China was "tilting" too far toward the United States, particularly at a time when our internal divisions made us appear to be a less effective counterweight to the Soviets. As a result—this argument may have gone—China should take steps to lower the level of tension with Moscow.

While the line never acquired official support, it does suggest one of the reasons why the Chairman and other Chinese leaders have become so overtly critical of our détente policies. Our actions may be exposing them to greater domestic criticism—this quite apart from the fact that it would obviously be to China's advantage to have us take on the Soviets frontally. Despite the signs of criticism of Mao's foreign policy orientation, however, the Chairman appears determined not to ease off pressures against what he sees as China's primary security problem, Soviet "hegemonism."

The signs of increasing political dissension in Peking in late 1973 coincided with the gradual diminution in the direct leadership role of Premier Chou En-lai—not only a major figure in the opening to the U.S., but also an urbane and far-sighted negotiator and moderating political influence within China. During my November 1973 visit to Peking, Chou adopted a rather passive role, while Mao—despite his age—discussed world events for over three hours and in great detail, clearly putting his stamp on policies which the Premier had articulated on my previous trip.

The Chinese apparently knew in late 1973 that Chou En-lai's health was failing, and consciously sought to reduce his load of responsibility. Peking sent Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing to New York for a special UN session in April 1974 in his first major foreign policy role since his rehabilitation a year earlier. During my first encounter with the Vice Premier, Chou's name was never mentioned. Throughout the rest of the year Teng assumed an ever-larger proportion of Chou's responsi-

---

[13] See footnote 4, Document 67.

bilities in foreign affairs, and when I visited Peking in November, I had only a brief and largely non-substantive discussion with the Premier. Teng became the principal interlocutor across the negotiating table.

The exact mixture of physical and political elements which account for the Premier's gradual withdrawal from a direct role in Chinese politics—and in our dealings with Peking—is difficult to estimate. We believe Chou has either heart trouble or stomach cancer, and may have had an operation this past September. Certainly the recent hardening in our dialogue with Peking is not merely an effect of Chou En-lai's withdrawal; yet there is no question but that the Premier imparted a degree of vision and finesse to our dialogue which is lacking in the style of his immediate successor, Teng Hsiao-p'ing. Teng does not display Chou's grasp of history or his deft handling of diplomatic discourse. His style is rather frontal and somewhat acerbic. Moreover, being a recent rehabilitee from the Cultural Revolution purges, Teng may feel the need to adopt a hard stance to limit his vulnerability to criticism from rivals unhappy with his remarkable return to political influence, and to retain the confidence which Chairman Mao appears to have vested in him in the past three years. In short, for both intellectual and political reasons, Teng does not appear to have the self-assurance to range very widely from his brief, or to take very innovative or controversial positions.

Apart from our sense of the respective positions of Chou and Teng, we believe that Chairman Mao continues to exercise the predominant influence in the formulation of China's foreign policy. This was borne out in my discussions with him last month. Distrust of the Soviet Union remains the cornerstone of his approach to dealing with the outside world. While the Chairman may be under some internal pressure for his policies, he gives no sign of wavering in his effort to construct a loose coalition of forces opposed to Soviet "hegemonism" as a way of countering Moscow's efforts to encircle China through détente with the West and promotion of an anti-PRC Asian Collective Security System.

If China's domestic political scene now produces greater caution, if not a certain immobilism and cooling of atmosphere, in their foreign policy stance, the Chinese perception of our own position may well reinforce such a tendency. While, as noted above, I believe the key factor accounting for this is the Chinese view that our domestic political foundation has eroded and that the U.S. is increasingly unable to project a coherent foreign policy, they also probably sense an increasing lack of responsiveness in our bilateral dealings. During my visit to Peking in November 1974, I foreshadowed for the first time the likelihood that there would be no major progress on the Taiwan issue before 1977 unless China explicitly renounced the use of force. I reinforced this view with the Chinese during the past summer, and explicitly told Foreign

Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua in late September that we were not prepared to complete the normalization process at this time.[14]

The Chinese are well aware that our major setbacks in Indochina have increased the Administration's domestic and international political vulnerabilities, creating a context where any major change in our relationships with Taiwan which implied abandonment of yet another ally would be unacceptable at this time. Moreover, as our pre-election politicking gathers momentum—and with it criticism of détente and other foreign policies which Peking does not like—the Chinese may calculate that their most effective posture will be one of waiting to see how our politics and leading personalities evolve over the coming year.

These cumulative factors seem to account for the cooler attitude toward the U.S. which was reflected in the way the Chinese handled my visit in October. Prior to my arrival in Peking their Foreign Minister criticized our positions with unusual force in his speech at the United Nations,[15] and the Foreign Ministry highlighted our differences by creating problems in our bilateral dealings on issues of Tibet and Puerto Rico. During the banquet toasts on my first night in Peking, Ch'iao Kuan-hua publicly criticized our détente policy, knowing full well that this would generate considerable attention and speculation in the world press.[16]

My conversations with Vice Premier Teng were rather desultory, except for rather taunting questioning regarding our dealings with the Soviet Union and Europe which he indicated were reminiscent of the appeasement policies of Chamberlain and Daladier in the 1930s. Chairman Mao reinforced these themes in our conversation, and clearly questioned our reliability as a serious world power. He alleged that China was a lesser priority for us now. And against a backdrop of our ineffectual maneuvering, European weakness and disunity and Japanese ambivalence, he sounded a consistent theme of Chinese self-reliance. In their unforthcoming posture on trade issues and the exchange programs, and by their lack of interest in some special briefings, the Chinese indicated a desire to keep us at some distance. And finally, the contentious nature of both the content of their draft communiqué for your visit, and their insolent procedure of presenting it to me at the eleventh hour of my visit, represented their most disdainful performance with us since the opening of our relationship. On substance, the Chinese indicated a desire to highlight our differences on international questions while showing no interest in advancing our bilateral relations.

---

[14] See Document 119.

[15] See footnote 2, Document 119.

[16] See Department of State *Bulletin,* November 17, 1975, pp. 681–682.

This change in mood in our relationship is annoying, even somewhat disturbing. At the same time, we do not believe it represents a major crisis in the relationship, and should be kept in perspective. The Chinese have no real strategic alternative to maintaining at least the symbolic aspects of our relationship at this time. They clearly remain interested in your visit. The international forces which brought us together remain basically at work. They still treat the Soviet Union as their principal enemy, even while they appear to want to maintain somewhat greater restraint in their posture toward us. And for all our domestic problems, they know full well that we remain the strongest power in the world and are not to be trifled with.

The Objectives of Your Talks in Peking

The above analysis represents our best estimate of Peking's perceptions of the U.S. and the Administration's various policies at this time. While we have confidence that the Chinese do not wish to break off a dialogue with the Administration, we have little expectation that Peking will make your visit much more than an occasion for symbolic contact and an opportunity to question Administration policies affecting them. On the other hand, it is not in their interest, given their concerns about the Soviet Union, to have your visit result in an apparent breakdown in the relationship. Moreover, we have been assured that you will be received courteously and with all appropriate protocol.

The Chinese Position. The results of my October trip to Peking indicate that the Chinese will not be very forthcoming on either international or bilateral issues in a way that will imply forward progress in our relationship. The draft communiqué which they tabled indicates that they are likely to highlight our differing approaches to dealing with the problem of "hegemony;" and we can expect no overt signs of cooperation on third country issues. They are most likely to try to sustain the relationship at its current level by limiting cultural and scientific exchanges to present levels; and they will continue to show no interest in movement on trade-related issues such as solution of the claims/assets problem. They will probably emphasize to you their continuing commitment to a policy of national "self-reliance." They are likely to state rather self-righteously that they will be "patient" on the Taiwan issue if we still "need" the island and that they are quite prepared to live with our relationship in its presently semi-normal condition.

Your Position. Thus, we believe the most realistic approach to your trip to Peking is that of a *sustaining visit,* an effort to maintain what has been a useful dialogue on world issues and a symbolic relationship of strategic value to both sides. A relationship such as this, because it lacks the substance of our ties to a country like Japan, requires periodic high-level exchanges on issues of common concern to maintain common

perceptions and sustain its symbolic weight. Moreover, it will be very useful for you to get a direct sense of the way this leadership works and to size up those who are likely to succeed Chairman Mao and Premier Chou En-lai as the next generation of senior PRC officials.

In addition, your subsequent stops in Jakarta and Manila will put the Peking visit—and our overall relationship with the Chinese—in more balanced perspective as one element of American policy in the Pacific. Your speech at the East-West Center in Hawaii on December 7 can be used to articulate our overall objectives in the Pacific Basin: our desire to encourage the evolution of an equilibrium of forces in the Asian area; our intention to support change in the region through political means and not violence; our enduring commitment to sustain the security of our allies and support the sovereignty of all states in the region; and our desire to maintain mutually beneficial economic and political relations with all the countries of East Asia.[17]

In your discussions with Chairman Mao and Vice Premier Teng, I believe you should concentrate on the following themes:

—Confirm the Administration's position that we seek to build a vital relationship with the PRC on both international and bilateral matters so as to strengthen the basis for coordinated action on the security issues which have brought us together.

—Emphasize that the U.S. will continue to play a vigorous international role, and that we are not constrained on basic security issues despite the short-term effects of Congressional actions and our post-Vietnam/post-Watergate domestic mood. (You should not, however, appear defensive about our domestic situation.)

—Stress that our complex strategy of combining serious negotiations and basic firmness is the best U.S. approach toward the USSR. We are convinced that this strategy is the most effective way to constrain the Soviets and to achieve agreements which reduce the danger of war. Tactically, it also creates a public orientation in the United States which will enable us to rally public support for resistance to expansionist activities when they occur. You should review recent examples of American actions which indicate that we are both determined and capable of countering Moscow's outward pressures and that we are not "strategically passive." (You can cite such recent examples as Congressional support for your Middle East diplomacy, renewed aid to Turkey, our increased efforts in Portugal and Angola, and the results of the European Economic Summit meeting.)

—State your views regarding further steps toward full normalization of U.S.–PRC relations and the handling of the Taiwan question.

---

[17] For text of President Ford's speech, see *Public Papers: Ford, 1975,* vol. II, pp. 1950–1955.

Your objective is to assure the Chinese that we are not just stringing them along on normalization, but that *mutual* efforts will be required to resolved the Taiwan question.

—Briefly touch on bilateral relations in relaxed fashion. You can indicate your awareness of their position that they are not prepared at this time to take steps in our bilateral relations which would indicate at least partial forward movement. You should say that we are ready to accept this, but this will lead much of the world to believe our relationship is stagnating, which is not in the interests of either of us. You can reiterate that we do not view progress in our economic relations or exchange programs as ends in themselves, but rather as activities which will strengthen the support of our public for a normal relationship with the PRC and for actions that we may have to take which would affect the security of both our countries.

On the basis of the mood and substance of your exchanges on the first day or so of your visit, you will have to decide on an approach regarding a public document which might be issued at the conclusion of your visit.

Thus far, the Chinese have made it crystal clear that they are *not* prepared to negotiate a full-fledged communiqué which would have sufficient balance between our areas of disagreement and points of common interest on international issues, combined with signs of progress in our bilateral relations, to make such a document look like an advance in our relations. Indeed what they have in mind could well be interpreted as a setback in our relations, especially three years after the Shanghai Communiqué. We seriously doubt that this situation will change. Your choice is likely to be between no formal statement at all and a bland, descriptive press release which simply puts on the public record the fact that you visited the PRC and held "frank and useful" talks with Chinese leaders. We will have to make a judgment at the time about which approach is likely to be most useful (or least damaging) to our purposes.

While most of the substantive issues of common interest have been covered in my previous discussions in Peking, it is of course essential that the Chinese get a feel for your own approach to them. Ultimately, it will not be words that will modify Chinese positions on the issues which have induced some current strain in our relationship. They will decide how much vitality to inject into their dealings with us on the basis of the degree of pressure they feel under from Moscow, their estimate of our ability to act as a world power—especially against the Russians—and the measure of purpose they sense in Washington with regard to completion of the normalization process. Hopefully, your visit to Peking will not only sustain a useful relationship and deepen the official dialogue, but will also lay the basis for a more constructive evolution of our bilateral relations in the years to come.

133. Editorial Note

On November 21, 1975, at 9:30 a.m., President Gerald Ford met in the Oval Office with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Brent Scowcroft. On the subject of Ford's upcoming visit to the People's Republic of China, Kissinger observed that the Chinese Government was becoming more conciliatory. "We have stared them down. What they respect is firmness." A few minutes later, Kissinger noted, "Without Congress, we would have the Soviet–Chinese triangle working again. I think we should tell the Chinese I am going to Moscow. The Soviet angle is what keeps the Chinese under control." Ford responded, "When we hung tough on the Peking visit, it obviously worked." (Memorandum of conversation; Ford Library, National Security Adviser, National Security Adviser Memcons, Box 16, November 1975–February 1976) Kissinger spoke on the telephone to Hugh Sidey of *Time* magazine on November 26 and told him that personal contact between U.S. and Chinese leaders was important, especially because Chinese "ambassadors have no authority." (Transcript of telephone conversation with Sidey, November 26, Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Telephone Transcripts)

On November 28, Ford, Kissinger, and Scowcroft met in the Oval Office. Ford said, "I think it [the trip to China] will be a good visit." Kissinger replied, "It is an important visit. Why have they insisted on your coming? These are unemotional people. Our kicking them around in October really paid off." (Memorandum of conversation, November 28, 9:30 a.m.; Ford Library, National Security Adviser, National Security Adviser Memcons, Box 16, November 1973–February 1976)

---

134. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Beijing, December 2, 1975, 4:10–6:00 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman Mao Tse Tung
Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-P'ing

---

[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, Box 2, China Memcons and Reports, December 1–5, 1975, President Ford's Visit to Peking. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place at Mao's residence. Ford arrived in Beijing on December 1.

Vice Premier Li Hsien-Nien
Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua
Ambassador Huang Chen, Chief of the PRC Liaison Office
Vice Foreign Minister Wang Jai-Hung
Chang Han-chih, Interpreter, Deputy Director, MFA
Tang Weng-shen, Interpreter, Deputy Director, MFA
Nurse/Interpreter

President Gerald R. Ford
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Ambassador George Bush, Chief of the United States Liaison Office
Mr. Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
Mr. Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State

(At approximately 3:00 p.m. the Chinese informed the United States party that Chairman Mao wished to see President Ford. The President, his wife and daughter, and other members of the United States party left the President's villa at 4:00 p.m. and drove to Chairman Mao's residence through a front gate of the Forbidden City complex. They were greeted at the entrance to the residence by Vice Premier Teng and the other Chinese officials and were escorted into the Chairman's den. The Chairman stood up to greet the American guests. While photographers took pictures, he shook hands and exchanged brief greetings with each of the following: President Ford, Mrs. Ford, Susan Ford, Secretary Kissinger, Ambassador Bush, Mr. Scowcroft, Under Secretary Sisco, Assistant Secretary Habib, Mr. Lord, and Mr. Solomon. After these greetings and pictures, the American guests left the room except for President Ford, Secretary Kissinger, Ambassador Bush, Mr. Scowcroft, and Mr. Lord. The Chinese officials present were those listed above. The group sat in a semi-circle on large arm chairs and the conversation began.)

Chairman Mao: So how are you?

President Ford: Fine. I hope you are too.

Chairman Mao: I am not well. I am sick.

President Ford: I think you look very well, Sir.

Chairman Mao: My appearance is not so bad. And how is Mr. Secretary of State?

Secretary Kissinger: I am very well. I am happy to be here.

Chairman Mao: And how are all the other American friends?

President Ford: They are all very healthy. We had a very good discussion this morning, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Mao: So what did you discuss?

President Ford: We discussed the problems we have with the Soviet Union and the need to have parallel actions as we look at the overall circumstances internationally, the need for your country and mine to work in parallel to achieve what is good for both of us.

Chairman Mao: We do not have much ability. We can only fire such empty cannons.

President Ford: I do not believe that, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Mao: With regard to cursing, we have some ability in that respect.

President Ford: We can too.

Chairman Mao: And you also? Then we shall reach an agreement.

President Ford: We can also use force against a country which causes much trouble.

Chairman Mao: That is not bad. Then we have reached another agreement.

President Ford: We were very specific this morning in discussing whom we were talking about.

Chairman Mao: It can be none other but the Socialist Imperialists.

President Ford: There was some strong language used this morning, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Mao: (pointing to Teng) That is, you criticized him.

President Ford: We strongly criticized another country.

Chairman Mao: The one in the North.

President Ford: Yes.

Chairman Mao: Your Secretary of State has been interfering in my internal affairs.

President Ford: Tell me about it.

Chairman Mao: He does not allow me to go and meet God. He even tells me to disobey the order that God has given to me. God has sent me an invitation, yet he (Secretary Kissinger) says, don't go.

Secretary Kissinger: That would be too powerful a combination if he went there.

Chairman Mao: He is an atheist (Secretary Kissinger). He is opposed to God. And he is also undermining my relations with God. He is a very ferocious man and I have no other recourse than to obey his orders.

Secretary Kissinger: We are very glad.

Chairman Mao: Yes indeed. I have no other way out, no way at all. He gave an order (Secretary Kissinger).

President Ford: To God?

Chairman Mao: No, to me.

(Chairman Mao speaks with Ambassador Huang in Chinese.)

How are things going, Mr. Huang Chen? Are you still going back (to the United States)?

Ambassador Huang: I listen to the Chairman's instructions.

Chairman Mao: Mr. President, do you want him?

President Ford: We certainly want him back. Our relationship has been excellent. It is important that the Ambassador be back and that Mr. Bush be here in Peking.

Chairman Mao: (to Ambassador Bush) Are you staying?

Ambassador Bush: Just a few days.

Chairman Mao: You have been promoted.

President Ford: Yes, he has been. We are going to submit a name for a replacement within a month.

Chairman Mao: We are reluctant to let him go.

President Ford: He is an outstanding person and that is why I have asked him to come back to the United States. But we will replace him with an equally good man.

Chairman Mao: That would be good. And it seems to me that it will also be better for Huang Chen to go back to the United States.

Ambassador Huang: I will firmly carry out the Chairman's instructions. I do want to come back (to China) because I have been abroad too long. But I will do what the Chairman says.

Chairman Mao: You should stay there one or two years more.

Ambassador Huang: All right, I definitely will go back and firmly carry out the Chairman's instructions.

Chairman Mao: There are some young people who have some criticism about him (Ambassador Huang). And these two (Wang and Tang) also have some criticism of Lord Chiao. And these people are not to be trifled with. Otherwise, you will suffer at their hands—that is, a civil war. There are now many big character posters out. And you perhaps can go to Tsinghua University and Peking University to have a look at them.

President Ford: I would not understand the signs.

I hope your telling the Ambassador to stay two more years means that we are going to continue the good relations between our two countries, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Mao: Yes. Yes, relations between our two countries should continue. It seems to me at present there is nothing very much between our two countries, your country and mine. Probably this year, next year, and the year after there will not be anything great happening between our two countries. Perhaps afterwards the situation might become a bit better.

President Ford: In the meantime, Mr. Chairman, I think we have to work in trying to achieve better coordination on the international scene, with emphasis on the challenges from some countries such as the Soviet Union.

Chairman Mao: Yes. Anyway we have no confidence in the Soviet Union. And Teng Hsiao-P'ing does not like the Soviet Union either.

President Ford: We have similar feelings as to their overall designs to expand on a worldwide basis—territorially, economically and otherwise. But we are going to meet the challenge.

Chairman Mao: Good. We are also going to meet their challenge.

President Ford: We expect on a bilateral basis, Mr. Chairman, to improve our relations after next year. We think that is the time real progress can be made on a bilateral basis.

Chairman Mao: You mean between us?

President Ford: Yes.

Chairman Mao: That would be good.

President Ford: In the meantime, Mr. Chairman, if your country and mine work to meet the challenge, in the East and West, from the Soviet Union, it will develop greater support in the United States toward continued progress for normalization between the United States and the People's Republic.

Chairman Mao: Good. Anyway, this is just talk. And how the Soviet Union will actually act is something we will still have to wait and see.

President Ford: Mr. Chairman, in the meantime we will have to convince the Soviet Union by what is done by the United States and the People's Republic—not words, but backed up by action. We will continue to keep the pressure on them. I hope the pressure from the East will be strong like our actions on our side.

Chairman Mao: Just firing of some empty cannon, cursing.

President Ford: We will do more than that, Mr. Chairman, as we have in the past. And the American people expect their President to be firm. We have, and we will in the future. More than words and more than empty cannons.

Chairman Mao: So you have solid cannons?

President Ford: Yes, and we will keep our powder dry unless they seek to challenge us, and then it will not be kept dry.

Chairman Mao: That is all right. That will not be bad. Yes, now you peacefully coexist.

President Ford: But that does not mean that we will not meet a challenge of any expansionist country. As a matter of fact we have met those challenges and will continue to do so.

Chairman Mao: That is good. Shall we reach an agreement?

President Ford: (nodding yes) And we can with an effort that achieves the same result. You put pressure from the East, and we will put on pressure from the West.

Chairman Mao: Yes. A gentlemen's agreement.

President Ford: That is the best way to achieve success against a person who is not a gentleman.

Chairman Mao: They are not gentlemen.

President Ford: Those are kinder words than we used this morning.

Chairman Mao: I thank Mr. President very much for having come to see me. And I hope that in the future our two countries can be friendly to each other.

President Ford: Mr. Chairman, that is the great hope of the American people and myself. I want it clearly understood that the historic steps taken over the last three years by your country and my country are fully supported by the American people. They recognize, as we do, that there must be strength to prevent actions by expansionist countries such as the Soviet Union. We will maintain our military capability and be prepared to use it. In our opinion this is the best way to maintain the world in a stable and better position.

Chairman Mao: Good. So we don't have any conflicts.

President Ford: That's correct. And if we do have conflicts, we can sit down and discuss them and understand them and hope to eliminate them.

Chairman Mao: Indeed. Yes, there are bound to be conflicts because our two countries, China and the United States, have different social systems and different ideologies.

President Ford: But that should not interfere with our capability for looking at the broad international scene and working in parallel and working firmly for results that are in the best interests of both countries and all the peoples.

Chairman Mao: (After a brief coughing spell.) For instance, we have not had discussions, conversations with the Soviet Union like the ones we have had with you. I went to Moscow twice and Khrushchev came three times to Peking. On none of these occasions did the talks go really well.

President Ford: Mr. Chairman, I have met with Mr. Brezhnev twice. Sometimes the talks went well, sometimes badly. I think this is an indication of our firmness because we do not agree to all that they propose, and we will not. We are going to be firm and have the military capability to be firm. They understand it, and I think it is in the best interests of your country and our country if we are firm, which we intend to be.

Chairman Mao: Good.

How are your relations with Japan now? Better than before?

President Ford: Yes they are. As you know Mr. Chairman, I visited Japan about a year ago. It was the first time a President in office visited there. About a month ago the Emperor and Empress came to the United States, the first time their Majesties came to our country. We

feel relations with Japan are the best they have been at any time since World War II.

Chairman Mao: Japan also is threatened by the Soviet Union.

President Ford: I would agree and therefore, Mr. Chairman, I think it is important that China and Japan have better and better relations—just as Japan and U.S. relations are getting better, in fact the best they have been.

Chairman Mao: And for Japan, its relations with you come first and their relations with us are second.

President Ford: Are your relations with Japan very good?

Chairman Mao: They are not bad. Nor are they so good.

President Ford: You want them to be better, don't you?

Chairman Mao: Yes. They have a pro-Soviet faction that is opposed to talking about hegemony.

Secretary Kissinger: Or just afraid.

Chairman Mao: Yes, indeed.

President Ford: How are your relations with Western European countries, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman Mao: They are better, better than our relations with Japan.

President Ford: It's important that our relations with Western Europe as well as yours be good to meet the challenge of any Soviet expansion in Western Europe.

Chairman Mao: Yes. Yes, and on this we have a common point there with you. We have no conflict of interests in Europe.

President Ford: As a matter of fact, Mr. Chairman, some of us believe that China does more for Western European unity and the strengthening of NATO than some of those countries do for themselves.

Chairman Mao: They are too scattered.

President Ford: Some of them are not as strong and forthright as they should be.

Chairman Mao: As I see it, Sweden is not bad. West Germany is not bad. Yugoslavia is also good. Holland and Belgium are lagging a bit behind.

President Ford: That's correct. And the Soviet Union is seeking to exploit some weaknesses in Portugal and Italy. We must prevent it, and we are trying to do so.

Chairman Mao: Yes, and now Portugal seems to be more stable. It seems to be better.

President Ford: Yes, in the last forty-eight hours it has gotten very encouraging. The forces we support have moved with great strength and taken the action that is needed to stabilize the situation.

We agree with you that Yugoslavia is important and is strong in its resistance against the Soviet Union, but we are concerned about what might happen after Tito.

Chairman Mao: Yes, perhaps after Tito it will be Kardelj.[2]

Secretary Kissinger: But we are concerned about outside pressures and within the country. And we are working on this now. Various factions are working with outside groups.

Chairman Mao: Yes, it has so many provinces and it is made up of so many former states.

President Ford: I had a very interesting trip, Mr. Chairman, to Romania this summer, and I was impressed by the strength and independence of President Ceausescu.

Chairman Mao: Good.

President Ford: We are very concerned about the situation in Spain as well, Mr. Chairman. The King we do support. We hope he will be able to handle the elements that would undermine his regime. And we will work with him in trying to have the necessary control of the situation during this period of transition.

Chairman Mao: Yes. And anyway we think it would be good if the European Common Market accepted them. Why doesn't the EEC want Spain and Portugal?

President Ford: Mr. Chairman, we urged the NATO alliance to be more friendly to Spain even under Franco. And we hope with the new King that Spain will be more acceptable to the NATO alliance. In addition we feel that the EEC ought to be responsive to movement by the Spanish Government toward unity with Western Europe as a whole. We will work in both directions as much as we can.

Secretary Kissinger: They are not radical enough for the Europeans.

Chairman Mao: Is that so? Yes, in the past they had fought each other. Yes, and in the past you did not curse Franco.

President Ford: No. And we support the new King because the whole southern belly of Western Europe must remain strong—Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia. All that must be strengthened if we are to meet any expansionist efforts by the Soviet Union.

Chairman Mao: Good. Yes, and we think Greece should get better.

President Ford: Yes, they went through a difficult time, but the new government we feel is moving in the right direction and we

---

[2] Edvard Kardelj was a Slovene politician and the heir apparent to Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito.

will help them. And we hope they will come back as a full partner in NATO.

Chairman Mao: That would be good.

President Ford: There is a radical element, of course, in Greece that would not be favorable from our point of view and would tend to weaken NATO and give encouragement to the Soviet Union.

Chairman Mao: Oh?

President Ford: As we move further east in the Mediterranean, Mr. Chairman, we think the Sinai Agreement has helped reduce the Soviet influence, but we recognize there cannot be any stagnation in advancing toward a broader peace. As soon as the next election in the U.S. has taken place we expect to move with vigor to try and achieve a broad, just and permanent peace in that area.

Chairman Mao: Permanent peace would be difficult to achieve.

President Ford: Yes they have not had it there for centuries. But the effort to achieve it, a successful effort, would eliminate a great deal of Soviet influence in that area of the world. If there is stagnation, that gives the Soviet Union the opportunity to stir up trouble. Therefore, we are convinced that there must be continual movement. And the Sinai Agreement has helped us develop good relations with Egypt. And if we move forward after the next election and help move others toward a broader peace, it will have a significant impact in keeping the Soviet Union's influence out of that part of the world.

Chairman Mao: I don't oppose that.

President Ford: As we move into the subcontinent, we expect to have influence there with our base in Diego Garcia. Of course, we continue to improve our relations with Pakistan. We have lifted our arms ban so that they can help themselves and develop sufficient military capability to convince India that it would not be a successful venture if the Indians should attempt any military operation.

Chairman Mao: That would be good.

President Ford: What is your appraisal, Mr. Chairman, of the situation in Bangladesh?

Chairman Mao: The situation there now is better, but it is not yet stable. And we are prepared to send an ambassador there. Perhaps he will take some time in getting there.

President Ford: Are you concerned that India will move in and take any military action against Bangladesh to take advantage of the current situation?

Chairman Mao: There is such a danger, and we must beware.

President Ford: India has been known, Mr. Chairman, to do some unwise things against other nations. I would hope that they would not do it here (Bangladesh).

Chairman Mao: Indeed. If they should take such action in that area we would oppose it.

President Ford: We are working with Pakistan and Iran to prevent any such action, and we would condemn any such action by India.

Chairman Mao: Yes. We have reached another agreement.

President Ford: I am sure you are as concerned as well as we about the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean, and of course their efforts on the east side of Africa. These developments are vigorously opposed by us. I speak here of course about Angola where we are taking forthright actions to prevent the Soviet Union from getting a stronghold in that part of that great continent.

Chairman Mao: You don't seem to have any means. Nor do we.

President Ford: I think we both could do better, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Mao: I am in favor of driving the Soviet Union out.

President Ford: If we both make a good effort, we can.

Chairman Mao: Through the Congo—Kinshasha, Zaire.

Vice Premier Teng: (Talks in Chinese to the Chairman) The complicating factor here is that of South Africa, the involvement of South Africa. This has offended the whole of black Africa. This complicates the whole matter.

Chairman Mao: South Africa does not have a very good reputation.

President Ford: But they are fighting to keep the Soviet Union from expanding, and we think that's admirable. We are putting substantial money through Zambia and Zaire. We believe that if there is broad action by ourselves, the People's Republic and others, we can prevent the Soviet Union from having a very important naval facility and controlling substantial resources in Angola. And we are violently opposed to the substantial participation of Cuba. They now have five to six thousand troops in Angola. We think that's not a healthy thing; and the Soviet Union.

Vice Premier Teng: You mean you admire South Africa?

President Ford: No. They have taken a strong stance against the Soviet Union. And they are doing that totally on their own, without any stimulation by the United States.

Vice Premier Teng: In Angola.

President Ford: South Africa is against the MPLA.

Chairman Mao: This is a question that needs study.

President Ford: Time is of the essence.

Chairman Mao: It seems to me that the MPLA will not be successful.

President Ford: We certainly hope not.

Secretary Kissinger: If the other two forces get enough discipline and we can give them equipment, then we can prevent them (the MPLA) from being successful. They (the FNLA and UNITA) need training from those who understand guerrilla war. We can get them the equipment if others give them the training.

Chairman Mao: We supported them in the past through Tanzania, but Tanzania has a hold on certain things that were supposed to go through. Perhaps now we should work through Zaire.

Vice Premier Teng: Perhaps it is better through Zaire.

Secretary Kissinger: Through Zaire. And the Chinese side could perhaps use its influence with Mozambique. It would have a moral significance in Africa if Mozambique did not support the Soviet group, the MPLA. (There is discussion among the Chinese.)

President Ford: But, you know, Mozambique supports the MPLA. It would probably be difficult.

Vice Premier Teng: Impossible.

Secretary Kissinger: I know. They may not understand what they are doing because they also look up to China very much.

Chairman Mao: We might make a try.

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think Mozambique understands the issue in Angola. They need advice and they listen to China more than to us.

Chairman Mao: We can make a try.

Vice Premier Teng: We can make a try but it might not necessarily be effective.

Secretary Kissinger: That's true.

Chairman Mao: Zaire is probably more reliable.

Secretary Kissinger: Zaire should be a base for active assistance. We can't get help from Mozambique, but maybe they will stay out of it. We can't get help from Mozambique, but maybe at least they will stay neutral.

Chairman Mao: We can make a try.

President Ford: I say again that time is of the essence because the other two forces need encouragement. They were doing well up until recently. There is a stalemate at the moment. It would be tragic if the MPLA should prevail after the efforts that have been made by us and by you and others.

Chairman Mao: That's hard to say.

So you think that's about all?

President Ford: I might say in reference to Angola, just before I left Washington I approved another $35 million to help the other two forces. This is a solid indication to meet the challenge of the Soviet Union and defeat the MPLA.

Chairman Mao: Good. (Chinese photographers enter room and take movies.)

President Ford: I wish to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to discuss the world situation and indicate our desire to expand our bilateral relations and work in parallel on many, many problems on the global scene.

Chairman Mao: Yes there are now some newspaper reports that describe relations between us two as being very bad. Perhaps you should let them in on the story a bit and maybe brief them.

Secretary Kissinger: On both sides. They hear some of it in Peking.

Chairman Mao: But that is not from us. Those foreigners give that briefing.

President Ford: We don't believe all we read in our papers, Mr. Chairman. (The photographers leave the room.) I think it is vitally important that both countries create the impression on a world-wide basis that our relations are good. When I return to the United States I will report that they are good, and I hope your people will do the same. It's not only important to have good relations, but to have the world believe that they are good.

Chairman Mao: We can go at it bit by bit.

President Ford: We will work on it, too.

Chairman Mao: So.

(The group stood up and the American guests shook hands and said good-bye with the Chairman as the photographers took pictures. The Chairman then indicated that he would escort the President to the outside room. With the help of the nurse, he walked with the President to the outer room where once again the American guests said good-bye to the Chairman as pictures were taken. President Ford thanked the Chairman and said that he thought that the talks were mutually beneficial. Secretary Kissinger said that he was glad that the Chairman obeyed his orders, i.e. not to go to heaven. President Ford said that he hoped to straighten the Secretary out so that the Chairman could go to heaven, but he and the Secretary added that they hoped that this would not be soon. Chairman Mao indicated that he could not go since he was under orders from the Secretary. Secretary Kissinger said that he would maintain those orders. The other Americans thanked the Chairman and said good-bye. The party was then escorted outside by Vice Premier Teng and the Chinese officials. The Americans entered their cars and drove away.

The Chinese later issued a press announcement of the meeting which is attached at Tab A.)[3]

---

[3] Dated December 2, attached but not printed.

135. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Beijing, December 2, 1975, 11 p.m.–midnight.

PARTICIPANTS

Ch'iao Kuan-hua, PRC Foreign Minister
Lin P'ing, Director, Department of American and Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
T'ang Weng-sheng, Deputy Director, Department of American and Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ting Yuan-hung, Director, United States Office, Department of American and Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Chao Chi-hua, Deputy Director, United States Office, Department of American and Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Shih Yen-hua (Interpreter)
Lien Cheng-pao (Notetaker)

Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Joseph P. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
William H. Gleysteen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Richard H. Solomon, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council

SUBJECT

Discussion of a Possible Communiqué; American Press and Public Support for U.S.–PRC Relations

Secretary Kissinger (looking at Scowcroft): Scowcroft has me in a dilemma. Notice him moving in on me?!

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: What about the communiqué? I believe the two sides are clear about the messages exchanged in the past. And since President Ford raised this matter, I would like to listen to any new ideas you have.

Secretary Kissinger: I simply thought we should decide at an early stage whether we should have any concluding document. If we do not, we should tell our press there will not be one and thus avoid the impression of a crisis where there is not one. I thought some exchange of views on how the visit might conclude would be useful. We do not insist there be something, but I thought there should be some discussion about it.

---

[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, Box 2, China Memcons and Reports, December 1–5, 1975, Ford's Visit to Peking. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place at Guest House 18. All brackets are in the original.

It also occurred to me that as you have already used part of your draft communiqué [tabled at the October 22 meeting][2] in the [Vice Premier's] toast, perhaps we might be able to accept the remainder. (Laughter)

Mr. Lord: He'll use the second half in the toast at the return banquet.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: We can lump the four toasts together. That would be a good document. (Laughter)

Secretary Kissinger: Any remainder will then appear in your next UN speech. (Laughter)

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: That is the principle [of physics] that the substance will not vanish.

Secretary Kissinger: What are your considerations now about the possibility of a concluding document? Should we have a statement? If so, what sort of a statement? Or should we simply indicate areas in which we will seek to work together? We have no draft for you; we thought we should have an exchange of views before we make any decision.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Our ideas remain what we told you in October and in the messages exchanged between our two sides later on. We still maintain our views. If there is any communiqué, it should be a step forward from the Shanghai Communiqué.

Secretary Kissinger: But what is your definition of a step forward? In that [idea] we agree.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: For instance, each side should state its own views on the international situation.

Secretary Kissinger: That we did before. That is not a step forward.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Because the situation is changing—although our basic position remains the same, in the face of the changing situation we have new views. This is what we mean by a step forward from the Shanghai Communiqué.

About the points we have in common, I don't know whether we can add something to the Shanghai Communiqué. To put it in a simple way, I believe that the draft we handed to you on October 22 has in many ways made a step forward from the Shanghai Communiqué.

Secretary Kissinger: It depends on one's sense of direction. (Laughter)

I think the problem is—I don't think we should have a debate [now] because we have debated it before—we do not insist on a communiqué or on any public statement. In fact, we can see the advantages of having nothing.

---

[2] See Document 126 and footnote 2 thereto.

Seriously, the problem is that you look at forward movement in a somewhat dialectic sense, as the movement of history. Our public will look at forward movement in a more linear sense; and they will make a specific comparison with the Shanghai Communiqué. This is what makes it a difficult problem.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Well, from our point of view, you can say that a dialectical way of looking at things is that if we do not make a step forward, if a [new] document is not as good as the Shanghai Communiqué, then in fact it will dilute the significance of the Shanghai Communiqué. So that I think it might be more advisable to have no communiqué at all.

Secretary Kissinger: I think that may be true. Is it your idea that there should be no statement at all at the end? Or should we have a simple press statement?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: As you mentioned just now, you also see the advantages of no communiqué; and I remember at our last talk in the other building [Guest House #5, on the night of October 22–23] I mentioned there might be some advantages in having no communiqué.[3] For instance, Chairman Mao told President Ford that you could brief your newsmen and without a communiqué you will not be constrained in that respect. If there is a communiqué which is very dry, devoid of content, you will be constrained.

Secretary Kissinger: I agree with that.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Apart from this, I think the understanding between us may be more profound than what our opponents will think. That is such a subtle way of indicating our relations that they cannot guess what they are.

Secretary Kissinger: In fact that is so complicated [an approach] that my associates cannot figure it out. You know what you said [in the Vice Premier's toast on Monday evening] was a repeat of the draft communiqué you handed us in October. But there are only five people [on our side] who understood that. I remember what Palmerston said of the Schleswig–Holstein agreement: of the three men who really understood it, one was dead, one was in an asylum, and he—the third—had forgotten what it meant. (Laughter)

Let me say something candidly about our press. I think you understand—whether you agree with it in all details or not—the basic thrust of our foreign policy. But our press got the impression on the last trip—I have not talked with them on this trip—that the Chinese side was attacking the U.S. position. And this explains many of the sto-

[3] See Document 126.

ries to which the Chairman referred about the impression of an increasing coolness in our relations.

Our situation is somewhat complex. I personally, intellectually, agree with your analysis of the situation. But as Secretary of State I must make sure to position our country in such a way that we have the greatest ability to respond to a crisis. Our biggest problem in America is that Watergate started an attack on central authority. We have to rebuild this central authority with care, and we must not fight battles where we cannot support our position. Therefore, speaking quite frankly, many of our opponents will use any issue to undermine the credibility of what we are doing—articles they may hear from the Chinese side and which are useful to them—and that would not be very helpful vis-à-vis the Soviet Union because these same people are attacking us for what we are doing in Angola, Portugal, Chile, and Iraq.

Therefore, if we want to create the impression of which we spoke this afternoon, one has to understand the impact on our press, even though I agree with your analysis with which—personally, I do not disagree with what the Vice Premier has said. But while we each seek the same solution, you have your method and we must have our method, because a careful analysis of our domestic situation will show you that we are pursuing the strongest anti-Soviet policy that is possible. But it is not entirely up to us to say our relations are good, because if we say if and then our press interprets your statements which have a different purpose in a certain way, if [our statements] will simply be taken as self-serving propaganda. We are promoting the strongest policy against the Soviet Union that we can before the elections.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: It is a well-known fact that there exist fundamental differences between our two sides on key issues. Now we should not confuse these differences. The Shanghai Communiqué was written in this spirit. In recent years many American friends have come to China—whether they be Senators, Congressmen, or friends from the press, and people from all walks of life. We have told them the relations between China and the United States are basically good. We have not stated to the contrary. Instead the sources of the stories about the cooling off of the relations between our two countries do not originate from the Chinese side but from the United States side.

Secretary Kissinger: There are a variety of reasons and we have to analyse it so that we understand. It is true that, for example, opponents of the Administration or opponents of myself will say our relations are cooling in order to have a point of attack. And therefore after my last trip there were many articles in newspapers which were written for the purpose of discrediting the policy and for either preventing the trip or depriving it of significance. It is important for you to understand that these do not come from the Administration but from opponents

of the Administration—and occasionally from fools within the Administration who were fighting personal battles by making up stories that are contrary to the national interest. Also—and I do not say this in a critical spirit—some of the analyses our newsmen heard when they were here last time gave the same impression. So these two things came together.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: They have not heard them from our side.

Secretary Kissinger: They got the impression—it is newsmen. Part of the reason is that when you give your analysis of the Soviet situation—I, for example, do not consider it directed against the United States but directed against the Soviet Union—but some of our newsmen interpret it as an attack on our foreign policy, especially when they hear it in your country—not otherwise.

I tell you this—I do not at all object—this does not bother me at all, in fact I think it is healthy for you to say the things you do about the Soviet Union. It is healthy for you to talk to the Europeans as you do. It is in our common interest. The only point on which I don't agree is when you imply that we might withdraw from Europe in the face of a crisis. The fact is that we will be fighting in Europe long after the Europeans.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Perhaps this issue of substance can be discussed tomorrow.

Our policy of détente has been the same since 1971. It is not true that this is only in our recent statements. We have been stating our position on détente publicly and privately on many occasions. But it is also true that the argument we hear of a cooling off of relations between China and the United States has been in circulation only in a recent period. It is important to understand that it did not come from our government.

Secretary Kissinger: This is true, but it is also true that our newsmen have used the mood of their visits here as a peg to gauge our relationship. There were many stories last time that you were cold at the farewell banquet, for example. I did not feel this, and I have denied it. We have always been treated with extraordinary courtesy, so we have no complaints. But we would like the impression that our relations are good and getting better. Maybe—you joked at the beginning that maybe we should publish our four toasts, but there is some sense in this. If, for example, at the final dinner each of our sides said among other things what Chairman Mao said this afternoon—that our relations are basically good and we are improving them, then everybody would hear it and—

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: But Chairman Mao also said about the improvement of relations between our two countries, that they would be gradually improving.

Secretary Kissinger: A gradual process. We agree. I am looking to see what you have—

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I believe that in our toast last night we also included a sentence that relations between our two countries are basically good.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, the President and I noticed it, although I am not sure our press noticed it. They were distracted by the cannons.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: We have to fire our cannons.

Secretary Kissinger: The problem is to get it across to our press in a way that overcomes their nihilistic tendencies.

(Chinese service personnel enter the room and place dishes of cookies and other sweets on the table.)

I was getting weak.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: But you tendencies are that you will get bigger. You have put on a lot of weight.

Secretary Kissinger: You are actually responsible for it.

Then let us agree not to have a communiqué!?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: We believe it might be more advisable if we cannot have a communiqué better than the Shanghai Communiqué.

Secretary Kissinger: Should there be no statement at all?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: We have put what we think in all our toasts.

Secretary Kissinger: So then you recommend no statement at all?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: If we cannot have a communiqué which is a step forward from the Shanghai Communiqué.

Secretary Kissinger: That is acceptable to our side. Mr. Lin [P'ing] and Mr. Lord are very relieved. They can get some sleep. (Laughter)

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: We are both also relieved of the heavy burden. Almost every time you come we have to have discussions about a communiqué; and actually I think it might be more advisable to encourage the new style we have adopted now. Either we have a communiqué which is more weighty than the Shanghai Communiqué or we do not have a communiqué at all.

Secretary Kissinger: I do not think it will be helpful to tell this to our press since we cannot get a new communiqué—(Laughter)

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I hope that our conversation tonight will not be leaked.

Secretary Kissinger: What do you think we should tell the press—not about our conversation, but about our conclusion?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: But what ideas do you have, because we do not quite know your press? You are more skilled in handling the press.

Secretary Kissinger: You can tell my skill with the press from the articles they write! (Laughter)

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I remember that in Shanghai you told me you could talk to the press for as long as one and one half hours without really giving any substance. You proved you could do it in Shanghai.

I still remember that you asked me what we should tell to the press, and I told you [to say] whatever you would like.

Secretary Kissinger: I will think about . . . we will, starting tomorrow we should explain to the press that there will not be a communiqué or a statement. I will explain that we decided to concentrate on the substance of the talks rather than take time out to draft fine points. And we will say that we reaffirmed the main lines of our policy.

I will brief the press on Thursday night after the banquet. I will express our gratification at the visit and say that from our point of view our relations are basically good and gradually improving. That will be the theme of what I will say.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: You may say that our relations are basically good and they *will be* gradually improving. Not in a progressive tense, because it conforms more to the reality [to put it in the future tense].

Secretary Kissinger: I don't even understand the difference. But it is acceptable to us. (Laughter)

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Chairman Mao talked to you in a very frank way. He said there will not be major changes [in our relationship] either this year, next year, or the year after next. Your President also agreed with this.

Secretary Kissinger: I think he meant the year after next he thinks there can be.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Basically that is—

Secretary Kissinger: There is one problem related to your point about the press writing that our relations are cooling. It is that if nothing at all happens in our relations on the sorts of issues that Habib and Lin P'ing are discussing, it will be taken in America by the press and public as a sign of stagnation. This should reflect on—may have some impact if the things you fear in the world happen. But it is up to you to consider.

I could not care less if there are seven exchange programs, or two. Contrary to many of my compatriots, I believe China lived 2,000 years without cultural contact with America and can live another 2,000 years without contact with America. But this is up to you to consider; we don't have to settle it now, it is something to reflect about.

I was going to say that during most of those 2,000 years America did not even exist. In my limited knowledge of Chinese history—Maybe we could think about whether there is anything in this category

that could be examined and if so we could take it up, perhaps following the visit. If it could be said to have come out of the visit it would be helpful, but only if it is considered helpful to both sides. We do not need it.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: It is the same case with us. The problem is that we have to take a realistic approach to our bilateral relations. As a matter of fact, the biggest problem is that before the normalization of relations between our two countries the various programs for exchange between our two countries will have to be limited. I have told you this, Mr. Secretary, as well as many other American friends. Logically speaking, the argument about expanding exchanges before normalization is not tenable.

As the two sides are well aware, the issue of Taiwan is the key problem preventing normalization of relations. Once the relations between our two countries are normalized, the situation will be quite different. But we are ready to listen to your new ideas about the bilateral relations if you have any.

Secretary Kissinger: I think they have been discussed between Habib and Lin P'ing. And we are always prepared, when your oil production increases, we will be prepared if you want to discuss some purchases. But you will let us know. We discussed it with the Vice Premier at dinner yesterday—or to sell some equipment of a special nature.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: This is a question which we have to leave to the future.

Secretary Kissinger: It is up to you to decide.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I do not think there are any new problems in our bilateral relations except the MIAs.

Secretary Kissinger: You told us you might give us some new information on this visit.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Yes, we will do that.

Secretary Kissinger: Will the Vice Premier do that with the President, or will you give it us us here? Or how do you want to do it?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Not at the moment. Either way we will do it. It is up to you. We prefer the Vice Premier telling your President.

Secretary Kissinger: I think that would be best. Shall we then discuss philosophy? (Laughter)

Assistant Secretary Habib: For the rest of the evening.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Shall we call it an evening? We could go on to discuss the philosophical problems, but everybody would not be able to go to bed. Once I discussed philosophy with some European friends. We had a big fight and then at the end I gave it up. We should not discuss it any more.

Secretary Kissinger: We will see you then at 9:30 [a.m.] here?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: You will have a good time when you talk to your press about this trip to China.

Secretary Kissinger: Explaining to them all the signs of progress in our relations. But I will tell you, if you let in one additional professor from the University of Michigan you will keep Solomon happy.

Nancy Tang: We recently had one here. His name was Whiting, I think.

Secretary Kissinger: If you let Allen Whiting in, don't let him leave!

---

136. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Beijing, December 3, 1975, 9:25–11:55 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Vice Premier of the People's Republic of China
Ch'iao Kuan-hua, PRC Foreign Minister
Wang Hai-jung, Vice Foreign Minister
Huang Chen, Chief of the PRC Liaison Office in Washington
Lin P'ing, Director, Department of American and Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
T'ang Weng-sheng, Deputy Director, Department of American and Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ting Yuan-hung, Director, United States Office, Department of American and Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Chao Chi-hua, Deputy Director, United States Office, Department of American and Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Tsien Ta-yung, Political Counselor, PRC Liaison Office in Washington
Shih Yen-hua (Interpreter)
Lien Cheng-pao (Notetaker)
Sui Chu-mei (Notetaker)

Gerald R. Ford, President of the United States of America
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
George Bush, Chief of the United States Liaison Office in Peking
Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State

---

[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, Box 2, China Memcons and Reports, December 1–5, 1975, President Ford's Visit to Peking. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in Guest House 18. All brackets are in the original.

William H. Gleysteen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Richard H. Solomon, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council

SUBJECT

The Soviet Union; Europe; the Middle East; South Asia; Angola

[The press was escorted into the room.]

Vice Premier Teng: Did you have a good rest?

The President: Yes, I rested very well. We had a walk through the garden.

Vice Premier Teng: Yesterday Mr. President had a very successful conversation with Chairman Mao Tse-tung.

The President: Yes, I agree. It was a very significant conversation which covered a very wide range of matters involving the international scene of great importance, and bilateral topics.

I am looking forward to the visit this afternoon to the agricultural center.

Vice Premier Teng: You will see our tradition of learning from Tachai. I presume that during your last visit you did not have a chance to visit there.

The President: But we did visit several agricultural communes in Liaoning Province.

Vice Premier Teng: Tachai is a very important model in our agriculture. It involves the whole country. It was the poorest [agricultural region] in the past, and now the average food grain—there is now a surplus of about 500 kilos for every person. In addition to accumulation for the commune and brigade, they can deliver 250 kilos of food grain as commodity grain for the state.

[The press is escorted from the room.]

The President: It is very encouraging to us, Mr. Vice Premier, that our relations are good and that the talks have been very beneficial and cover a wide range of subjects. And I am looking forward to the additional talks we will have before we depart.

Vice Premier Teng: Yes, we can continue our talks of yesterday. Mr. President, what subject do you have in mind for today's talks?

The President: Mr. Vice Premier, I thought we could have you lead off the discussions this morning. I would be very glad to have your observations and comments on the matters we discussed yesterday.

Vice Premier Teng: I think in your conversation with Chairman Mao yesterday we almost covered all the international issues. And yesterday our two sides talked about the strategy and tactics against the Soviet Union. And during the meeting with Chairman Mao yesterday afternoon, Mr. President, you also discussed with the Chairman the

strategy regarding the Soviet Union. We have noticed that it seems recently the Soviet Union has adopted a tougher position—a fiercer position. And I believe that Mr. Secretary made a statement with regard to the problems in Angola and a warning to the Soviet Union. We have also noticed that the Soviet Union has given a tit-for-tat response.

Flaunting the banner of supporting the national liberation forces of the oppressed peoples, the Soviet Union is using [this banner] as a cover for gaining access to strategic ports in many places. And, of course, this has something to do with [Soviet] domestic politics because in February the [25th] Party Congress will be held. And the agenda for that Party Congress has been adopted in which Brezhnev will make a political report. And Kosygin is going to make the report on the five-year economic plan.

It is worth it to pay attention to the response of the Soviet Union with regard to the problems of Angola. In effect, in plain language it is their belief that détente should not prevent the Soviet Union from seeking hegemony.

The President: Mr. Vice Premier, I agree we covered a great deal of territory in our discussions with the Chairman yesterday. And in our talks I went into the things that the United States has done and is doing in our efforts to meet the expansionist efforts of the Soviet Union. And I noticed as you did that Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Kosygin are going to make two significant talks at their Party Congress. Would it be appropriate for me to ask if you are sending a delegation [to their Congress]? (Laughter)

Vice Premier Teng: I went to Moscow seven times. I know almost all of the old-age leaders in the Soviet Union—of course, except those of relatively young age. As the Chairman told you yesterday, there is not a single time in our dealings with the Soviet Union that our minds have met.

The President: That is encouraging. (Laughter)

Vice Premier Teng: In 1963 I led a Chinese delegation to Moscow, and that was our last delegation. But even then we didn't give up hope. When Khrushchev fell and Brezhnev took power [in 1964] the Premier went to the celebration of the October Revolution anniversary to see if there was any change there. When the Premier arrived in Moscow the first sentence he heard from the Soviet leaders was that the policies of the Khrushchev time would not change. So Premier Chou did not fulfill his original itinerary and came back earlier than planned. To speak frankly—and I hope that it will not offend you—in the dealings with the Soviet Union, perhaps we are a little more experienced than you.

The President: Let me say, Mr. Vice Premier, we have had some experience in dealing with them and we met and challenged them in a number of cases as I indicated yesterday, and we will continue to do so. But I think it would be helpful in this frank talk with you if you could indicate the various places and ways—whether in Southeast

Asia, the Middle East, or Africa—what your country is doing to meet this challenge so we can better understand how we can act in parallel.

Vice Premier Teng (with some visible tension in his face): We have done only two things: One is to make preparations for ourselves—to make solid down-to-earth preparations. Second, we fire some empty cannons. The empty cannons include encouragement to Japan to strengthen its relations with the United States, and our encouragement of European unity and for the European countries to strengthen their relations with the United States.

And I believe you also understand that we told the Europeans that at present the total military strength of the Soviet Union is stronger than that of the United States and Western Europe put together. In view of this assessment, we have told our friends from Western Europe that the United States is not strong enough to deal with the Soviet Union alone; and the strength of Europe and Japan together are still not enough put together with that of the United States to be adequate.

The President: The Western alliance is not an empty cannon, and we believe the NATO alliance is being strengthened and will continue to be so, even though we think several of the countries are less vigorous than they should be in expanding their military capability. I think it is beneficial that you speak frankly to some of our allies and thereby help to strengthen ties between some of the Western European countries. This is the same as far as Japan is concerned.

And we think it is important also that you urge Thailand to strengthen its relations with Japan; and we also feel that we can and will under the proper circumstances take action as far as Cambodia is concerned.

Vice Premier Teng: That is good. As far as we know, Cambodia will not refuse to have relations with the United States.

Secretary Kissinger: We have approached them in New York—after my conversation with the Foreign Minister [Ch'iao][2]—and we also sent them a message through Thailand.

Vice Premier Teng: Probably you have noticed that Cambodia has first of all established relatively good relations with Thailand.

You are always saying we are criticizing you, but I must say we think you have overdone it [in the *Mayaguez* affair] with regard to that small island. And according to our information, the Cambodian leaders did not know about the incident—it was the people on that small island themselves. And then the United States began the bombing after the Cambodian leaders agreed to return the boat.

---

[2] See Document 119.

Secretary Kissinger: We didn't know this until after our military operation had begun. (Laughter from the Chinese side.)

The President: It is accurate to say we made diplomatic efforts at the very outset, in order to find an answer without taking the military steps; and we were very disappointed those diplomatic efforts were not responded to. [Huang Chen laughs, and Foreign Minister Ch'iao points at him in mock blame.]

Vice Premier Teng: Well, you should know that at that time they [the Cambodian leaders] were scarcely able to take care of their own affairs. But the Cambodian leaders were very sensible.

Secretary Kissinger: But the Vietnamese have solved the problem anyway by taking over the island. (Laughter)

Vice Premier Teng: Anyway, you have slightly overdone it with that incident. Because you are such a big country and Cambodia is such a small country.

During Chancellor Schmidt's visit to China we had very good talks. And, of course, we had a number of differences. And also on the issue of détente and on the assessement of the Helsinki Conference. But we have a common point—that is we worry about the Soviet Union. They are most worried about the development of the Soviet navy, more than Soviet nuclear weapons. But they hold a very clear view—they are aware of the role that NATO can play. That means they are placing their hopes on the strength of the United States to some extent.

In our talks with leaders of other countries, including France, we have found that they hold similar views. And to speak frankly, and also I suppose you know it, leaders of Western European countries are worried whether the United States will fight for Europe. Of course, they haven't raised such worries with us directly; we just sense them.

The President: The countries in Western Europe have no need whatsoever to worry. They have been told explicitly that we have not only the capabilities but also the will to fight for the countries of Western Europe. Just as you have advised some of our allies to strengthen their ties with us, I would like to also say that we have told Japan and we have told Thailand to strengthen their ties with you. And we also feel that the Soviet influence in Laos is a disturbing phenomenon in Southeast Asia as far as we are concerned.

Vice Premier Teng: Yes, that is the case with Laos. But the Soviet Union can only exert that much influence.

As I have said to you just now, the Europeans have worries on two things: that the United States and the Soviet Union are talking too much about so-called détente; and they worry they may start deals over their heads. Second are the domestic problems, and I presume you know there are the so-called leftist forces. They worry about the strength of the left.

The President: That, of course, was one of the primary reasons for meeting at Rambouillet. The six countries—four from Western Europe, Japan, and ourselves—met primarily for the purpose of coordinating our economic plans because if our economic recoveries are not coordinated or are not moving ahead at a reasonable rate, there is the possibility that the leftist forces might increase their strength. But it is our overall view in the United States that economic recovery is moving ahead very well, and I believe at Rambouillet there was a consensus—many of the economic plans were coordinated.

Vice Premier Teng: The problem I have raised just now, perhaps I can also by way of suggestion say that if the United States has such relations with the Soviet Union that get the Western European countries worried, and if the European countries are under the impression that they are not in an important position, then the role they may play in détente with the Soviet Union may go inappropriately too far or they will do too much with their relations with the Soviet Union. And the United States is in an important position politically and economically—and these tactics you have mentioned will affect Western Europe and Japan. And this tactic will surely lead to creating a favorable situation for the Soviet Union. It is favorable for the Soviet Union to disintegrate the European countries one-by-one, to so-called "Finlandize" the countries of Western Europe one-by-one.

The President: Mr. Vice Premier, you should have no apprehension as to our attitude and feeling toward the Soviet Union. The Secretary of State is meeting regularly with Ministers of four Western European countries to coordinate our diplomatic and other matters so that we are working together and we are not, through détente with the Soviet Union, going to—

Secretary Kissinger (interrupting): We meet secretly once a month to coordinate plans for Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Yugoslavia—and we are even making joint plans, for your information, for common action regarding Yugoslavia. But we don't announce the meeting to spare the feelings of the others. We will meet again next week in Brussels.

Vice Premier Teng: We are of the view that the top priority is that the United States should pay more attention to Europe, because this problem is relatively difficult, because the European countries are many and their problems are different, and they are not all in agreement.

We have disagreement on the point that the focus of the Soviet Union's strategy is in Europe. That doesn't matter, but the fact is the Soviet Union is paying more attention to the Europeans. In case war breaks out in Europe, as Chairman Mao mentioned yesterday, several countries in Europe would fight—West Germany, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Sweden. And even when our Chairman talked with some

friends from the West, he told them the unification of the two Germanies is nothing to be feared. Germany, I believe, is Doctor Kissinger's first homeland.

The President: Mr. Vice Premier, the relations between the United States and Western Europe are today better than they have been for a number of years. Take France for example: Our personal and bilateral relations are far better, and I certainly believe that in case of any military activity in Europe France would be strong. And I agree with you that Western Germany would be strong. And they know our military coordination today is better than ever.

We are developing and strengthening our anti-tank capability. In the new budget I approved earlier this year the United States is increasing the M–60 tank capability. This tank is capable of handling any Soviet tank available. And General Haig in NATO is working closely to improve the overall capability of Western Europe.

We have no objection to the reunification of Germany, and as a matter of fact consider it inevitable.

Secretary Kissinger: The only problem in Sweden is that the army is stronger than the government.

Vice Premier Teng: During Chancellor Schmidt's visit he said that they are making efforts to strengthen their tank and anti-tank weapons, and their surface-to-air missiles. But I told him to be careful as the Soviet Union might not try to break through the center. It might attempt the tactic of outflanking Europe. There are not only problems in the northern wing, but also in the southern wing, and these are more complicated and important. We have learned from you that recently the situation in Portugal has improved, but it is possible there might be reversals and trials of strength again.

The President: We are working closely with various governments in West Europe, urging them to take strong action in Portugal; and we ourselves, as I indicated yesterday, are helping to strengthen the anti-Communist forces in Portugal. I recognize that the situation is not yet stable, but the progress has been significant in the past several weeks.

As I told you yesterday, the United States is working with the government forces against the Communists in Italy and France. And we think these problems must be recognized by the governments themselves; and they must be able to take action against the elements in their own countries. For example, when Mitterrand came to the United States, we had no contact with him under any circumstances.

Secretary Kissinger: When he came I saw him, not the President, and only in the presence of the French Ambassador so that he could make no propaganda. And we told him we would not deal with him unless he broke with the Marchais group.

Vice Premier Teng: And I believe you can do more solid work to help Yugoslavia. And, of course, in Yugoslavia they had domestic problems: the pro-Soviet forces are considerably strong. These are what we called in the past the International Communist Intelligence Agency. But this nation [Yugoslavia] can fight.

The President: We had a very successful visit to Yugoslavia. We strongly feel they should take the strongest action possible to meet the challenge of this element that you indicated; and we were impressed with the recognition on the part of Tito that the nation must be kept together and the need to prepare a proper succession when he leaves the scene. We were impressed with his recognition of both problems.

We have a long record of helping Yugoslavia be independent going back to the 1950s; and we feel strongly as you do that they not only did fight but also that they will fight. And we would welcome any actions on your part to encourage or help Yugoslavia.

Vice Premier Teng: We have a very good (pu-tso) relations with Yugoslavia now. Not long ago their Prime Minister came to China for a visit, and we had good talks. And they told us that they had done much work to eliminate pro-Soviet forces, including an open trial; and they told us that they would conduct not just one open trial but others.

The President: We are resuming the sale of military equipment to Yugoslavia.

Vice Premier Teng: Very good.

The President: And we are having our military work closely with Romania as well.

Vice Premier Teng: I believe we have relatively covered the problems of Europe. Perhaps we can proceed to the problems of the Middle East.

I believe Doctor, Mr. Secretary, you may recall that during your conversation with Chairman Mao he told you that our position on the Middle East is two-fold: The first point—and I'm afraid we will have disagreement on this point—we must support the Arab countries against Israeli Zionism. The Soviet Union is trying to fix, get the United States in that area.

Through the Doctor's recent shuttle diplomacy several problems were solved, but it is still far from settling this [entire] problem.

It seems to me that in matters with the Soviet Union, more and more countries have come to realize that the Soviet Union is not reliable. Those countries which have had long dealings with the Soviet Union have come to realize this. They are distrustful or disillusioned.

The President: That is the feeling in the case of Egypt. They have been disillusioned with relations with the Soviet Union, and because

of Dr. Kissinger's successful efforts relations between Egypt and the United States are closer than they have been in many years. Egypt is an important country in the [Middle East] region, and I intend to develop relations with Egypt in an economic and military sense.

Vice Premier Teng: In the past, when Vice Premier Shafei came to visit China, Chairman Mao encouraged him to improve relations with the Soviet Union—

The President: The Soviet Union?

Secretary Kissinger: That would be an amazing development!

Miss Tang (corrects the interpreter): The United States.

Miss Shih: The United States. (Laughter)

Vice Premier Teng: At that time they were not quite willing to do that, and later Chairman Mao told Doctor to use both hands. One for helping Israel, and the other one to help Egypt.

The President: And Mr. Vice Premier, we are doing both, and also urging some of our Western European friends to help Egypt break its military dependence on the Soviet Union. We have made some progress.

Vice Premier Teng: And we must pay attention to changes in the Arab countries: Iraq and South Yemen. Somalia cannot be included. We don't have sufficient knowledge of Somalia. And as far as we know, Syria is not monolithic [in their support for the Soviets]. They are on their guard against the Soviet Union too.

The President: Let me make a comment, and then Secretary Kissinger—who knows more about the Middle East than just about any person—can speak. We have been disturbed about Somalia. There is some evidence that it may not be as big a problem as we thought; but Somalia, if it stays with the Soviet Union, could cause serious military problems in that area.

Secretary Kissinger: In the Middle East, Mr. Vice Premier, we look at the various countries. We have a good relationship with President Assad. He has a complicated domestic situation. Some of his advisers, including the Foreign Minister, are closer to the Soviet Union than he is. But they are very suspicious of the Soviet Union, and they are using it only for military equipment. They are not a satellite of the Soviet Union. In fact, I am quite confident that when we are prepared to move in Syria, we can do to the Soviet Union in Syria what we did to the Soviet Union in Egypt. But we cannot take decisive action in Syria—to speak here among friends—until after our elections. But we will take decisive action some time after that. So we must give Assad some face-saving formulas for the next ten months; that is why we supported his resolution in the UN.

But on the other hand, we must not get pushed too hard in the Security Council debate in January, because it is an empty victory to get a resolution for the Arabs if our domestic support [for this policy in

the Middle East] is eroded. We don't want that kind of a situation to exist in the next ten months. So we will, of course, have a bland resolution. You might keep this in mind in the Security Council.

But our direction is clear, and President Assad understands it. He just sent a message to President Ford thanking him for our recent action in support of his position.

With respect to Iraq, we brought great pressure on them in combination with Iran and other countries while they were very pro-Soviet. Partly as a result of this pressure, and partly because the Soviet Union seems unable to gain political support without an army of occupation, Iraq is moving away somewhat from the Soviet Union. We have many unofficial contacts with them, and I expect our relations will improve over the next year.

With respect to South Yemen, we again have a combination of pressure from Oman and somewhat from Saudi Arabia. I met with their Foreign Minister at the UN and we agreed to open diplomatic relations. We are only waiting for Saudi Arabia to do it first, so that the wrong impression is not created.

Somalia: The Soviet Union has military bases, as you know. But we are working—and you can help perhaps also with the Organization of African Unity—and we will use the influence of Saudi Arabia. In Somalia, influence usually means money.

The Soviet Union has put much military equipment into Libya. This is the most dangerous [situation] right now. And we think that Egypt will look after that in some period of time.

We will have about ten months of a defensive policy, but after that we will move decisively. But we can oppose Soviet actions as they are afraid of war in the Middle East, and because they can't achieve anything in the Middle East without our cooperation. As the President said yesterday to the Chairman, he will not have a period of stagnation, and it will be evident we will be working with both our hands.

Vice Premier Teng: In the past, I talked to some of your American friends—I don't remember if I told [this to] Doctor: The greatest reality in the Middle East is that there are 3 million Israelis fighting against 120 million Arabs. In this regard, the position of the United States has some advantages, but also considerable disadvantages. The Soviet Union has a lot of openings they can squeeze into.

Secretary Kissinger: But they can't produce anything—they can only talk.

Vice Premier Teng: It is important to pay attention to the national sentiment [of the Arabs]. In this perhaps we are more sensitive than you. If Mr. Sadat had gone beyond a certain limit, he would have lost the sympathy of the Arab countries.

Secretary Kissinger: But looking at it historically, it is the United States who can realize the aspirations of the Arab states. As the President said to Chairman Mao yesterday, he will move to an overall solution as soon as conditions permit—in about a year. And nobody can do anything better in the interim.

Vice Premier Teng: If no solution is arrived at for the Palestinian problem, it is far from a total settlement of the Arab problem. And the Doctor is complaining that sometimes we criticize the United States; but we must fire cannons sometimes. If we do not, we will not be in a position to do work with the Arab states.

Secretary Kissinger: We understand, but the Foreign Minister gets carried away with his barrages. (Laughter)

Vice Premier Teng: This is not going too far.

Regarding Iraq, we are advising them to be on the alert against the Soviet Union. We told this to the Iraqi Vice Premier when he came to visit China last September. And we told the same to Chairman Robaya of South Yemen when he came to China.

Secretary Kissinger: We are willing to deal with them in good will when they are ready to deal with us.

Vice Premier Teng: This has to be done slowly because we know how they feel about you. But Iraq is ready to improve relations with Iran, and they have adopted some good measures already. But you must be aware of the fact that these countries have very strong national pride.

So much about the Middle East issues. Should we proceed to the issue of South Asia?

The President: Very much so; and I might make a comment: It seems to me that we want to encourage the independence of Laos and Cambodia. And at the same time we will work with Thailand to strengthen its relations with those countries.

Vice Premier Teng: So that is the issue of the Southeast Asian countries. With regard to the issue of South Asia, we have advised you on many occasions to aid Pakistan.

The President: We had significant discussions—and we made an announcement that we were lifting the arms embargo with regard to Pakistan. And the Pakistani Air Chief is coming to Washington very shortly to negotiate the equipment and delivery.

Vice Premier Teng: You shouldn't give the Pakistanis the impression that the United States attaches more importance to India than to Pakistan. They [the Paks] are very much worried about dismemberment.

The President: As I indicated before, we are moving to help Pakistan militarily. At the same time we are seeking to move India away from the Soviet Union. This is not easy, but it may pay dividends if it's

possible to achieve. And we strongly warned India not to pressure Bangladesh.

[Vice Premier Teng and his side converse.]

Vice Premier Teng: After your [Secretary Kissinger's] second visit to China, Pakistan was dismembered. And Premier Chou En-lai told the Doctor—and it might be counted as criticism, but with good intention—that you took no effective action, because your tone was of advice and not the tone of warning.

When the Soviet Union took action with regard to India, it paid attention to the attitude of the United States because it knew China's capability was quite limited. We have good relations with Pakistan and also have rendered some help to Pakistan, but our equipment is backward. Only the United States can give them some good things either directly or indirectly.

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, at that time the President was not in office. I agreed with Chou En-lai's analysis and I did not consider it an unfair comment. But our situation was complicated by two factors: One, the Vietnam war and the domestic difficulties caused by it; and second, President Yahya Khan was not the greatest leader of which history informs us. He made great mistakes politically and militarily. So he made it very hard for us, but you will [also] remember the difficulties President Nixon and I had in America. But President Nixon and I had made the decision—for your information—that if you had moved and the Soviet Union had brought pressure on you, we would have given [China] military support—even though the Shanghai Communiqué was not yet issued. We understand why you didn't, but you should know our position, our seriousness of purpose.

Vice Premier Teng: These are historical views. On the other hand, the Soviet Union has not given up its plan for Baluchistan.[3]

The President: We had discussions with the Shah in Washington on that particular problem. We understand that situation, and are working both with Iran and Pakistan on it.

Vice Premier Teng: That's good.

On the question of Bangladesh, Chairman Mao already discussed this question with you yesterday. We have established diplomatic relations with Bangladesh, and will send our Ambassador there at a later date. The only consideration we should make is to seek an opportune time which is favorable to the present government of Bangladesh. And according to our information, Pakistan has the same consideration.

---

[3] Deng is referring to charges that the Soviet Union was seeking to create a Soviet-dominated greater Baluchistan, which would combine the Baluch tribes of Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan.

About India, recently Mrs. Gandhi has also assumed the post of the Minister of Defense. What implications do you think it has?

The President: I can't give you any categorical answer, but I think it is probably indicative of a more aggressive attitude. Of course, it may be indicative that she is fearful of a coup within India itself.

Secretary Kissinger: She may have seen what General Scowcroft did. (Laughter) He did it while I was in China. (Laughter)

Vice Premier Teng: We could well hope that she did it out of domestic considerations.

The President: I would like your estimation of Afghanistan and Pakistan. We note a growing tension between the two.

Vice Premier Teng: In Afghanistan there are two tendencies: One is that Afghanistan cannot but rely on the Soviet Union; and the other is Afghanistan is vigilant against the Soviet Union. In this respect, maybe Iraq can do work with Afghanistan. It seems to be difficult to improve the relations of Afghanistan and Pakistan for the time being. There is still a long way to go.

Secretary Kissinger: The major thing is to keep the Indians out of Pakistan.

Vice Premier Teng: As a matter of fact, the Soviet Union in collusion with India, is trying to influence Pakistan from two sides.

The President: Do you feel there is any threat of an Indian invasion of Nepal?

Vice Premier Teng: Nepal itself feels the threat, but at the moment there are no indications that India will make open military actions.

Secretary Kissinger (in an aside to the President): Pressure.

Vice Premier Teng: The key element is that the King of Nepal and the Nepalese government has—can control the situation there. As a land locked country, Nepal has all its communications through India. This is the greatest practical difficulty for Nepal. And I believe that you can do more things with Nepal. We are doing what we can with our capability. We have established good relations with Nepal—we have mutual confidence—but what we can do is quite limited. Perhaps things will get better when our railroad into Tibet is accomplished.

The President: I am sending a personal friend [as Ambassador] to Nepal, Mrs. Maytag.

Secretary Kissinger: This shows the significance we attach to Nepal.

Vice Premier Teng: It is necessary to help Nepal. The Nepalese are a nation that can fight. Nepal isn't Sikkim or Bhutan.

So much about the issue of South Asia. Now to Southeast Asia?

Just now Mr. President discussed the situation in Southeast Asia. As far as Southeast Asia as a whole is considered, we feel that the

situation there is relatively good. Three Indochinese countries have different attitudes. The attitude of Cambodia is relatively good. Undoubtedly the Soviet Union will increase its influence in Vietnam and Laos. But we also believe that it is not such a simple thing for a nation which has fought three wars to forget its independence so lightly. But the possibility should not be ruled out that the Soviet Union will try by every means to get the bases in Camranh Bay which you so painstakingly established. (Laughter)

The President: You may have noticed that the Secretary of State in Detroit last week opened the door a crack as far as Vietnam is concerned.

Vice Premier Teng: Yes, we have noticed. It is beneficial to have dealings with the Soviet Union over a long period of time. And we also believe that someday India will eventually rebel against the Soviet Union. Because the deeper the Soviet involvement, the more problems they [the client state] will confront. We know very well the way the Soviet Union is doing things. The salient characteristic of the Soviet Union is that it is very stingy. Anything it supplies will have some political conditions attached.

Secretary Kissinger: On the other hand, gratitude is not a characteristic India is famous for. The combination of these two factors is likely to produce some tensions.

Vice Premier Teng: The Soviet Union at present is pushing its collective security system in Asia, and particularly in Southeast Asia. I believe it will not succeed; even Vietnam will not agree to it. As to the five countries in ASEAN, they are very clear about it.

The President: We are totally opposed to it.

Vice Premier Teng: Because it is primarily those countries which are concerned. Those which accepted it would become the victims of the so-called collective security in Asia. Even India does not dare to give open support to the Soviet proposal.

The President: In my visit to Indonesia and the Philippines, I will make this very clear. We are vigorously opposed to it.

Secretary Kissinger: But it warrants attention that India has a treaty with the Soviet Union, and India wants to establish treaties with these countries.

Vice Premier Teng: We have seen that India is making efforts to sell the so-called collective security system of Asia, but to no avail. Their Vice President has made a round of trips to Southeast Asian countries especially for this purpose.

We have established diplomatic relations with a majority of the ASEAN countries. Indonesia does not have good relations with us, but we are in no hurry.

The President: When I am in Indonesia, we will speak very forcefully to them concerning this effort.

Vice Premier Teng: It seems not to be easy for the time being. The diplomatic relations between our two countries were suspended in 1965. And that [situation] also involves several million Chinese descendants. As far as China is concerned, we are willing to improve relations with Indonesia, but we have patience.

Finally, we may discuss the issue of Angola. Actually this issue was already discussed in Mr. President's conversation with Chairman Mao. We hope that through the work of the two sides we can both bring about a better situation there. The relatively complex problem is the involvement of South Africa. And I believe you are aware of the feelings of the black Africans toward South Africa.

Secretary Kissinger: We are prepared to push South Africa out as soon as an alternative military force can be created.

The President: We hope your Ambassador in Zaire can keep us fully informed. It would be helpful.

Vice Premier Teng: We have a good relationship with Zaire, but what we can help them with is only some light weapons.

Secretary Kissinger: We can give them weapons. What they need is training in guerrilla warfare. If you can give them light weapons it would help, but the major thing is training. Our specialty is *not* guerrilla warfare. (Laughter)

Vice Premier Teng: In the past we trained the three organizations—including Neto.

Secretary Kissinger: Like NATO! (Laughter)

Vice Premier Teng: And we helped to train the soldiers of FNLA for some time.

Secretary Kissinger: They needed it most.

Vice Premier Teng: And in the past, we assisted all three organizations, and more so to Neto. And the organization which we helped earliest was MPLA. With respect to UNITA—Savimbi—we supplied them with weapons by way of Tanzania, but they were not delivered.

The President: Both UNITA and FNLA need help particularly.

Vice Premier Teng: We have no way of transferring weapons into their hands.

Secretary Kissinger: Zambia or Zaire?

Vice Premier Teng: Zambia does not support Neto and the MPLA. If we asked them to allow our weapons to pass through their territory they wouldn't allow it.

Secretary Kissinger: Really?

Vice Premier Teng: Yes. As I mentioned to you just now, the primary problem is the involvement of South Africa. In those countries which

originally did not support the MPLA, there is now a change in attitude exactly because of the involvement of South Africa. Some independent countries have begun to support Neto. I think through Zaire. If you can get South Africa out of Angola as soon as possible, or find some other means to replace South Africa on the southern front, this would be good. We are in no position to help except in the north through Zaire.

The President: We had nothing to do with the South African involvement, and we will take action to get South Africa out, provided a balance can be maintained for their not being in. In addition, if you would like, we can talk to Zambia with regard to transshipment.

Vice Premier Teng: I am afraid it is very difficult. Yesterday I said we could try with Mozambique, but we don't expect great results.

Secretary Kissinger: I talked with their Foreign Minister in New York. They feel very close to China.

Vice Premier Teng: Yes, we have good relations with Mozambique, but on this particular issue it is another matter, because Mozambique takes a very strong position on Zimbabwe—Rhodesia—and South Africa. I believe the better way is for you to help through the southern front, and I believe you will find the way.

There is one point which is evident. Since Nyerere would not permit transshipment through Tanzania, how could Zambia account to Tanzania if it accepted transshipment of weapons?

Secretary Kissinger: Can we talk to Kaunda and see what he thinks? We have some influence with him.

Vice Premier Teng: Please understand this with regard to African countries—even the small ones: they are extremely sensitive on matters involving national pride. [Because of this] we have not raised the suggestion with them, despite all our assistance to them—as in Tanzania and Zambia in railway construction.

The President: You have been effective. Will you move in the north if we move in the south?

Vice Premier Teng: But you should give greater help in the north too. As far as I know, you have many ways to help. Also through third countries.

The President: We have and will.

Vice Premier Teng: Good.

Secretary Kissinger: We are working with France. They will send some equipment and training.

The President: I just approved before I left Washington $35 million more above what we have done before; and that [amount] is on its way as I understand it.

Vice Premier Teng: It is worth spending more money on that problem. Because that is a key position of strategic importance.

The President: Yes. They have an important port; and their natural resources are vital.

Vice Premier Teng: So should we call it a morning and continue our talks tomorrow? We spent two and a half hours making a round the world trip.

The President: It has been very beneficial and encouraging to work with you, Mr. Vice Premier, to be very frank, and to see how our interests are similar in many, many areas of the world.

Vice Premier Teng: We have said we have many things in common.

Secretary Kissinger: What should we say to the press?

Vice Premier Teng: We may say that we have continued significant discussions on a wide range of international issues.

Secretary Kissinger: All right.

Vice Premier Teng: We will see you tomorrow.

Secretary Kissinger: We will actually see you—does that mean you are withdrawing your invitation for tonight? (Laughter)

Vice Premier Teng: No, we will see you at the performance tonight!

---

137. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Beijing, December 4, 1975, 10:05–11:47 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

PRC
Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Vice Premier of the State Council
Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Amb. Huang Chen, Chief, PRCLO, Washington
Wang Hai-jung, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
Lin P'ing, Director of American & Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
T'ang Weng-sheng, Deputy Director of American & Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (Interpreter)
Chien Ta-yung, Counselor, PRCLO, Washington

---

[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, Box 2, China Memcons and Reports, December 1–5, 1975, President Ford's Visit to Peking. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Great Hall of the People. All brackets are in the original.

Ting Yuan-hung, Director for U.S. Affairs, American & Oceanic Affairs Department
Chao Chi-hua, Deputy Director for U.S. Affairs, American & Oceanic Affairs Department
Mrs. Shih Yen-hua, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (Interpreter)
(Plus two notetakers)

U.S.
President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Amb. George H. W. Bush, Chief of the USLO, Peking
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff
Amb. Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
William H. Gleysteen, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff
Bonnie Long, Sec. Kissinger's Office (Notetaker)

SUBJECT

Taiwan; bilateral relations; MIA; trade (oil and computers); Dalai Lama; Korea; Chinese minorities; agriculture; Amb. Bush

[A press pool was admitted at the beginning]

Vice Premier Teng: Did you have a good rest?

The President: I certainly did. I have had three beneficial, friendly, and I think, constructive days. I am looking forward to the final session and I think it will be as helpful as the ones before.

Vice Premier Teng: I am sure they will be, Sir, and we are also very pleased that our two sides are now setting a new style this time. That is, we do not think we are compelled to issue a communiqué. We think the importance lies in the visit itself, and that our two sides have had significant discussions. We don't think importance lies in such superficial things as a communiqué.

The President: I agree. Actions and agreements are much more important than the words, and the discussions far more significant than a piece of paper.

Vice Premier Teng: But perhaps the ladies and gentlemen of the press won't be so satisfied by that. [Laughter] And perhaps they will also notice that I have begun smoking again. [Laughter]

The President: Mr. Vice Premier, the relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China—this relationship has been strengthened by the visit and the meeting with Chairman Mao and yourself, the kind of meetings that can be meaningful in the months and years ahead.

Vice Premier Teng: I agree with that.

The President: I have my pipe out too. [Laughter] But they all know I do that.

Helen Thomas (UPI): We want a rebuttal some day.

The President: She always has the last word. [Laughter]

Helen Thomas: I want a translation of that. [Laughter]

[The press was then ushered out.]

Secretary Kissinger: That made my press briefing a lot easier.

The President: That performance at the gymnasium last night was one of the finest things I have ever seen.

Vice Premier Teng: It is more relaxing, and we did not want the time to be too tiring.

The President: I am envious of those young people who can do all those things.

Secretary Kissinger: General Scowcroft was so moved that even though he fell asleep, he applauded. [Laughter] [To Foreign Minister Ch'iao:] You saw him.

Vice Premier Teng: Mr. Scowcroft is a Lieutenant General and I, after having fought twenty years in a war, still don't have a rank. I am only an ordinary soldier. You are my superior! [Laughter]

President Ford: Mr. Vice Premier, the Battle of the Potomac sometimes gets a little rough.

Taiwan

Vice Premier Teng: So we now enter our third session and I think the final session for this visit. I believe in the talks we had yesterday, we have covered almost all the ground, and I think especially the deep going conversation you had with Chairman Mao shows we have touched upon all aspects.

And the Taiwan issue that both sides are concerned about actually was also discussed during your wide-ranging conversation with Chairman Mao. And we have understood Mr. President's point; that is, that during the time of the election it will not be possible to make any new moves.

As for our side, we have told the Doctor many times that we are very patient. And in our relations we have always put the international aspect first and the Taiwan issue second.

The President: Mr. Vice Premier, you are absolutely correct. We have covered the globe in detail, ourselves as well as the discussions with the Chairman, and we did touch on the question of Taiwan. We are very grateful that you are understanding of the domestic political situation in the United States.

But I think it is important for us—and for me, I should say—to speak quite frankly about the political commitment that I feel the United States has concerning Taiwan. Although we understand and have discussed the situation, I think it is beneficial that I reaffirm for

the record of these meetings what in the first instance President Nixon said in 1972. There were five points that were made:

—Number one, that we support the principle of the unity of China.

—Number Two, we will not support any independence effort by the Taiwan Government.

—And that we would actively discourage any third force from seeking to take some expansionist activities concerning Taiwan.

—Of course, you do know that we have significantly reduced, as President Nixon said, the military forces that we have on Taiwan. As I recall the figure in 1972, there were roughly 10,000 American military personnel on the island. That has been reduced, so that at the present time we have roughly 2,800. And it is my intention within the next year that we will reduce that by 50%, down to a figure roughly of 1,400. I want you to know that we have no offensive weapon capabilities on Taiwan.

—So, with the total reduced figure from 10,000 to 1,400, and the fact that we have no offensive military capability, there is a clear indication that the commitments made by President Nixon are being carried out by myself.

And, we do understand and we are grateful for the patience that your government has had. On the other hand, we want to say after the election we will be in a position to move much more specifically toward the normalization of relations, along the model perhaps of the Japanese arrangement, but it will take some time, bearing in mind our domestic political situation.

Teng: We have taken note of Mr. President's well-intentioned words, that is, that under suitable conditions you will be prepared to solve the Taiwan issue according to the Japanese formula. And of course, when the normalization of relations is realized, we are sure that will be in accordance with the three principles we have stated many times: It will go along with the abolishing of the so-called U.S.–Chiang Kai-shek defense treaty, and the withdrawal of United States troops from Taiwan, and the severing of diplomatic relations with the Chiang Kai-shek government. Of course, we can also realize the Japanese formula which also includes the remaining of some people-to-people, nongovernmental trade relations with Taiwan, as Japan maintains at the present time.

Other issues pertaining to Taiwan will be settled in accordance with the principle that it is the internal problem of China.

And under these conditions we are not worried about any third country, particularly Russia, being able to do anything of consequence on Taiwan.

[Teng bends over next to his seat and spits into a spittoon under the table.]

The President: We would certainly anticipate that any solution would be by peaceful means as far as your government and Taiwan are concerned. We certainly have to look at it from the point of view that we can't just cast aside old friends. It would have to be a peaceful solution, which I understand is the understanding President Nixon made at that time. I would agree that we would perhaps retain trade relations, etc. which would continue.

But I might add that I would hope that in our own relations, Mr. Vice Premier, we could move in a broadening sense, as friends, in the direction of trade relations, and educational and cultural exchanges. They are very meaningful, as the Ambassador [Huang Chen] knows, in the support that comes from the American people for the forward movement of our overall relations.

Teng: Of course, I believe the Doctor will well remember the talks he had with Chairman Mao during his recent October visit in which the Chairman has very explicitly discussed our position. And with regard to the thing you mentioned just now, to put it frankly, we do not believe in peaceful transition. Because there is a huge bunch of counter-revolutionaries over there, and the question of what method we will take to solve our internal problem is something that we believe belongs to the internal affairs of China, to be decided by China herself. And in his conversation with the Doctor, Chairman Mao mentioned five years, ten years, 20 years, 100 years. While the Doctor continued stressing the point that "you had mentioned 100 years." [Laughter] So, I think that is about all for that question.

The President: You can argue that 100 years is a peaceful transition. [Laughter]

Teng: But I think it is clear that the Chairman's meaning was that even in 100 years a peaceful transition would be impossible. There is still time left.

The President: But I would reiterate, Mr. Vice Premier, how it is beneficial for us to expand the visits and exchanges from our country to yours and your country to ours. The good will that has been engendered by the many groups that come to the United States has been very helpful, and we hope that those who have come to the People's Republic likewise are helpful, whether they are educational, agricultural, scientific or otherwise. It is a step that strengthens the ties between our two countries.

Teng: I believe our two sides have already discussed the specific programs that we will be exchanging next year. And we believe that the strengthening of mutual exchanges is always for the good.

There is another issue that your side has mentioned many times. That is the question of missing in action.

The President: Very important.

Teng: We have conducted many searches once again, and we have found out about what has happened to seven of them. And we have the ashes of two. But the remains of the others have not been able to be obtained. As for the others, there have also been cases in which planes have been shot down, some into the sea, and the remains have not been able to be found.

So we can hand over the information to you. [He hands paper at Tab A to the President.][2]

The President: Mr. Vice Premier, this is very helpful. [Teng spits into his spittoon.] Of course, I have not had a chance to read it, but the fact that you have responded to something that is of deep concern to the American people will be greatly appreciated. And I would hope that if any other developments take place in the future, either a plane shot down or ashes or remains, and means of identification are found, that you would do the same in those cases as you have done in these. This will have a very beneficial impact on the reaction in the United States.

And I notice on the last page here that you do indicate that if we wanted we can take back the remains of two Americans, Kenneth Pugh and Jimmy Buckley. My quick reaction is we perhaps can do it through the Red Cross or some way; that probably would be the best way to handle it. But the news will be very well received in the United States.

Teng: We agree then, if you want it handed over from the Chinese Red Cross to the American Red Cross.

Secretary Kissinger: Maybe at the briefing today, without giving names, can I say that you have informed us of seven missing in action? But we want to notify their families, so we will not release the names.

Teng: All right. In the future, if similar events occur, I think it will be much easier to handle because we can deal with it directly.

Secretary Kissinger: Do you mean overflights? There are no such . . . [Laughter]

Teng: Do you think you envisage such overflights? [Laughter]

Secretary Kissinger: No.

Teng: So there will not be the question arising. [Laughter]

The President: I notice, Mr. Vice Premier, that the Cambodians have indicated that they hold no American prisoners and have no information. I think this attitude on their part is helpful in trying to make some progress on relations if we can, as far as they are concerned. If you have any influence on other friends in Indochina it might be helpful in that regard to indicate to them that any information would

---

[2] Not attached and not found.

be very beneficial in the improvement, in the movement towards relations.

Teng: I think you mean Vietnam. [Laughter]

The President: You are very perceptive!

Teng: And as I believe we discussed with Dr. Kissinger during his recent visit, we mentioned that you have many channels leading to Vietnam. [Laughter]

The President: We do thank you for this information. It will be very helpful.

Teng: As for the question of oil and equipment and so on, as Mr. President mentioned, we think this can be conducted through trade channels.

The President: Very good.

Teng: And under our present relations we believe it also conforms to reality that the volume of trade between our two countries has not been very stable. Of course this also includes our ability to pay for certain things. And I also believe that with the developing of our economy, the prospects will be better.

The President: I admire . . .

Teng: For instance, under the present situation, some things we are interested in perhaps you find it impossible to supply. Like for instance computers of a speed of 10 million times. We do not think such issues are of great consequence.

Secretary Kissinger: Our problem is we have refused certain computers to the Soviet Union. [Teng spits into his spittoon.] I think we could approve computers to the People's Republic of China that would be of considerable quality. As long as we can at the same time maintain our policy with the Soviet Union.

Teng: I think that such issues can be discussed through trade channels. And we do not think it matters if perhaps you at the present will find it difficult to proceed; it would not be of very great consequence.

The President: Mr. Vice Premier, in principle we would be very anxious to be helpful in the computer area, and I think we can be. And certainly those matters can be discussed by the trade people, but I think with the overall attitude that we have, progress can be made in that regard.

Teng: Fine.

Secretary Kissinger: Could I make a suggestion, Mr. Vice Premier?

Teng: Okay.

Secretary Kissinger: I know your normal procedure is to do it through trade channels. But this has the consequence that you may ask for a particular model that then comes to us for decision and we

refuse it for a reason that may have to do with our Soviet relationship and not the Chinese relationship. If your Ambassador could tell us informally ahead of time what you have in mind, we may be able to find a model of good quality which meets your needs which you can be sure will be approved, and we could work with the companies. Because there are many varieties which could be effective to you. If we can just find a model with technical differences to preserve the principle with the Soviet Union, then we can give it to you, and we can certainly work that out.

Teng: To our understanding, what we term trade channels actually are controlled or influenced heavily by the governments.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but there are two ways it comes to our attention. One is if you go through the technical channel, and we do not know until you have already made a specific proposal. If you tell us informally, I can . . . For example, the other day I had dinner with the President of Burroughs Corporation, and he told me of your interest in some computers. He said there are many computers he could give you, various models, if he knew your needs. If we could have some preliminary talks with your Ambassador, or whoever you designate, I could talk to Burroughs Corporation or whoever you want to deal with, and then we could give an appropriate model and we would not be made to get into the position of having to accept or reject a specific model, once we know what you have in mind.

Teng: We can think over that suggestion. And the Chairman said that our Ambassador will be staying in your country for one or two more years. [Laughter]

Kissinger: It will be with the intention of approving it, not refusing it.

The President: The Secretary has suggested the better procedure for the handling of the matter, and I would like you to know, Mr. Vice Premier, that we are very anxious to be helpful in this area. If we follow the right procedure it makes it very possible that we can cooperate.

Teng: Fine. So we think that, first of all, we can study the issue and then further consider it. And we think that the solving of specific issues like this, or their all remaining unsolved, will not be of great effect to our general relations. [The Chinese all laugh.] There are also many small issues like this between us.

For instance, the question of the Dalai Lama having set up a small office in your country. And during my discussions with some of your visitors, I said that was like chicken feathers and onion skin. [Laughter] Do you have such an expression?

Ambassador Bush: We have an impolite one.

Teng: In Chinese it means something of very little weight. Feathers are very light.

The President: Let me assure you, Mr. Vice Premier, that we oppose and do not support any governmental action as far as Tibet is concerned.

Teng: Things might be easier if you refused them visas.

The President: No United States governmental action was taken. This was done privately, Mr. Vice Premier.

[Teng spits into his spittoon.]

Teng: It is not so important.

Kissinger: When they become Communists, then we have a legal basis to refuse them visas. [Laughter]

Teng: The present Palace of Culture of Various Nationalities, which I pointed out to you in the car and which your daughter visited, was built for the Dalai Lama. And in 1959, when the Dalai Lama came to Peking, he stayed there for one period. After he went back to Tibet he staged a rebellion and left, fled the country. At that time actually it was possible for us to have stopped his leaving the country. It was entirely within our capacity to stop him from leaving. But Chairman Mao said it is better to let him go. [The Chinese all laugh.]

You can see the difference in Tibet now. Recently a woman writer, Han Suyin, visited Tibet. She is of British citizenship, but very often visits the United States. And the standards of living in Tibet are much higher than before, and in comparison to other areas in China it can not be considered very low.

So that is all the bilateral issues we can think of.

The President: I think we have covered the bilateral and I think we have covered the international issues in great depth.

I may just add that we do not approve of the actions that the Indians are taking as far as Tibet is concerned.

Teng: We do not pay much attention to that because it is of no use. And to put it in more explicit terms, the Dalai Lama is now a burden on India. [The Chinese laugh.] If he should want to come back to Tibet, we might even welcome him back for a short visit. And perhaps he can see what changes have been wrought by the serfs that he had so cruelly ruled.

The President: I do not think you want to relieve India of any extra burdens that it has.

Teng: We do not want to. Let them carry it for 100 years! We will think about it after that. The Dalai Lama must be in his 30's, at the most 40. He was very young at that time. He might still live another 60 years, to 100. So let India carry that burden for another 60 years at least.

The President: We are very grateful, Mr. Vice Premier, for your warm welcome. We feel very strongly that the discussions both on bilateral, as

well as international matters, have been very fruitful and significant. I think the opportunity to meet you personally and meet the Chairman will be very productive in the long run in our efforts to make possible affirmative action on a parallel basis. And on behalf of myself and my family and all of the delegation from the United States, we are very grateful for the frank and significant, fruitful discussions that we have had.

Teng: I agree with the words of the President, and I would like to take this opportunity to once again express our thanks to the President for the visit.

So, do you think we have come to the end of our discussion?

The President: The only apprehension that I have, Mr. Vice Premier, is that we have gotten along so well that we have not had to take as much time this morning as we anticipated. And our friends in the press might misconstrue that, and they often times do. [Laughter] So if there is anything that we could discuss, informally, or otherwise, it might be helpful. [Laughter]

Teng: Fine.

Kissinger: See, if the meeting runs longer than planned, it proves we quarreled. If it runs shorter than planned, it also proves we quarreled. [Laughter]

Teng: Yes, the press people do not seem to have any particular noses or ears. I wonder how they get so sensitive.

Kissinger: There were two British correspondents here, Mr. Vice Premier, who wrote articles that there was great tension in our first meeting here.

Teng: I sometimes think perhaps that is due to inspiration. [Laughter]

The President: Mr. Vice Premier, the Secretary has told me that the two Foreign Ministers did discuss Korea, and their discussions I think will not require that we discuss the situation, but I think it is important for them to have a dialogue on this issue.

Teng: As for the Korean issue, during the Doctor's previous visit we discussed that with him, and this time Foreign Minister Ch'iao has discussed it with him again. So I think that our position is very clear and both sides understand each other very well on this issue. We have noticed that there seems to be an idea that various parties, including ourselves, should participate in the discussion of this question. This is something that we cannot agree to. Because we no longer have any military forces in Korea. Only your side has. But we are in favor of your side having a dialogue with Korea. You also have your channels, for instance, in the United Nations; they have an observer there.

But we can say that we are not of the same impression that you seem to be under. We are not worried like you are about a military at-

tack by the North against the South. But we hope that the American side will keep an eye on Park Chung Hee. Not now and neither in one or two years. The question is that you must keep an eye over him when he gets in a particularly difficult position.

The President: Mr. Vice Premier, we are encouraged when you say that the North has no intention and I can assure you that we will keep our eye on the South. We think it would be very ill-advised and very harmful for any military action in that area whatsoever. As a matter of fact, we would not tolerate it. [Teng spits into his spittoon.]

Teng: When Mr. Cyrus Vance led a delegation of world affairs organization people to China, we discussed this with him.

Kissinger: That is like the Dalai Lama. [Laughter] A government in exile. [Laughter]

Teng: They stressed that South Korea should be linked with Japan. They stressed the linkage that should be maintained between Japan and South Korea. Of course, if that is perceived from a purely geographical point of view, that might be of some sense. But if you are speaking from a political point of view, Japan and Korea are issues of two different natures. We are always reminding our friends that one must pay attention to the question of national feeling, national sentiment. And to be very frank, on this issue we find that your people, and including European friends, do not seem to have such acute and deep feeling about this issue as we have. Because we have passed through that period.

Take our situation, our state of affairs, pertaining to Taiwan. Some people are saying this is a two-China issue. And so we can feel very acutely the feelings that others have on other similar issues. And we feel that the question of the so-called two Koreas, two Vietnams, and two Germanies, are all issues of the same nature. And although the Soviet Union is now in control of East Germany, we believe that not only the West German people, but also the East German people have the same desire to reunify their country, and we feel certain that such an aspiration will eventually be realized.

There are a lot of people who have taken a lot of notice to our mention of 100 years. We think even if it takes 100 years, or even if it exceeds 100 years, this desire will finally be realized. Such a national urge cannot be resisted. Take for instance the question of the two Vietnams. One part of the nation has fought for reunification for 30 years. In Korea, the war did not go for so many years but shows a basic feeling there too.

President: With respect to the reunification of Germany, as I said the other day, we feel the reunification of Germany is inevitable. How soon I would not predict, but it would surprise me if it were 100 years, Mr. Vice Premier.

As for Korea, I think it might be helpful if the Secretary made an observation.

Kissinger: Only on the relationship between Japan and South Korea, Mr. Vice Premier. I think we both have an interest to prevent Japan from becoming militaristic. If there is turmoil in Korea and if South Korea is threatened, then there is a danger Japan will move in a more militaristic direction. On the other hand, we do not favor Japan having a more political and military role in Korea, and this is why we have attempted to move in the direction we have.

Teng: Japan's interest in South Korea is no lower than that of the United States.

Kissinger: It is greater.

Teng: There is some sense in those words. And there indeed exist forces in Japan that want to restore militarism. These are also forces that are most enthusiastic about South Korea and Taiwan.

Kissinger [to Ch'iao]: My student.

President: You mentioned Mr. Nakasone.

Teng: Your student is such a man.

Kissinger: I just said it to the Foreign Minister.

President: You mentioned earlier Mr. Cyrus Vance. He was a classmate of mine in Law School. I don't expect he will be back in government for some time. If ever.

It was mentioned to me several months ago when Mr. Paul Miller of AP came to see me following his visit to your country—and I understand he had talked with your people—about the possibility of setting up an AP bureau here. I would hope you would seriously consider that, Mr. Vice Premier. Mr. Vice Premier, they might be more constructive than the British correspondents.

Teng: But under the present state of affairs, it perhaps will be difficult for this to be. Perhaps it will be more appropriate for us to consider this after the elections, when there will have been a change in the situation.

President: I mention again, we are very grateful.

Teng: We still have some time left, though. Perhaps we can chat about Tibet. [Laughter] The features of Tibet today are completely different from what they were before. In history, in Tibet, almost 40% of the population were lamas, that is, Buddhist priests, including very small children, who were also lamas. These lamas first of all could not till the land. Secondly, they did not reproduce the human race, because they were not allowed to marry. And they relied completely on the other 60% of the population, the serfs, to feed them. And their rule was very cruel. It was very cruel oppression of the people. They had very many varieties of torture.

They only produced a kind of barley, a different strain that perhaps you may not have found in any other place in the world. It is a kind of barley which has a very low yield. Now they are growing wheat. In the past it was thought impossible. But now they are having very high yields.

Kissinger: Are any Chinese settling there?

Ch'iao: You mean of the Han nationality?

Kissinger: Yes.

Teng: There are. After our army went in, some of them settled down there. And there are also people engaging in a lot of construction there. But the new generation of Tibetans has also produced a new generation of specialists, in new fields, and workers that they never had before because they did not have the industry. In the past they did not grow vegetables. Now they have successfully grown new varieties of vegetables in an area of such high altitude that was not thought possible before, and of such growth that the turnips they grow there are much larger than those grown in our area.

President: Do you have a Tachai project there? That was very impressive yesterday.

Teng: Yes. In Tibet, one of the characteristics of the agriculture in Tibet is that they have done a lot of work in water conservancy. Because that is an area in agriculture, and we found that though it is very high and lacking in air, it is closer to the sun and is therefore more bountiful, and it has more sunshine.

So, no matter what the Dalai Lama can boast about himself, he cannot affect the prospects of Tibet. They have begun to develop a bit of industry there too.

President: He should stay in India.

Teng: Yes, and we wish him a long life and a long stay there. [Laughter]

On the whole, our country is still very backward. But we pay attention to the policy towards the different nationalities, and no matter whether it is in the Tibetan area. The area where the Tibetans live is larger than Tibet itself. In Kueichow Province, and on the western borders, also in Sinkiang Province, there are many Tibetans. It is populated with Hans too. Where we have dozens of Khazaks and other peoples of minority nationalities, we have tried to provide a standard of living for people of minority nationalities that is slightly higher than the other ones.

Our country has a weakness in that it has too large a population. We have had to pay attention to birth control. And the increase in the population is lowering down a bit in some provinces. But in the minority nationality areas we have encouraged an increase in the popu-

lation. Because in the places that they live in, they have large areas and few people.

President: In the three years since I was here in the first place, I have noticed on this trip tremendous progress. And I have seen a tremendous amount of new construction and new developments. [Teng spits into his spittoon.] So I think your initiatives have been quite successful. We of course compliment you and your people for the progress that has been made. It is very evident to someone who has been away for three years and comes back.

Teng: Still not very great. We still have a lot of work ahead of us. For instance, in agriculture we are only barely sufficient in food. And on the average we only have the per capita of output of food grain of only 335 kilograms. It can only be said that that is barely sufficient. We have only barely sufficient food and clothing.

So now the whole country is trying to learn from Tachai agriculture. This means that whole counties are trying to learn from the standards adopted in Sian county, where Tachai is. And if only one-third of the counties of the nation are able to do as well as they have done, that would make a great difference. And if, say, 200 million of our population would have been able to learn from Tachai and do as well as they do—on the average section they are doing 250 kilograms per person—then these 200 million people should be able to produce something around 50 million tons.

That is commercial grain that they now produce. That is excluding what they use for their own purposes. If they are able to increase a bit over that, that will be something around 60 or 70 million tons.

What we are concerned about in our country, first of all, is agriculture, because we have a population of 800 million and first of all they have to eat. And food and clothing and the things that we use mainly come from agriculture. So it seems that there is hope.

President: It is very obvious that you are doing far better than the Soviet Union in meeting the needs of your people for food as well as clothing, particularly food. That is a great achievement.

Teng: But there is still quite a lot to do. To achieve the standard, or just to get close to the standard of the West in various fields, will take years, at least 50 years. That is speaking of the overall situation. But if you cut it down to the income per capita, then it will take more than 50 years.

President: When I was here in 1972, in a meeting with the Foreign Minister, we talked bout the mechanization of agriculture in the United States, and he indicated that you were moving forward to further mechanize. And I noticed in the exhibition concerning agriculture there has been great progress in agricultural mechanization, irrigation and all of the modern methods of increasing the productivity of the soil. Over-

coming the problems of floods on the one hand and drought on the other. A very impressive demonstration.

Teng: But mechanization alone will not be able to solve our problems. We also have to till the land scientifically and intensively. In this aspect we are different from your country, because in our country 7½ people share 1 hectare of cultivated land. You have wide and vast cultivated lands.

President: You should come and see our agricultural lands, Mr. Vice Premier.

Teng: Maybe I will have the chance in the future. It would be quite interesting.

But I do not think your methods in agriculture would be entirely applied to ours. In some typical places in the South, on one plot we would grow seven different crops.

President: Seven, one after the other? Or mixed?

Teng: Seven times in rotation. That is, before the first one is harvested, you sow in the second, between the rows.

President: We are trying to integrate, in some areas of the United States, fruit, and put in the rows between the trees another crop. And it is developing very successfully. We have been trying to diversify crops for the farmers so that he will not depend solely on fruit, and can have another crop that will bolster their income.

Teng: Your agriculture has been doing very well.

President: I can see the Vice Premier has a deep interest in and a deep knowledge of agriculture.

Teng: Once, during wartime, I was for a long time in the countryside, and therefore I have some feeling for the land. I am also familiar with it, to a certain extent.

President: Mr. Vice Premier, our Ambassador is leaving, as you know.[3] He is a very close colleague and close personal friend of mine, and has been for many years. When he comes back to the United States he will be very capable and effective and very helpful in explaining to the American people the relationship that we have and the importance of that relationship. I can assure you that his successor will be an equally capable and high-level individual and a person in whom I have the greatest personal confidence and trust as I have had with Ambassador Bush.

Teng: You have given him a post that is not considered to be very good. [Laughter]

Bush: You're talking like my wife, Mr. Vice Premier. [Laughter]

---

[3] Bush left Beijing on December 7.

Teng: But it won't matter so very much. If you deal with it correctly, it might not be of such great harm.

President: Mr. Vice Premier, it is a post of great importance in the United States, and I picked him because I know that he has great competence and great abilities. It will be a sacrifice for him because he has enjoyed very greatly his opportunity to be in your country. But for handling a very difficult job I wanted the best person that I could find.

Teng: So perhaps I was impolite in interfering in your internal affairs. [Laughter]

So do you think we can call it a day now? Thank you very much for coming.

President: And thank you for giving us the opportunity to be here.

[The meeting ended.]